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Preface
The UCL Press FRINGE series presents work related to the themes of the 
UCL FRINGE Centre for the Study of Social and Cultural Complexity.
The FRINGE series is a platform for cross-disciplinary analysis and 
the development of ‘area studies without borders’. FRINGE is an acronym 
standing for Fluidity, Resistance, Invisibility, Neutrality, Grey zones, and 
Elusiveness – categories fundamental to the themes that the Centre 
supports. The oxymoron in the notion of a ‘FRINGE Centre’ expresses our 
interest in both the tensions between ‘area studies’ and more traditional 
academic disciplines and the social, political, and cultural trajectories 
from ‘centres to fringes’ – and inversely from ‘fringes to centres’.
The series pursues an innovative understanding of the significance of 
fringes: rather than taking ‘fringe areas’ to designate the world’s peripheries 
or non-mainstream subject matters (as in ‘fringe politics’ or ‘fringe theatre’), 
we are committed to exploring the patterns of social and cultural complexity 
characteristic of fringes and emerging from the areas we research. We aim 
to develop forms of analysis of those elements of complexity that are 
resistant to articulation, visualization, or measurement.
We are delighted to present this monograph by Marlene Laruelle, 
which focuses on a region of the world conventionally deemed peripheral, 
located as it is in a geopolitical space dominated by Russia, China and 
Iran. By engaging in a cross-country analysis of four Central Asian states 
– Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan – Laruelle examines 
themes of nationhood, ideology, and religion emerging in these post-
imperial states.
The book questions the West-centric understanding of ‘fringes’ and 
promotes Central Asia as an experimental ground to explore notions of 
hybridity of political regimes, geopolitical positioning, and national 
construction. The region is revealed as simultaneously globalized 
and composed of sovereign nation-states. In a wider sense, Laruelle 
contributes to the growing literature on Huntington’s idea of the ‘rise of 
the rest’. This ‘rising powers’ perspective is fascinating because these 
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Central Asian regimes model themselves on both Putin’s Russia and the 
Asian ‘tigers’ and ‘dragons’, experimenting with ideas of authoritarian 
modernization. At the same time, they rely on legitimacy mechanisms 
that have been given an Islamic framing, similar to those found in some 
Middle Eastern countries.
In the ethos of the FRINGE series, this study takes a multidisciplinary 
approach combining political science, intellectual history, sociology and 
cultural anthropology.
Alena Ledeneva and Peter Zusi, 
School of Slavonic and East European Studies, UCL
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Introduction: Central peripheries
Central peripheries. With that term, this book hopes to capture one of 
Central Asia’s many paradoxes: its identity as both centre and periphery.
Geographically, of course, the region is central: it is one of the most 
landlocked spaces in the world, far from any ocean. Double-landlocked 
Uzbekistan is its most central state, while Urumqi, the capital of the 
Uyghur Xinjiang region in China, holds the record for the big city that is 
furthest from any ocean. Historically, too, Central Asia has been central: 
from centuries before the Common Era up until the sixteenth century, the 
region was a key venue for world products, ideas and people to be traded, 
exchanged and enriched. It pioneered irrigation techniques (the qanat, a 
network of underground canals that transport water from highland 
aquifers to the surface) and mastered metallurgical arts (the famous 
Scythian silver and gold craftmanship). During the Abbasid Caliphate, it 
became a key Islamic centre and, a few centuries later, one of the core 
pieces of the Mongol Empire. In recent years, the new Central Asian states 
have deployed the language of the international community to emphasize 
their centrality: they position themselves at the ‘crossroads’ of East and 
West; favour rhetorical tools such as ‘Eurasianism’ or ‘New Silk Road’; 
promote transcontinental trade and newspeak about shared prosperity; 
and have worked hard to belong simultaneously to European, Asian and 
Islamic international cultural and financial institutions.
At the same time, however, Central Asia also has significant 
experience of being a periphery. It was a remote corner of the Persian-
speaking world in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries; a borderland 
of the Chinese, Russian and British empires in the nineteenth century; 
and a cul-de-sac of the Soviet Union during the Cold War decades. Today, 
it is often described in Western media as the backyard of both Putin’s 
Russia and Xi’s China, sandwiched between two neighbours with global 
aspirations.
Central Asia’s ambivalent status as both a centre and a periphery is 
paralleled by two contradictory conventional narratives about the region’s 
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place on the international scene: Central Asia as the centre of the 
geopolitical tensions of the post-Cold War world, where Washington, 
Moscow and Beijing compete for influence and display their muscles 
against each other, versus Central Asia as the epigone of our world, a 
remote region that is the least connected to global transportation 
infrastructure and has almost no agency over its own destiny. This binary 
reflects a Western-centric view of the world that magnifies the great 
powers, articulates normative ideas about where countries ‘fit’ on ladders 
of development, and seeks to rank states’ governance.1
Central Asia’s post-postmodernism
To cope with these ambivalences, Western analysts and scholars have 
been exploring the notion of hybridity. Central Asian political regimes are 
indeed hybrid in the sense that they combine features of authoritarianism, 
patronalism and nepotism, on one hand, with a belief in democratic 
representation and a technocratic, rational elite, on the other. Central 
Asia’s state-building takes a similarly diverse, ‘all-you-can-eat buffet’ 
approach: it combines concepts from Soviet-era Marxist-Leninist theories, 
the admiration for Europe as the continent of the nation-state par 
excellence, borrowings from Asian ‘tigers’ and ‘dragons’ that promote 
authoritarian modernization, and legitimacy mechanisms shaped by an 
Islamic repertoire. Yet the notion of hybridity remains normative: it 
frames situations that do not fit the conventional typologies by defining 
them as ‘in-between’ without challenging the existence of conceptual 
binaries themselves.2
Here, I prefer to see Central Asia as a typical example of post- 
postmodernism. Post-postmodernism rejects postmodernism’s relativist 
paradigm, instead assuming a neo-realist view of the world and of human 
interactions.3 At the level of nationhood and international affairs, 
post-postmodernism questions postmodernism’s cosmopolitanism, 
as well as its belief in the abolition of boundaries and the ‘death of 
the nation’.
Although relative latecomers on the international scene, the Central 
Asian states see themselves as globalized: they engage with as many 
multilateral institutions as possible; their internationalized elites use 
their skills and knowledge of the world to travel and study abroad, and to 
offshore national wealth; and millions of their citizens work abroad as 
migrants, creating remittances-to-GDP ratios that are among the highest 
in the world as well as transforming religious belonging and inaugurating 
introduCtion: CentraL PeriPheries 3
new trans-spatial practices – what Rustamjon Urinboyev has nicely coined 
‘smartphone transnationalism’.4
And yet in spite of – or perhaps precisely because of – this, the 
Central Asian states still hold a very classical vision of the nation-state, 
one that is founded on the archetypal elements (constructed and 
reconstructed) of national language, national heroes and dynasties, 
and ‘ethnic’ cultural products or folklore that are honoured as having 
survived centuries of oppression or the erasure of the nation. Their 
unabashed celebration of very classical nationhoods built on postmodern 
premises challenges the Western view of nationalism as a dying ideology 
that ought to have been transcended by post-national cosmopolitanism.5
Inspired by an Herderian vision of nationalism emanating from 
Central and Eastern Europe, Central Asian nation-makers believe 
that nationalism – in the sense of the construction of the state and the 
promotion of a national identity – is the path to universalism and, today, 
integration into and recognition by the international community. They 
read the term ‘concert of nations’ literally. The choice is not between a 
backward-looking national identification and a postmodern globalism: 
the two coexist, on their own terms. Central Asia’s nationhood trajectory 
thus shows the ability of peripheral states and latecomer nations to re- 
appropriate and question Western ideological productions. It encapsu-
lates the tension inherent in a large part of today’s world, in which 
countries seek to be both postmodern in their eclecticism and traditional 
in their values. Central Asian elite thus feel at ease with the current rise 
of illiberal movements across the globe and the latter’s insistence on 
recreating political, economic and cultural boundaries; they consider 
nationalism to be a tool for gaining agency in the world.
How can a post-postmodern nationhood be built in light of such 
contrasts? How can Central Asia’s peripherality be diluted (at least 
rhetorically) and its centrality insisted upon? How can a usable past be 
scripted and taught to the population? As with any other nationhood, the 
answer is to highlight some historical moments; obscure or silence others; 
and compress time, almost glossing over some centuries while engaging 
with others in detail and at length. As Ernest Renan famously declared, 
to exist, a nation has to remember together, but also forget together.6
In the crafting of Central Asian nationhoods, many other paradoxes 
also have to be taken into account. First, nationhood must promote the 
nation’s ethnic continuity and its autochthonism on its contemporary 
territory by essentializing ethnic features, rediscovering a golden age and 
reinventing national heroes. But in the process, it must confront a long 
tradition of mobility – from nomadism and transhumance to more recent 
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population displacements and labour migrations – that is difficult to 
integrate into a linear and uniform narrative of history.
Second, nationhood must combine ethnic and civic senses of 
belonging, managing to promote inclusivity while simultaneously 
deploying exclusion mechanisms that favour the titular group.7 That is, it 
must create a civic nation whose cultural features are heavily borrowed 
from the ethnic majority. All the Central Asian states have maintained the 
Soviet distinction between nationality and citizenship – a dichotomy that 
was not problematic in the Soviet era, when the ethnic nation was a 
local nation, but now makes it difficult to determine who is a legitimate 
part of the polity.
Last but not least, nationhood must insist on historical continuity in 
the face of innumerable political and cultural ruptures that have dis-
rupted collective memory, particularly in the twentieth century. The old 
elites, associated with the colonial Ancien Régime, were largely destroyed 
by the violence of the Russian civil war and the arrival of the Soviet 
regime. The new generations, who were educated in the early twentieth 
century and largely rallied around the Bolshevik regime – the Jadids, 
national-communists, and so on – were purged at the end of the 1930s. 
Nomadic societies were the most fundamentally transformed by the 
Soviet policy of violent sedentarization and collectivization. In this 
process, one-third of the Kazakh population died and another third fled 
abroad – meaning that the new Kazakh nation that emerged in the 1940s 
and 1950s was built on only one-third of the original population. The 
Second World War killed about 1.5 million Central Asians and heavily 
impacted the social fabric. It was not until the second half of the twentieth 
century that more stable intergenerational transmission began to take 
place, helping to steady the collective memory process. To a lesser extent, 
the 1990s inaugurated another loss of memory: millions of people 
left the region, especially ethnic minorities with higher-than-average 
skills and knowledge; millions of people changed jobs and left Soviet 
public service for the private sector; and in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, 
the alphabet shift and the obliteration of Soviet-era national literature 
created new impediments to knowledge transmission.
As everywhere in the world, crafting a coherent narrative that can 
be learned and internalized requires taking some liberties with the 
historical truth, as the past is often resistant to efforts to compress it into 
simplifying teleological frames.8 But perhaps more importantly, Central 
Asian nation-makers found themselves in an ambivalent post-imperial 
situation. Should they interpret Soviet rule as a form of colonialism? The 
discursive line taken on this sensitive topic directly affects whether 
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the nation is presented as an agent of its own past or as the disempowered 
object of victimization. What Talal Asad calls the ‘irrevocable trans- 
mutations’9 caused by Western colonial rule have been especially 
transformative in Central Asia, as the Soviet Union invested a huge 
amount of both state violence and human capital into dramatically 
reshaping the social fabric of Soviet nations.
Finding the right equilibrium between agency and victimhood is 
challenging. Unlike Ukraine or the Baltic states, the Central Asian 
countries cannot refer to numerous, clearly identifiable figures and 
groups that fought for independence, nor to the existence of a modern 
independent state that was temporarily incorporated into the Soviet 
Union.10 A victimhood narrative increases the danger of ‘Orientalizing’ 
Central Asia as a backward region whose populations were unable to 
stand up for themselves and to take advantage of the opportunities of the 
Soviet regime while coping with its limits. How can today’s Central Asian 
states acknowledge that their Soviet-era citizens had agency, felt 
empowered by Soviet modernizing projects, and embraced many aspects 
of Soviet culture and behavioural norms, yet avoid disavowing the 
independence that these states received – without fighting for it – in 
1991? How can they refrain from framing the Soviet decades as a foreign 
imposition and instead recognize this era as an internalized transformation 
that gave agency to local societies and can be re-appropriated today with 
a critical perspective?
Nationhood as a commonsensical mythmaking process
Theories about the creation of nations have long been divided between 
two main schools: primordialism, which sees nations as enduring entities 
with essentialist features, and constructivism, which sees the nation as a 
top-down modern social construct process initiated by state elites. A third 
school, ethno-symbolism, has tried to move away from this dichotomy 
by arguing that although nations are indeed a modern construct, they 
are built upon pre-existing cultural and ethnic roots that are then 
reinterpreted in this new context.11
Central Asia offers a fascinating case study of this multi-layered 
construction, in which ancient roots and contemporary statecraft merge 
to advance what authorities hope is a consensual narrative.12 National 
history is apprehended as a teleological process whose natural and only 
output is today’s statehood: nationhood requires a ‘usable’ past that can 
be deployed to respond to contemporary political and cultural challenges. 
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Yet a longue durée perspective should not be ruled out merely because 
nationhood is constructed: although obviously transformed by the 
massive socioeconomic and cultural changes of the Soviet era and 
reinterpreted through a new set of values, some roots have persisted, 
including in societal structures, family genealogies, spatial representations 
and individuals’ relationship to the natural environment.13
Here, I interpret nationhood as a symbolic construction that not 
only requires political and social preconditions, as explored by Eric 
Hobsbawm, Rogers Brubaker and Ernest Gellner,14 but that also engages 
cultural, religious, historical and geographical myth-making, as proposed 
by Benedict Anderson, Anthony Smith and Michael Billig.15 I follow, for 
instance, Anthony Smith’s definition of nationhood as ‘an amalgam 
of selective historical truth and idealization, with varying degrees of 
documented fact and political myth’.16 Nationhood should be understood 
as offering a grid of intelligibility that makes it possible to navigate the 
complexity of social relations, promoting a reified past and making it 
commonsensical through schooling, museification, mass communication, 
changes in urban space, sport celebrations, and so on.17
Nationhood aims to define cultural normality, which helps 
individuals in their search for answers to the ‘big questions’. It is not only, 
as mordantly formulated by Karl Deutsch, ‘a group of persons united 
by a common error about their ancestry and a common dislike of their 
neighbors’,18 but a necessary in-group logic to decide who belongs to the 
citizenry and who is excluded, and on which grounds individuals will be 
willing to share with and sometimes sacrifice themselves for the collective. 
It is, in essence, a boundary-making enterprise that defines who is ‘us’ 
and who is outside the group. Thus, even in so-called well-established 
democracies, nation is always a space of conflict:19 it advances compelling 
visions of identity, history and the place of religion, and it shapes everyday 
practices through which citizens adapt the national metanarrative to 
their individual realities.
As a scholarly object, nationhood in Central Asia has been framed 
through Rogers Brubaker’s seminal concept of ‘nationalizing states’: the 
state projects itself as an ethnocultural entity in which symbolic 
production identifies with the titular majority.20 This feature is far from a 
specificity of Eastern Europe and Eurasia: all states, including established 
democracies with a strong civic identity like France, are based on an 
ethnic core that is supposed to accommodate, assimilate and acculturate 
other groups.21 In the Central Asian case, the five states claim, to different 
degrees, an intrinsic relationship with the titular ethnic group, and even 
in those which emphasize supranational civic belonging such as 
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Kazakhstan, the pre-eminence of the ethnic core is openly expressed. A 
process of self-ethnicization, as well as an obsession with ‘counting’ who 
belongs to the in-group, therefore accompanies nationhood.22
While this ethnic core nation dominates, some other components of 
the national toolkit, such as religion, are more challenging to articulate. 
Inherited Soviet atheism, an authoritarian definition of secularism, and the 
fear of ideological competition from Islam(ism) has made Central Asian 
nation-makers suspicious of Islam: while celebrated as a national heritage 
and a moral grounding, it remains repressed or at least marginalized as an 
identity marker.23 In many respects, Islam is treated as the main ‘internal 
other’ of Central Asia’s nationhood, the main unspoken subtext.24
Although attempts have been made to adapt national biographies to 
post-independence conditions, nationhood remains deeply moulded by 
the Soviet legacy. Today’s Central Asia nationhoods have exchanged one 
ideological constraint – the Marxist-Leninist reading of history – for 
another – the mandatory celebration of independence as the natural 
development and final stage in the history of a titular ethnic group. The 
new nationhood has preserved the former’s teleological understanding of 
history, treating the nation’s history as a linear progression across 
centuries and even millennia, but whereas this progression used to be 
toward communism, it is now toward independence.
Another constraint on Central Asian nationhoods, the paucity of 
local sources able to articulate local perspectives on some of the key 
moments of national history,25 has even deeper roots. This problem is 
especially acute in the case of countries with a nomadic past, such as 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan, where knowledge and 
memory were oral and are therefore partly – though not yet entirely – lost 
to us. Kazakhstan’s state-sponsored ‘Cultural Heritage’ programme 
(2004–11), which focused on collecting external sources related to the 
country’s history from around the world,26 epitomized the desire of the 
authorities to reclaim the nation’s narrative and insert local voices into 
the mostly externally-framed narratives that have prevailed to date.
The notion that one can access post-Soviet modernity through 
the revival of traditions is a prevalent frame of thinking in the region, with 
the result that reinventing traditions is perceived as a sign of modernization. 
This overlap between modernization and re-traditionalization explains 
the fascination of many Central Asian political and intellectual circles 
with Japan, South Korea or Singapore: seen as having succeeded in 
modernizing without westernizing or Europeanizing, these countries are 
considered by many to be a model to follow. But the Central Asian 
countries’ efforts to achieve the lauded balance between modernization 
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or globalization, on the one hand, and ‘rootedness’ or cultural 
preservation, on the other, remain fragile, nurturing resentment and 
disillusionment and providing fertile soil, fed by conspiracy theories, for 
feelings of a nationhood under attack.
Nationalism as a technology of power
Nationhood also serves to legitimate or naturalize a given configuration 
of political authority. In Central Asia, national biographies are closely 
interlinked with state-building. The interaction between nationhood and 
statehood, and therefore between the ideology of the nation, on one side, 
and power relations and the nature of the political regime, on the other, 
is intense.27 Each nationhood project is essentially statist: it believes in the 
state as the quintessence of the nation. With the partial exception of 
Kyrgyzstan, nationhood narratives are produced under authoritarian 
state structures, which see themselves as having a duty to be involved in 
crafting the national narrative in order to secure the state, the nation and 
the political status quo – though as synonyms.
As Soviet authorities, the national elites of independent Central 
Asia think of themselves as nation-makers: they have devoted an 
impressive amount of resources – human, administrative and financial – 
to elaborating and popularizing a new nationhood. As Asel Murzakulova 
and John Schoeberlein explain, ‘political authorities, large segments of 
intellectual circles, and the population share the assumption that a 
national ideology is a critical element of statehood that contributes to 
guaranteeing social order.’28 While the national construction starts as a 
top-down project, it aims to secure the governmentality of the regime, in 
the Foucauldian sense: the authorities can reign only if the population 
internalizes power relations. To justify their domination, the authorities 
need popular consent to domination, even in an authoritarian context.
Nationalism thus serves as a technology of power. The authorities 
attempt to mitigate their authoritarianism and limit the use of repressive 
tools by being the agenda-setter and preventing ideological contestation.29 
Regime security now hinges on nationhood, which drives consensus and 
makes it possible to surmount political divisions: the authorities rely on 
performative non-democratic mechanisms that not only saturate the 
public space with imaginaries of nation/statehood, but also involve 
citizens, individually and collectively, in joint performances.
Too often, studies of Central Asian regimes look only at their 
authoritarian features, neglecting their nationhood strategies. Yet the 
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latter show a more consensual form of governance, one that has succeeded 
in developing co-creational mechanisms that help make the current 
political order appear natural. In that sense, the Central Asian regimes are 
national-populist: they think the national collective is a direct subject of 
history and they use and abuse references to the nation and its supposed 
unified will to circumvent representative mechanisms such as elections or 
institutionalized political pluralism.30
As the proverb goes, the past tells us, above all, about the present. 
Jan Assmann explains that memory is important not for its factuality but 
for its actuality.31 The regimes’ use of the national past is a way to exit 
politics and artificially boost popular unity: today’s political path cannot 
be questioned, as it results from the objective trajectory of the nation 
along a unique path on which there are no possible alternative routes. 
This obsession with the past goes hand-in-hand with a strong aspirational 
identity: with Kazakhstan initiating the trend, the region’s states project 
a modern, globalized statehood based on a developmentalist ideology.32 
With this dual focus – national/ethnic when looking backward, 
developmentalist when looking forward – the authorities hope to promote 
a depoliticized narrative that is not open to contestation. This ideology 
can be policed to a greater or lesser degree – loosely in Kyrgyzstan, tightly 
in Turkmenistan – depending on the regime’s degree of authoritarianism.
Often described through a normative Western lens as stagnant, 
rigid or even immobile, the Central Asian states have in fact made 
inventive use of the largest possible array of tools for performing 
the nation. They did not stop at rewriting official historiography, 
school textbooks and museology, all of which serve as the state’s 
representatives in educational affairs. Instead, they invested in 
innumerable other ways to convey the new national message to the 
population as a whole. Chief among these have been changes to the urban 
landscape, from modifying toponymy and creating new statuary to 
erecting new buildings and even creating new cities. In sum, the Central 
Asian states have used an impressive range of ideological materials to 
represent the nation publicly and to craft a new ideological script. They 
have excelled in symbolic politics.33
The book
With all this in mind, the present book aims to offer the reader a 
comprehensive look at nation-building in post-Soviet Central Asia (with 
the exception of Turkmenistan), taking into consideration the ways in 
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which the Soviet past has influenced the construction of national 
storylines, as well as the diversity of each state’s narratives and use of 
symbolic politics.
The book is based on the principle that only multidisciplinarity can 
help us to untangle the puzzle of nationhood. It therefore uses mixed 
methods, combining political science, intellectual history, sociology and 
cultural anthropology. Even if the book focuses on official production of 
nationhood, it tries not to leave out the imaginational registers that are 
advanced by non-state actors.34 It has been inspired by more than two 
decades of fieldwork in the region and a deep knowledge of the state of 
local academia and the political environment. Based in Uzbekistan at the 
French Institute for Central Asian Studies (IFEAC) for five years in the late 
1990s and early 2000s, I was able to travel to almost every remote corner 
of the five republics. Since 2005, I have been returning to the region every 
year, mostly to Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, and have come to 
focus on Kazakhstan. This book compiles a series of articles published 
over the course of the 15 years between 2004 and 2019, updating them 
and giving them internal coherence. I am grateful to the journals and 
publishers concerned for authorizing the republication of these chapters.
My knowledge of Russian allows me to read a large number of 
academic publications and to interact with the intellectual elites of each 
country. That being said, I lack access to publications in national 
languages, which limits my capacity to capture that part of the academic 
debate and, more importantly, to engage with folk literature and 
discussions on some segments of social media. To partially compensate 
for this shortcoming, I have worked closely with the new generation of 
Central Asian scholars at the George Washington University’s Central Asia 
Program and oriented the Program to promote research based on 
national-language sources.
The first part of the book offers a broad overview of state-sponsored 
nation-building narratives in the Central Asian region. It first reminds the 
reader that each state’s post-Soviet nationhood is deeply rooted in its 
Soviet past. The conceptual framing of the nation was elaborated in 
the 1940s and 1950s and developed gradually in the academic circles of 
each republic, thus providing the new independent countries with a 
ready-made national teleology. All that remained to be done in the 
independence era was to make an ideological shift that entailed 
reinterpreting the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The key element 
inherited from Soviet times is the concept of ethnogenesis, which justifies 
the supposed uninterrupted ethnic continuity of the nation over the 
centuries (Chapter 1).
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Moving to the post-Soviet period, the first part of the book looks at 
three case studies – Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan – and explores 
their different trajectories for writing the biography of the nation. 
Uzbekistan under Islam Karimov succeeded in developing a nationhood 
intimately articulated with regime securitization and centred on the 
historical continuity of the nation since ancient times and its centrality in 
Central Asia (Chapter 2). Tajikistan, too, attempted to develop a unifying 
narrative that would overcome the deep divisions of the civil war, in its 
case by exalting its Aryan identity. Such an identity allows Tajikistan to 
set itself apart from its Turkic neighbours and avoid giving Islam too 
prominent a place in the national construction (Chapter 3).
Reflecting its plural and decentralized political life, nationhood in 
Kyrgyzstan has remained quite uncertain and chaotic, advancing a 
multitude of competing narratives. Even if the state has tried to put 
forward a unifying discursive line, the more universal narrative is 
increasingly that of a nation whose sovereignty is under threat from 
multiple enemies. A multiplicity of competing narratives on the nation 
have challenged the state’s and academia’s traditional legitimacy as 
nation-makers (Chapter 4). The final chapter of the first part of the book 
turns to alternative conceptions of the nation, looking at the example 
of Tengrism, a revivalist religious movement that combines ethno- 
nationalism, pan-Turkism and the rejection of Islam. While agreeing with 
the authorities on the need for more centralized and authoritarian forms 
of power, Tengrism positions itself somewhat in opposition to the official 
line (Chapter 5).
The second part of the book focuses exclusively on Kazakhstan. It 
takes a more comprehensive look at different components of Kazakhstan’s 
nation-building process, seeing the nation-building arena as a contested 
space where different agents seek to promote their own visions of 
the nation. It first addresses the three paradigms elaborated by state 
authorities about the country’s identity: Kazakhness, Kazakhstanness, 
and what I call transnationalism (Chapter 6). It then delves more deeply 
into Kazakhstani authorities’ Eurasian profession of faith, exploring a vast 
array of narratives that include everything from Olzhas Suleimenov’s new 
philosophy of language to elites’ pragmatic, foreign policy-oriented 
strategies to brand Kazakhstan’s place in Eurasia and Asia more globally 
(Chapter 7).
The book then moves from state narratives to more diverse spaces 
where the nation is discussed. It does this first by looking at television – a 
nation-building tool that is curiously understudied in the Central Asian 
context. On Kazakhstani TV, documentary films using state-backed 
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discourses of the nation compete with more innovative discourses crafted 
by private actors who aim to perform the nation in a way that I define as 
patriotic entertainment (Chapter 8). Second, the book turns to look at the 
crucial and growing role of the nationalist landscape, which, although 
marginalized for two decades by the Nazarbayev regime, has seen an 
impressively rapid renaissance in recent years. A new generation 
of nationalist publicists in the social media world now promote 
anticolonial discourses targeting Russia (Chapter 9). Last but not least, 
the book explores the identity patterns of what I call the Nazarbayev 
Generation – the millennials and members of Generation Z born under 
the first president. They display the features that will characterize Kazakh 
identity in the coming decades: a vivid debate between a cosmopolitan 
identity and an inward-looking vision of Kazakhness, as well as over the 
definition of national authenticity, re-traditionalizing gender roles and 
the place of Islam in the national pantheon (Chapter 10).
The conclusion explores other forms of national biography: 
non-textual biographies sponsored by the state and biographies 
promoted outside of any forms of state control (such as collective and 
family memory, popular history developed by non-professional historians 
and alternative history brandished by the political opposition). It 
concludes by stating that we are now witnessing a gradual shift toward a 
new historiographical landscape in Central Asia – a more plural, less 
consensual, less state-centric one that features increased co-creational 
mechanisms.
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1
The longue durée of national 
storytelling: Soviet roots and  
the quest for ethnogenesis
The Soviet period both continued and discontinued the late tsarist 
regime’s nationalities policy and its definition of ethnicity.1 Though some 
elements of the prior regime were maintained – in particular, a public 
policy of assigning national identity to individuals and the confounding 
of social class and ethnic hierarchies – techniques of population control 
in the name of scientific knowledge took on unprecedented scope 
with the officialization of Marxist-Leninist science. The Soviet regime 
elaborated a new nationality paradigm that combined territorial 
anchorage (rights were attributed to a group on its historical territory) 
with historicism (the nation had to have existed since ancient times to be 
legitimate).2 National assignment was not only collective but also 
individual: it affected the legal rights of each citizen by partially 
determining his or her course through society. Citizens identified as 
members of ‘punished peoples’ (Chechens, Crimean Tatars, Volga 
Germans and so on) or as Jews faced a more complex – and more 
frequently tragic  – trajectory through the Soviet system. This stratification 
has had a long-term impact on society: thirty years after its disappearance, 
the Soviet system of territorial and collective identification continues to 
shape many ethnic claims and territorial tensions.
Hierarchized pluralism and the assignment of identities
For Marxism, the national question was secondary to the class one, as 
nation was a product of the bourgeoisie and therefore destined to 
disappear with it. That being said, some intellectual currents, such as 
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Austro-Marxism, which germinated in a Habsburg Empire in which the 
national question was highly sensitive, insisted on the idea of 
institutionalizing individual cultural autonomy.3 As early as the start 
of the 1920s, however, Stalin rejected the Austro-Marxist principle of 
extra-territorial individual cultural autonomy advocated by Otto Bauer 
and Karl Renner, condemning it for its petit-bourgeois individualism.4 He 
gave preference instead to a territorial definition of identities that was 
closer to the tsarist vision of ethnic groups. This approach necessitated 
not only objectivizing historical, cultural and administrative markers, but 
also collectivizing rights: the individual was endowed with rights only 
because he was a member of a larger group.
Stalin defined the nation as ‘a stable, historically constituted 
community of language, of territory, of economic life and of psychic 
formation, which translates into a community of culture’.5 Territory thus 
became the guarantee of the indigeneity of the people, with language and 
‘psychic formation’ enabling an essentialist and naturalist reading of the 
community. The expression ‘historically constituted’ emphasized that 
the Marxist timeline was the sole possible mode of interpreting national 
identity through time.
In order to rally the minorities of the tsarist empire behind the 
revolutionary cause, Lenin transformed Russia into the Russian Soviet 
Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR) and promised a large degree of 
autonomy to all national groups. On 30 December 1922, the Soviet Union, 
which then encompassed four republics – the RSFSR, Ukraine, Byelorussia 
and Transcaucasia – was born. The Twelfth Congress of the Bolshevik 
Party, held in 1923, hierarchized nationalities based on territory as the 
primary marker of identity: some nationalities were endowed with a 
federated republic, while others were given an autonomous republic or 
an autonomous district, or merely the right to schooling in their national 
language in regions where they enjoyed high population density.
The Soviet federal system was structured in stages. In 1924, Moscow 
granted Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, then part of the Autonomous 
Republic of Turkestan, the status of federated republic. In 1929, it 
promoted Tajikistan from the status of an autonomous republic within 
Uzbekistan to that of a federal republic. Then, in 1936, it separated 
Kazakhia and Kirgizia from the RSFSR; both then acceded to the coveted 
federal status.6 With that, the five republics of Central Asia were born, 
and since then they have faced only very minor adjustments to the 
delimitation of their borders: a few small territories were exchanged in 
the 1950s, while the most recent external border delimitations, which 
were more polemical, were signed with China in the 1990s–2000s. 
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In contrast to the South Caucasus, which remains mired in territorial 
conflicts that threaten state sovereignty, national identity-related issues 
in Central Asia are rarely linked to territorial status.
Officially, the borders of the republics were drawn according to 
ethnic identity. In practice, this was often hardly pertinent. Many 
populations did not claim any externally assigned identity, tending 
instead to describe themselves as being ‘from here’ or as ‘peasants’ when 
they wanted to distinguish themselves from townspeople or as ‘Muslims’ 
when they sought to distinguish themselves from the Russian colonists. 
Seeking to rationalize the use of land, the authorities introduced 
economic rationales into their administrative divisions. As Juliette Cadiot 
rightly remarks, ‘this topographical conception of nationality was linked 
to a project of land settlement’.7 Two scientific rationales, ethnographical 
and economic, thus confronted each other. These rationales were put 
forward by two sets of institutions. On one side was the People’s 
Commissariat of Nationalities and the Commission for the Study of the 
Ethnic Composition of Russia’s Population, which both sought to foster 
the small peoples against the Russians and to put an end to the tsarist-era 
processes of assimilation, in particular Russian agricultural colonization. 
On the other side stood the Regionalization Commission of Gosplan (the 
State Planning Committee), which promoted a model of modernization-
by-colonization and saw economics as a way to bring civilization to 
‘backward’ peoples.8
The distribution of arable lands, waterways, factories and extant 
industries – but also of sites of memory – made border division a rather 
delicate task. But contrary to the widespread idea that Stalin himself drew 
borders in order to better ‘divide and rule’, indigenous elites in each 
republic were closely associated with territorial division. Their multiple 
conflicts found echoes in the Bolshevik leadership structures: border 
delimitations were in large part decided on the basis of local power 
relations between political groups, nationalities and regions – and indeed 
the personal interests of local leaders. The Tajik elites, for example, 
clamoured for Bukhara, Samarkand and part of Surkhandaria to be given 
to the Tajik republic, while the Tashkent elites maintained the ‘Uzbekness’ 
of these regions and organized a lobby in Moscow to advocate for the 
Uzbek republic to keep them.9 Some Uzbek leaders from the Fergana 
Valley wanted their natal villages to be attached to Uzbekistan and 
not to Kirgizia – something they achieved by creating territorial exclaves 
that continue to cause tensions in the bilateral relationships between 
Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan and between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to 
this day.10
CENTRAL PERIPHERIES20
Nor did the populations stand passively by and watch the carving- 
up of their territories. The communities organized themselves to make 
their issues heard over sections of land, valley slopes, waterways and 
transhumance territories. Some villages made collective requests to 
change their identity so that they could be incorporated into a 
neighbouring republic or obtain certain advantages: nationalities 
regarded as sedentary, for instance, had a right to arable lands at the 
expense of those that were not. After the 1924 Commission of National 
Delimitation for Central Asia, several villages of the Uzbek republic 
declared themselves Kazakhs and denounced the repression of their 
identity by the centre; the countervailing phenomenon emerged in the 
Kazakh republic.11 The claim that border zoning was a matter of Stalin’s 
personal choice is thus an historical oversimplification that denies 
individual and collective agency within the system.
In parallel with the territorial delimitation of the republics, the 
Soviet regime established a nationality policy based on assigning an 
ethnic identification to every citizen and typologizing rights in accordance 
with that identification. Immediately after the end of the civil war, the 
Bolshevik authorities commissioned large ethnological surveys across 
the entire country, even though the economic situation was extremely 
challenging and some territories were still facing sporadic revolts. The 
objective was to map national diversity with the utmost precision. In 
counting the number of existing ethnic groups, the political authorities 
and the ethnologists associated with the task took multiple criteria into 
account. Chief among these was language, but given that this was 
imprecise, it was complemented by a study of dialectical differences, the 
consideration of clan differences wherever they existed, and recognition 
of variations in farming culture, folklore and sometimes physical 
anthropological features.
The number of recognized ‘nationalities’ underwent significant 
fluctuations. In the 1920s, when the autonomy of the republics was 
particularly extensive, fragmentation was intense, since the nationalities 
were able to organize themselves at the micro level. With the first Soviet 
census of 1926, the Commission for the Study of the Ethnic Composition 
of Russia’s Population accepted 600 terms of ethnic identification, which 
it classified into 196 recognized nationalities, each endowed with specific 
rights.12 Terminological debates were tense as well: nineteenth-century 
Russian ethnology employed two terms translatable as ‘nationality’, 
namely narodnost’ – a common designation for the Slavic peasantry – for 
the so-called ‘evolved’ peoples and natsional’nost’ for the supposed 
‘backward’ peoples. In the 1920s, this usage reversed when the national 
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republics requested to be classified as natsional’nost’, seeing it as a 
sign of greater cultural and economic evolution. The polemics over 
terminology were particularly virulent in Ukraine and in Byelorussia, 
where to be classified as narodnost’ commonly meant that a people 
would be considered a branch of the Russian populace rather than a 
distinct nation.13
The allocation of identities was not solely a question of territorial 
distribution or hierarchization of national groups, but rather affected 
the individual rights of each citizen. The authorities forced citizens into 
an identity assignment. In the 1920s, the first civil state questionnaire 
forms had included the question of nationality and accepted self-
definitions. However, the regime stipulated that forthwith, an individual’s 
nationality would depend upon the nationalities of his or her parents 
and not on his or her place of birth, a measure intended to prevent 
so-called ‘suspicious’ nationalities from disappearing, particularly Jews 
and Ukrainians, who could identify themselves as Russians if they were 
born on the territory of the RSFSR.14 When passports were introduced in 
1932, the choice of nationality was still left to the citizen, but from 1938 
people had to prove their nationality via documents stipulating the 
nationalities of their parents, and once decided, their designation 
could not be altered.
The coding of identities followed the political fits and starts of the 
regime.15 The famous 1937 census, which was supposed to corroborate 
the transformations of Soviet society in the space of a decade, was 
cancelled by Stalin when it failed to meet his expectations. The data 
provide a glimpse of the impact of collectivization and the famines, in 
particular in Ukraine and Kazakhstan, as well as demonstrating that more 
than 40 per cent of the population continued to declare themselves 
believers in the ‘homeland of atheism’. The 1939 census, carried out after 
the brutal reorganization – through purges – of Soviet statistical circles,16 
was based on a strong evolutionist logic: small ethnic groups were 
ordered to assimilate with a majority nationality as a sign of their 
transition to socialist modernity. Many ethnonyms with religious 
connotations disappeared (including the Kryashens, who were Orthodox 
Tatars), while the Cossacks lost their right to a distinct nationality. 
Meanwhile, priority was given to territorial entities. Thus, the Iranophone 
populations of the Pamirs were considered Tajik, since they lived within 
the Tajik republic;  the Sarts, a term which served to define the city 
dwellers of Turkestan, were encouraged to declare themselves Uzbeks; 
and terms with clannish connotations, such as Kipchak, were eliminated 
in favour of Uzbek. Though the Commission still admitted 800 terms of 
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possible identification, only 106 official nationalities were eventually 
accepted and endowed with rights.17
After many debates between ethnologists and statisticians, between 
republican and federal bodies, between the administrative commissions 
and the party’s decision-making circles, the decision was made to 
hierarchize national identities into three main groups: natsional’nost’, 
narodnost’ and ethnic groups (etnicheskie gruppy). The categorization of 
a given national identity depended largely on its territorial status: the 
first group included those with a federated or autonomous republic; the 
second those with a region or an autonomous district (although some 
densely populated groups without administrative recognition were also 
included in this category); and the third what Moscow referred to as 
national minorities – that is, populations that had a kinstate outside 
Soviet borders and whose loyalty to the Soviet state was viewed with 
suspicion.18
In the 1920s, Soviet rationales privileged a diversity of identifi- 
cations, in particular among small groups, in order to challenge traditional 
collective identities, especially those that were refractory to the Bolshevik 
ideological project. As of the 1930s, identity assignment became more 
restrictive and closely connected to a territorial administrative entity. The 
hierarchization of national groups, the obligatory and exclusive allotment 
of an identity, and the obsession with classification all remained crucial 
drivers of the nationalities policy of the Soviet regime until its collapse. 
As Yuri Slezkine puts it, from the 1930s, ‘all Soviet children inherited 
their nationality at birth, and their individual ethnicities became 
biological categories that were impermeable to cultural, linguistic, or 
geographical change’.19
The science of ethnos or the paradoxes of  
Soviet ethnology
Reprising the imperial tradition, Soviet ethnology was ascribed the 
mission of academically legitimating Soviet nationalities policy.20 This 
occurred through the Institute for the Study of Nationalities of the Soviet 
Union, led by Nikolay Marr (1865–1934), and later the Miklukho-Maklay 
Ethnology Institute, led by Yulian Bromley (1921–90).
Long in search of its object of study, Soviet ethnology had to 
maintain its submission to history, one of the key sciences for Marxism, 
which required that the study of the characteristics of peoples be rooted 
in a temporal reading of their existence.21 The national collectivities 
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were thus studied in time, as an evolutionary process that was spread 
along a common scale divided into very precise stages of development 
(stadial’nost’): tribe (plemia), nationality (narodnost’ or natsional’nost’), 
people (narod) and nation (natsiia). Each corresponded to a historical 
stage of the development of humanity as proposed by Marxist-Leninist 
science: primitive communism, feudalism, capitalism, socialism and 
communism. At the end of the 1930s, the influence of Marr’s theory of 
stages of development, and its claim that migrations have no direct 
impact on the evolution of language,22 contributed to the birth of 
ethnogenetics (etnogenetika), the science of the (historical) genesis 
of ethnic groups.23 Ethnogenetics hailed itself as a discipline that could 
only ‘reach its authentic scientific realization in the Soviet Union, on the 
basis of the theories of Marxism-Leninism and with the aid of progressist 
teachings in the domain of linguistics such as those of Nikolay Marr’.24
Ethnogenesis emerged as Soviet ethnology’s main research object in 
a second context: the ideological confrontation with Nazism. Since the 
eighteenth century, Russian science had sought both to emulate German 
science and, simultaneously, to compete with it. Many Soviet–German 
scientific collaborations were undertaken in the 1920s, but the country’s 
closure under Stalin and Hitler’s rise to power in Germany severed these 
historic links. Whatever the relationship between the two countries, 
however, Soviet scholars had always violently rejected Germanic (German 
as well as Austrian) discourses that considered the peoples of the 
Russian Empire to be too backward on the evolutionary scale to be 
able to develop. They posited instead that humanity is determined by 
socioeconomic conditions, not by innate biological characteristics.25
Soviet science also sought to demonstrate the possibility of a non-
racist science of race (rasovedenie), a science that would study peoples’ 
physiological features and their relationship with nature but without 
making any socio-biological presuppositions: no people would be placed 
on a scale of intrinsic value. One of the most famous Soviet scholars in 
physical anthropology, Georgii F. Debets (1905–69), propounded such a 
view: according to him, bourgeois Western anthropology either developed 
racist theories or denied the links between race and language. Soviet 
science, by contrast, had accurately demonstrated ‘the correspondence 
between anthropological types and linguistic, cultural, and ethnic 
groups’, the study of which correspondence had proved to be ‘the principal 
means for a multifaceted analysis of the processes of ethnogenesis’.26
Interpreting any migrationist theory as denying Soviet peoples’ 
legitimacy, Soviet scholars stood strongly in favour of autochthonous 
theories. They rejected the Germanic discourse on the non-Europeanness 
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of the Slavs, a discourse that placed their cradle in Asia, and claimed the 
East-European plain as the origin of Slavs from the Bronze Age. Aleksandr 
Bernshtam (1910–56), a famous historian of the Kyrgyz, asserted that 
migrationist theories were ‘reactionary’ and derived from bourgeois 
science whose goal was to diminish the Soviet peoples’ place in world 
history.27 Soviet discourse likewise criticized the Western tradition of 
political history for not adequately taking into account the economic 
elements highlighted by Marxism: ‘ethnic history … cannot be reduced 
chiefly to migrations provoked by political events and military 
confrontations. Such an approach could hardly be deemed scientifically 
correct’.28 What was applicable to the Slavs, the main targets of Germanic 
discourses, was then replicated for all the Soviet Union’s nationalities: 
each nationality’s historiography was invited to focus on autochthonism 
and reject migrationist theories.
Physical anthropology accompanied the all-encompassing search 
for ethnogenesis – here, too, following a tsarist tradition.29 According 
to Georgii Debets, Soviet science had accurately demonstrated ‘the 
correspondence of anthropological types with linguistic and ethno- 
graphical groups’.30 In the late 1950s and throughout the decade that 
followed, the Khrushchevian Thaw had a substantial impact on 
ethnological debates, as it encouraged Soviet scholars to introduce more 
biological references into their definitions of ethnic groups. This evolution 
was supported by the new Director of the Ethnology Institute, Yulian 
Bromley, who held his position from 1967 until perestroika. His publi- 
cations on the ethnos as the primary object of Soviet ethnology, based on 
a pre-revolutionary tradition centred on nationality, were in part inspired 
by the works of Sergei Shirokogoroff (1887–1939).31 An ethnologist who 
emigrated to China to flee the 1917 Revolution, Shirokogoroff elaborated 
a general classificatory model of ethnos based on studies conducted on a 
Siberian people, the Tunguz. In his view, ethnos had to serve as a global 
explanatory framework into which both the history of peoples and their 
cultural specificities were integrated. For humankind, the ethnos was 
thus held to be the equivalent of the species.32
Bromley applied the norms of a Marxist reading of history to this 
postulate: the ethnos is a socio-historical phenomenon explicable by the 
forces of production and the social relations that result from it. This 
stance was politically correct for Soviet science; beyond it, however, the 
Bromleyan ethnos was conceived in essentialist terms.33 For even if 
the birth of the ethnos was a historical and not a biological phenomenon, 
once present, ethnic identity became absolute: it passed from one 
generation to the next, imposing itself on individuals who were unable to 
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rebuke it, and it was unable to be combined with other ethnic categories 
or to evolve over time. For example, although the medieval Kievan 
Rus’, the Muscovy principality under the domination of the Mongol 
Horde and the Romanov empire, all belonged to different ‘ethno-social 
organisms’, there allegedly existed a single temporally invariant entity, 
the ‘Russian ethnos’.34 This concept thus made it possible to reconcile the 
evolutionism of Marxist theories with a primordialist conception of 
national identities.
In the 1970s–80s, Soviet ethnology specialized in the study of 
so-called ethnic processes. If some controversial scholars like Lev Gumilev 
(1912–92) were condemned for publicly defending the biological 
character of the ethnos,35 most official works, whether published by the 
publishing house of the Academy of Sciences (Nauka) or by academic 
journals such as Sovetskaia etnografiia, maintained similar discourses. 
Whereas Soviet propaganda advocated friendship between peoples and 
their possible merging into a single Soviet nation, ethnologists were 
investigating the modes of preservation of the supposedly specific ‘genetic 
pool’ (genofond) of each Soviet people. A plethora of works polemicized 
over the divisions in subethnos, set out to investigate whether diasporic 
communities belonged to the ethnikos (for instance, do the Tatars of 
Moscow form a different ethnos to the Tatars of Tatarstan?) and discussed 
the formation of superethnos’ or megaethnos’ (such as, for example, the 
superethnos of Turkic-speaking peoples or Arctic peoples).
Endogamous postulates also broadly dominated Soviet ethnograph-
ical scholarship. Researchers who specialized in studying the peoples of 
the Far North were concerned, for example, with the consequences of 
miscegenation between Siberian peoples and Slavic populations, since 
this was supposed to weaken the genetic capacities of young generations 
born of mixed marriages to withstand the cold.36 Believing in the 
existence of ‘degenerate behaviours’, Soviet science largely referred to 
medical works from the early twentieth century and the first Bolshevik 
years, which were marked by eugenics, even though the term was 
subsequently prohibited as bourgeois. A biological representation of 
heredity made it possible for ethnology to slip from the medical register 
(notably using the salience of the question of alcoholism) toward the 
political and the cultural repertoires.37 In this context, physical anthro- 
pology could easily carve out space for itself. The existence of the nation 
as a physical unity was thus affirmed by producing an amalgam of 
craniological, serological, odontological and dermatological data, as 
well as by using diverse ethnonyms given to the ancient races and to 
contemporary populations interchangeably.
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As Élisabeth Gessat-Anstett has noted, Soviet ethnography 
‘developed a complex theoretical discourse while dispensing with an 
epistemology of its own practice’.38 Founded on solid empirical fieldwork 
research, it combined theories of ethnos and extremely descriptive studies 
of the cultural mosaic of the country. The desire to classify cultural 
differences, in particular in the field of material culture – the byt, or 
everyday life: habitats, customs, handicraft, folklore, rituals – contributed 
to the conceptualization of ethnic groups as reified entities.39 Material 
culture was studied as the expression par excellence of the ‘ethnic 
specificity’ of each people and of its ‘genetic fund’. The naturalness of the 
ethnos could thus be formulated in cultural terms conceived as apolitical 
but whose bedrock was the rejection of the multiplicity of human 
identities. Soviet ethnology therefore ontologized human communities 
by giving ethnos a meaning almost comparable to that of race.
Competing for antiquity: crafting Central Asians’ 
ethnogeneses
Pushing back against Germanic theories about the Asian origins of Slavs, 
Soviet ethnology emphasized the antiquity of Soviet peoples and of their 
ethnogenesis. In 1936, an Ancient History of the Peoples of the USSR 
(Drevniaia istoriia narodov SSSR) was published on the initiative of 
academician Iurii Got’e. The Academy of Sciences decided to pursue this 
initiative further, and, under the leadership of Aleksandr D. Udal’tsov, it 
organized four conferences on ethnogenesis: one on the peoples of the 
Far North in 1940, another on those of Central Asia in 1942, another on 
the Slavs in 1943, and a final one in 1944 that was more specifically 
devoted to the Indo-European question. The conference on Central Asia 
was held in August 1942 in Tashkent and involved some 15 researchers, 
mostly Russians, whose papers were published in summary form in a 
1947 volume of Sovetskaia etnografiia.40 This foundational conference 
established the principles of ethnogenesis for Central Asia: each 
eponymous people was to establish a dynasty of reference and identify a 
chronologically well-defined historical period in which the process of 
the nation’s formation was completed. For maximum prestige value, the 
period should be as ancient as possible.
Reading the papers from the 1942 conference, one cannot help but 
be struck by the insistence of all participants on the issue of inter-ethnic 
miscegenation, on one hand, and on a people’s degree of ‘purity’, on 
the other. Although no value judgment was rendered on the latter 
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question – a more hybrid people was not deemed inferior – the logic of 
autochthonization went beyond territoriality and was associated with 
the notion of ethnic or even racial continuity. As several papers from the 
August 1942 session imply, reconciling the findings from linguistics, 
archaeology and physical anthropology can solve the question of a 
people’s ethnogenesis, as it allows scholars to know whether it the ‘same’ 
people that is being discussed across time. Several conference papers 
pondered the ‘racial type of the natives’ (rasovyi tip aborigenov) in order 
to determine whether the type had been preserved in this or that republic. 
The Soviet authorities’ explicit rejection of Nazi theories and lack of a 
racial policy thus does not mean that racial criteria were absent from the 
academic debates of the time: race was seen as one among many 
legitimate components involved in the crafting of national identities.41
The development of an ethnogenesis theory for each eponymous 
people of Central Asia paralleled the institutionalization of each republic’s 
Academy of Sciences. From the 1920s onward, each capital city had 
opened subsidiaries of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, but a national 
academy would not be established in each republic until the Second 
World War or later – as late as 1954 for Kirgizia. Although the Tashkent 
conference of 1942 marked the official introduction of the ethnogenetic 
topic into the national historiographies of Central Asia, the concept was 
already being used a year earlier in Uzbekistan. The quincentennial 
celebration of the birth of the poet Alisher Navoy (1441–1501), 
considered the greatest figure of Uzbek literature but also claimed by the 
Tajiks for their national pantheon, helped the new Uzbek elites, massively 
purged during the 1937–8 purges, to express a national feeling that was 
compatible with Stalinist ideology.
The Uzbek Communist Party’s Alisher Navoy Jubilee Committee 
commissioned the historian and Orientalist Aleksandr Iu. Iakubovskii 
(1886–1953), an expert on the Golden Horde, to compose a small 
brochure on the ethnogenesis of the Uzbek people, published as On the 
Question of the Uzbek People’s Ethnogenesis (K voprosu ob etnogeneze 
uzbekskogo naroda). The brochure challenged the historiography 
elaborated in the 1920s–30s that traced the origin of the Uzbeks to the 
arrival of the Shaybanid dynasty, a nomadic group that moved from 
the eastern part of the Golden Horde to today’s Uzbek territory at the 
beginning of the sixteenth century. While the Shaybanids were considered 
the Uzbeks’ national symbol in the interwar period, the rewriting of 
history in 1941 refuted this too-recent crystallization of Uzbek national 
consciousness and offered instead a genealogy that was more ancient – 
and therefore more prestigious. To build its refutation, Iakubovskii 
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criticized the idea that the Uzbeks could have appeared as a people on the 
world stage only with the advent of their ethnonym. From the first 
sentence of his book, he enunciated the fundamental postulate of future 
ethnogenetic research: ‘We must distinguish the conditions under which 
this or that people was formed from the history of its name’.42
As soon as an Uzbek Academy of Sciences was created in 1943, local 
historians undertook to publish a two-volume History of the Peoples of 
Uzbekistan (Istoriia narodov Uzbekistana). Paradoxically, it was volume II, 
covering the period from the Shaybanids to the 1917 Revolution, that, in 
1947, was the first to appear, a decision rooted in local historians’ desire 
to challenge Iakubovskii’s vision of national history. This first volume 
continued to identify the Shaybanid dynasty as the key element that 
signalled the birth of the Uzbek nation. But by the time that the second 
volume was published in 1950, Iakubovskii’s theories had gained control 
over the ethnogenetic discourse: in the volume’s preface, the Russian 
historian reiterated the claim that the Uzbek people’s existence predated 
its ethnonym.43
Iakubovskii’s approach was continued by the historian Sergei 
P. Tolstov (1907–76), one of the great figures of Stalin-era Soviet 
scholarship. From 1939 to 1951, Tolstov held the chair of ethnology at 
Moscow State University, and from 1942 to 1965 he chaired the Soviet 
Academy of Sciences’ Institute of Ethnography and its prestigious journal 
Sovetskaia etnografiia. His public career declined after Stalin’s death; 
under pressure from his opponents, he was even forced to resign as 
scientific secretary of the Academy of Sciences in 1954. Tolstov was 
nonetheless named honorary academician when he retired in 1965, and 
he continued to lead prestigious multidisciplinary expeditions to Khorezm 
until 1969. Tolstov’s famous book, Ancient Khorezm (Drevnii Khorezm), 
won the highest Soviet award, the Stalin Prize, in 1949.44 This distinction 
reflected the interest of the country’s top leader in the Central Asian 
region, in particular in the gigantic project of the Great Turkmen Canal, 
which was supposed to give desertic Khorezm access to the Caspian Sea 
by water. The awarding of the prestigious prize did not occur without 
some twists and turns: it was supposed to go to Boris Rybakov, a historian 
of early Russia but, at the last minute, Stalin decided to give the prize to 
both Rybakov and Tolstov.45
Tolstov was also one of the main editors of the second major 
historical anthology on Uzbekistan, The History of the Uzbek Soviet 
Socialist Republic (Istoriia uzbekskoi SSR), published in five volumes 
between 1955 and 1958. In the preface to the first volume, the authorial 
collective made no secret of the revisions to which the nation’s history 
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had been subjected between the publication of the 1947–50 History of the 
Peoples of Uzbekistan and the present edition. The authors specifically 
noted that ‘the division between volumes one and two does not correspond 
to Marxist historical periodization, thereby giving the reader the 
impression that the authorial collective regards the era following the 
Shaybanid conquest as a new period’.46 The scene was set for decades of 
ethnogenetic research seeking the most ancient possible antiquity.
The quest to locate the moment of the nation’s crystallization in 
antiquity threw the Central Asian nations into competition with each 
other. In Tajikistan, the key Stalin-era figure, Bobodzhan Gafurov (1909–
77), affirmed that the Tajik nation had formed as early as the Samanid 
dynasty in the tenth century (see Chapter 3), thereby leaving Uzbek 
scholars with no choice but to look for an even more ancient origin. The 
Shaybanid dynasty was decidedly too late. Kazakhstan likewise found 
itself in an ambivalent situation to Uzbekistan. In tsarist historiography 
and up until the 1930s, the prevailing approach was to date the 
ethnogenesis of the Kazakhs back to the development of the Kazakh 
Khanate from the wreckage of the Golden Horde. The mid-fifteenth-
century departure of two nomadic chieftains, Janibek and Girey, was said 
to symbolize the separation of the future Uzbeks and Kazakhs and mark 
the creation of the first Kazakh Khanate. However, since this theory had 
the flaw of deriving from migrationist principles and insisting on the 
common past of two ethnic groups, it was challenged by the emerging 
ethnogenetic discourse in the 1940s.
In 1950, Viktor F. Shakhmatov denounced the History of the Kazakh 
SSR (Istoriia kazakhskoi SSR), published in 1943, as too subservient to 
bourgeois migrationist theories. He advocated instead that Kazakhstan 
follow the lead of the History of the Peoples of Uzbekistan, which asserted 
the soundness of autochthonist theories. Although the post-1941 
historiography of Uzbekistan was recognized as setting the standard for 
the other republics, the competition between republics for their share of 
history remained intense. Indeed, while praising the ground-breaking 
vision of Uzbek historiography, Shakhmatov also criticized it: claiming 
the Sogdians as the original inhabitants of Uzbekistan implied that the 
Kazakhs were latecomers to the area.47 On the contrary, according to 
Shakhmatov, one could speak of a Kazakh nationality as early as the pre-
feudal stage – that is, before the Uzbek ethnogenesis. Capturing the 
Sogdians and more generally the Scythians as the first embodiment of a 
Kazakh nation enabled Kazakhstan to rival its Uzbek neighbour in terms 
of antiquity. On this view, Kazakhs’ nomadic way of life in no way signified 
non-autochthonism.
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In Turkmenistan, the founder of ethnogenetic discourse was none 
other than Iakubovskii himself. Following his brochure on Uzbek ethno- 
genesis, the Russian researcher turned his attention to Turkmenistan, 
publishing an article in Sovetskaia etnografiia entitled ‘Questions of 
Turkmen Ethnogenesis in the Eighth to Tenth Centuries’. The title clearly 
indicates the historiographic issue at stake – to situate the birth of the 
Turkmen as a nation as far back in time as possible. Until then, the 
conventional discourse had the Turkmen arriving on the territory of 
present-day Turkmenistan in the eleventh century, during the Seljuk 
migrations toward Anatolia. Yet according to Iakubovskii, Arab sources 
attested to the presence of Oghuz Turks near the Ustyurt plateau as early 
as the ninth century, with the term ‘Turkmen’ designating those who had 
converted to Islam. For Iakubovskii, the encounter of these Oghuz with 
the other Turkic populations that had been present in southern 
Turkmenistan since the sixth century represented the origin of the 
Turkmens as such.48 Here again, the goal of the ethnogenetic discourse 
was to anchor in ancient times the titular nation’s presence on the 
republic’s territory.
By the late 1940s, all the Central Asian republics had at least one 
book that established the principle of their ethnogenesis – all, that is, 
except for Kirgizia, which stood out for the trouble it experienced in 
constructing an ethnogenetic orthodoxy as quickly as its neighbours. 
Reconciling the different historical sources that mention the term 
‘Kirgiz’ proved difficult and required a choice between two different 
approaches: either do without authoritative historical sources and make 
the undocumented autochthonist claim that the Kirgiz were the original 
inhabitants of the Tian-Shan, or else glorify the Kirgiz as having 
constituted a state since ancient times but in various places located 
outside the borders of the present-day republic.
In 1952, the Kirgiz branch of the Soviet Academy of Sciences 
expressly asked the Presidium to organize a series of ethnological 
expeditions able to deliver convincing results for one theory or the other. 
A special session of the Academy of Sciences, held in Frunze in 1956, was 
devoted exclusively to the question of the ethnogenesis of the Kirgiz, 
followed by three anthologies of Kirgiz history combining approaches 
from ethnology, linguistics, folklore and physical anthropology to provide 
a consensual answer that would be, it was hoped, definitive.49 Bernshtam’s 
opinion, reflecting the dominant view, was officially reproduced in 
1956 in the first History of the Kirgiz SSR (Istoriia kirgizskoi SSR): the 
ethnogenesis of the Kirgiz happened in multiple historic stages and 
locations, from Siberia to the Tian-Shan.50 Kirgizia thus failed to produce 
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a well-oiled ethnogenetic myth, causing the little republic to stand out 
from its neighbours.
Subsequent nationalist rewritings and reinterpretations
The implementation of ethnogenesis theories in each of the USSR’s 
union republics suggested a process of translation and adaptation to 
local contexts. For Central Asia, two important shifts in meaning 
shaped the development of ethnogenetic discourses in the second half 
of the twentieth century: first, the confusion of ethnic and racial 
discourses within the concept of ethnogenesis, and second, the desire 
to use ethnogenetic theories to deny the importance of clan divisions. 
These shifts in meaning were particularly visible in Kazakhstan and 
Turkmenistan.
In the 1920s–30s, physical anthropology attempted to retrace the 
great phenotypes present in Central Asia, a project that was almost 
systematically dissociated from historical and ethnological research. 
The main physical anthropology scholars, such as Debets and Lev V. 
Oshanin (1884–1962), came from the medical or biological disciplines, 
not the human sciences. They saw no direct link between the major 
original races and contemporary peoples: on the contrary, Soviet doctrine 
insisted on the common racial origin of Tajiks and Uzbeks, even though 
they had distinct histories and therefore dissociated ethnogeneses. With 
the arrival of ethnogenetic research, the linkages between the concepts 
of ethnicity and race grew more complex, with some researchers tending 
to treat the two terms as synonyms and hoping to prove the continuity 
of a people’s physiological traits across time. Beginning in the 1940s, 
several texts conflated the somatic data collected by archaeology and 
anthropological investigations among contemporary peoples and 
employed interchangeably the various names given to ancient races 
and the ethnonyms of today.
In Turkmenistan from the 1950s on, the question of ethnogenesis 
was closely tied to research in physical anthropology. This research 
supposedly confirmed the preponderance of the Iranian substratum in 
‘Turkmen physiognomy’, thereby validating both the people’s antiquity 
and its ethno-racial continuity.51 In the 1960s, at the Turkmen Institute of 
History, Ata Dzhikiev (1933–2013) argued that the continuity between 
the contemporary Turkmen and ancient peoples could be proven thanks 
to Oshanin’s research, which linked contemporary Turkmen to the ancient 
dolichocephalic Caspian race. Hence, ‘from the anthropological point of 
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view, the Turkmen are the direct descendants of the Scythians’.52 Dzhikiev 
likewise asserted that the Turkic languages were native to Central Asia 
and that the region had always been characterized by Persian–Turkic 
bilingualism. He thus transposed a desire for ethnic/racial autochthonism 
into a linguistic autochthonism. In 1967, at a special conference of the 
Academy of Sciences of Turkmenistan on the ethnogenetic question, 
the speakers insisted on the importance of Turkmen racial features that 
were said to validate the ethnogenetic theory of their Scythian 
dolichocephalic autochthonism.53
In Kazakhstan, the same racializing of ethnogenetic discourse 
became apparent in the 1960s and was formally theorized in the following 
decade. The Laboratory for Ethnic Anthropology at the Institute of 
History and Ethnology of the Kazakh Academy of Sciences, led by Orazak 
Ismagulov (b. 1930), has, since the 1970s, continuously published 
studies in physical anthropology to demonstrate the racial unity of the 
Kazakhs. According to Ismagulov, there not only exists a specific Kazakh 
race that is uniform throughout the entire republic but this race also 
occupies a central position among Turkic peoples and exceeds them in the 
harmonious way in which it combines various somatic criteria.54 
Ismagulov’s 1977 work, The Ethnic Genogeography of the Kazakhs 
(Etnicheskaia genogeografiia kazakhov), in which he defends the idea of 
‘man’s biosocial nature’, came under direct attack from the Communist 
Party of the Soviet Union, which belatedly labelled it as nationalist. Yet 
milder discourses on the unity and antiquity of a supposed ‘Kazakh race’ 
were allowed within the local academic system.
These racial references were employed in an ambiguous manner 
with respect to the ethnic question: the dolichocephaly of the Turkmen 
was, as Oshanin suggested, a ‘persistent racial feature’ (stoikii rasovyi 
priznak) that made it possible to differentiate the Turkmen from the 
other peoples of Central Asia.55 Orazmukhammed Babakov, a specialist 
in physical anthropology, analysed the place of the Turkmen ‘in the 
racial system’ (v rasovoi sistematike) of the region and affirmed the 
Turkmen people’s anthropological unity despite their tribal diversity.56 
As in Kazakhstan, the persistence of tribal and/or clan divisions posed 
a problem for scholars defending ethno-racial unity: omnipresent in 
oral literature through genealogies and often invoked in emic definitions 
given by a part of the population, especially rural, the reference to 
tribe disrupted the idea of unity that underpinned the modern socialist 
nation.
Physical anthropology was thus instrumentalized to prove the 
physical unity of the nation using data from craniology, serology, 
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odontology and dermatology. The internal divisions represented by 
tribes, clans or regionalisms were considered to be matters of history or 
culture, ‘vestiges’ (perezhitki) that were doomed and scarcely relevant to 
understanding the reality of contemporary societies. While ethnogenetic 
discourses anchored each nation in the most ancient past possible, 
physical anthropology asserted the ethnic/racial unity of Soviet Central 
Asian societies and therefore their socialist modernity.
Soviet ethnological science institutionalized ethnogenesis as one 
of its core research objects in Central Asia for the brief period between 
1941 and 1956. This quest for ethnogenesis remained part of the 
ethnological orthodoxy throughout the entire Soviet period. All its main 
theoreticians for Central Asia – Iakubovskii, Tolstov, Gafurov and 
Shakhmatov – had brilliant academic trajectories. Although trained 
in Moscow in a specific intellectual and political context, that of 
Stalinism, their legacy was never repudiated, even in a new, post-Soviet 
context; instead, they remain celebrated founding fathers of local 
academia to this day.
The arrival of political independence in 1991 has not challenged but 
instead reinforced the quest for the most ancient ethnogenesis: national 
historiography still aims to demonstrate the permanent presence of the 
nation on its eponymous territory dating back to ancient times and to 
refute the idea that the Turkic population arrived from the Eastern 
Siberian steppes. In Kazakhstan, the disciples of Ismagulov continue to 
assert that ‘the Kazakhs’ genetic stock is biologically indivisible and 
unified, and a division into clans, tribes, or hordes is not justified’.57 The 
Museum of National History in Almaty maintains a physical anthropology 
department that displays tableaux on Kazakh ethnogenesis based on the 
physical appearance criteria worked out by Ismagulov.
The republic-level tradition of ‘archaeological patriotism’ – looking 
as far back in the past as possible to trace the nation’s origins – is still 
seen as a unifying thread for national historiography to this day. 
Although Soviet historiography was certainly not aiming to achieve the 
independence of the republics, it indirectly elaborated a repertoire of 
scholarly arguments in support of the nation-state. It offered a ‘ready-to-
think’ checklist for nationhood that did not require major methodological 
transformations: minor adjustments were needed with regard to the most 
recent historical periods, those which have involved interactions with 
Russians, but the longue durée vision of the nation could easily be 
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Centrality and autochthonism: 
Uzbekistan’s nationhood
Since independence, Uzbekistan’s strategy has been to promote two 
forms of state nationalism. The first was a political nationalism that 
reflected the authoritarian nature of the Karimov regime, which regarded 
the political order as natural and uncontroversial and the state as the 
ultimate embodiment of the nation. The second was a cultural nationalism 
that gave preference to the titular ethnic group in everything symbolic. To 
this day, even after Karimov’s death and the arrival in power of Shavkat 
Mirziyoyev, the ideological premise of the Uzbek state, inspired by German 
Romanticism, rests on the idea that each people has a spirit that endures 
across time and expresses its essence under different ethnic labels. The 
ideology of national independence as a political project is, therefore, 
closely interrelated with the sublimation of the Uzbek nation in its 
supposed essence, manifested through a linear historical trajectory with 
the independent nation-state as its most evident achievement.
Under President Islam Karimov, the Uzbek regime successfully 
crafted a historical grand narrative as well as a wide array of national 
symbols whose meaning is largely understood by the population – a 
strategy nicely described by Laura Adams as the ‘spectacular state’.1 Thus, 
the new Uzbek state is displayed through a political architecture style that 
could be named ‘dubaio-timurid’, a reinterpretation of the classic Timurid 
style with a modernity inspired by the Emirates.2 What Michael Billig 
defines as banal nationalism also constitutes an integral part of the Uzbek 
nationhood process. This is the case, for instance, for Uzbek pop music, 
which combines a Russian-Soviet legacy with Oriental flavours (Arabic or 
Persian in style, with some borrowings from Bollywood) and offers a 
pantheon of modern idols and their ‘people’ stories.3 It is also the case for 
Uzbekistan’s vibrant film industry: Uzbekkino is the only cinema 
production agency in Central Asia able to produce commercially viable 
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films that attract a large domestic audience.4 Uzbek cuisine has also 
became a brand that works both domestically, where its rich symbolic 
background (family, community, hospitality)5 means that it is easily 
celebrated, and internationally, with chains of Uzbek restaurants all over 
Russia, for instance.
The literature on post-Soviet Uzbek nationhood is rich, with 
masterful studies by Laura Adams and Peter Finke joining older works on 
late Soviet Uzbekistan such as those by William Fierman. In addition, 
articles by Andrew F. March, Nick Megoran, Timur Dadabaev, Shahram 
Akbarzadeh, Charles Kurzman, Reuel Hanks, Johan Rasanayagam, Sarah 
Kendzior, Nancy Rosenberger and others examine various aspects of the 
nationhood process.6 In this chapter, I focus on the intersection of the 
political and cultural aspects of the official Uzbek ideology of nationhood, 
especially the ways in which its authors have rewritten the nation’s 
historical trajectory.
Pillars of post-Soviet Uzbekistan: stability as a brand 
After Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan under Islam Karimov (1938–2016) was 
long the most stable and repressive regime in Central Asia. It avoided 
Tajikistan’s path to civil war and the political upheavals of Kyrgyzstan, as 
well as the appearance of opposition coalitions at regular intervals 
as occurred in Kazakhstan. Though the rise and fall of the president’s 
eldest daughter, Gulnara Karimova, and other squabbles over property 
rights suggested the existence of scores to be settled among the elite, 
these remained mostly behind closed doors. After pushing oppositional 
nationalist figures – such as Muhammad Salih of the Erk movement and 
Abdurakhim Polatov of Birlik – into exile in 1992–3, authorities faced 
minimal externalized intra-elite tensions. There were, of course, some 
exceptions, such as vocal regime-critic Rustam Usmanov, a businessman 
who founded Uzbekistan’s first private bank – Rustambank – in 1990. The 
regime also succeeded in hunting dissidents abroad by using mechanisms 
of extraterritoriality shared with neighbouring countries.7
Uzbekistan’s wealth derives mainly from a few major industries and 
resources, principally cotton, gold, uranium and hydrocarbons; the 
country has a limited private sector. This wealth structure has helped to 
consolidate elites around a few rent-seeking opportunities. The Karimov 
family monopolized the most profitable sectors, especially the national 
mineral industries and Gazprom’s gas sales, as well as such niches as 
construction, cement production, trade with China, and communications 
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and entertainment – at least until Gulnara Karimova’s commercial empire 
was dismantled in 2013–14.8 
Closely linked to the president’s family but nonetheless autonomous, 
the security services (known as the SNB), the successor organization to 
the KGB, became one of the main actors in the Uzbek economy. From 
their early days selling off Soviet-era military spare parts, the SNB’s main 
figures, especially Rustam Inoyatov, built a veritable commercial empire. 
Over time, a faction at the SNB took control of fiscal sectors, the Customs 
Committee, the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, the Border 
Guards and the National Migration Agency, as well as cotton export state 
holdings, the banking system and wholesale markets. The regional elites, 
although they had been powerful in the 1990s, were gradually pushed to 
the margins of decision-making processes in Tashkent, then relegated 
to managing day-to-day affairs in their own regions and focusing on their 
primary assets, cotton and agriculture.9 The luckier and better-connected 
among them controlled part of the industrial production and communi- 
cation sectors.
In this context, the grand national narrative rapidly positioned 
Uzbekistan as a fortress of stability in the face of unstable neighbours. The 
authorities branded Tajikistan and, to an even greater extent, Kyrgyzstan 
as counter-models of statehood, states that were failing due to civil war 
and colour revolutions, respectively. They also released propaganda 
against Islamist – or allegedly Islamist – attempts to challenge Karimov’s 
legitimacy, painting them as an existential threat to state sovereignty and 
to national survival. The authorities crushed the Islamist opposition in 
the Fergana Valley, led by Tohir Yuldashev (1967–99) and Juma 
Namangani (1968–2001), as early as 1991–2; accused Islamists of 
organizing the Tashkent terrorist attacks of February 1999; fought 
against incursions of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan coming from 
the Tajik and Kyrgyz sides of the Fergana Valley in the summers of 1999 
and 2000; and abruptly repressed the Andijon riots of May 2005. With the 
exception of minor skirmishes at the Uzbek–Kyrgyz border,10 the regime 
then enjoyed a decade of stability without any visible fomented instability 
until the natural death of Islam Karimov in September 2016.
Under the first president, the authorities not only skilfully liquidated 
any potential opposition, but also used coercive tools on a large scale in 
order to maintain stability. Restrictions on the freedoms of speech, press 
and association – as well as an isolationist policy aimed at limiting 
external influences of all sorts – secured the political status quo for two 
decades.11 Yet it would be a mistake to think that this popular support 
was obtained through coercion alone. The regime also succeeded in 
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articulating several political, economic and nationhood-related narratives 
that consolidated its legitimacy. It branded itself as the only secular force 
able to resist the supposed Islamist threat,12 an approach that won the 
regime the support of many citizens who had been traumatized by 
the neighbouring Tajik civil war and were fearful of any risk of 
destabilization. The regime also articulated a paternalistic vision of the 
relationship between leader and people that gained the support of the 
large part of the population that was concerned by the collapse of 
the Soviet welfare state and wanted the state to continue to provide public 
goods. Lastly, the regime structured widespread patronal practices that 
integrated each citizen into a clientelist pyramid based on the exchange 
of several types of duties (extended family, neighbourhood community, 
regional kinship, professional community and so on).13
Closely interrelated to this patronal politics was Uzbekistan’s 
economic policy. In the 1990s, the choice of gradualism – that is, moving 
slowly towards a market economy and avoiding the shock therapy 
promoted by Western donors or international financial institutions – 
proved decently successful, protecting the Uzbek population against 
upheavals in their standards of living.14 This success gave rise to the 
so-called Five Principles of Uzbek economics, which the country 
officially followed for almost three decades.15 However, the model stopped 
working as early as the 2000s: Uzbekistan lost many of its foreign 
investors in the mineral and energy industry; could not reform the 
agricultural sector (which still employs half the population); failed to 
rapidly develop new, tertiary, service-based economic domains; and 
began to face massive labour migration (at least 3 million Uzbek citizens 
were working in Russia just before the economic crisis of 2014, with 
hundreds of thousands more employed in South Korea, Turkey and the 
United Arab Emirates) and brain drain due to the departure of its younger, 
highly skilled generations.16
This economic devolution was reflected in Uzbekistan’s regional 
policy. At the beginning of the 1990s, Tashkent was hoping to become 
the new regional leader of Central Asia, a claim based on its historical 
pre-eminence and demographic domination (half the Central Asian 
population is Uzbek, or about 30 million of the region’s 60 million 
people). However, unsatisfied with its reluctant neighbours, and then 
rapidly surpassed by a rising Kazakhstan boosted by oil prices, Uzbekistan 
withdrew into an isolationist policy.17 This strategy had two main goals: 
first, to avoid any disruptive external influences from world powers such 
as Russia and the United States (as well as from international institutions 
pushing for regional cooperation and integration); and second, to secure 
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the regime in the face of regional instabilities that threatened to spill over 
into Uzbekistan, from the wars in Tajikistan and Afghanistan to inter-ethnic 
tensions in Southern Kyrgyzstan.18 This isolationist policy dramatically 
hampered regional cooperation, fuelling tensions with Tajikistan and 
Kyrgyzstan over cross-border hydroelectric management, limiting the 
country’s natural role as the region’s trade power, and weakening 
the regime’s narrative of Uzbekistan as the crossroads between East and 
West, Europe and Asia. 
The ideology of national independence
In parallel, the Karimov regime rapidly and effectively built a state-
sponsored discourse to replace the previous, discredited Marxist-Leninist 
ideology, with the goal of preventing a potential ideological ‘vacuum’. 
This discourse aimed to neutralize any external influences that could 
divide the country, whether Islamic, ethnonationalist or inspired by 
Western liberal values. The regime continued to subscribe to the Soviet 
epistemological view that ideology is not only above politics, but also 
objective and neutral when based on uncontestable realities. In Karimov’s 
own words, ‘It is natural that the state system, its operation and 
accompanying policies should above all be constructed on the basis of a 
concretely formulated ideology’.19 
In the first years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Karimov 
tried to revive the historical name of Turkestan and promoted a regional 
identity based on Turkic and Muslim values, an identity that he dubbed 
Turanism.20 He thus positioned himself in direct ideological competition 
with Kazakhstan’s president Nursultan Nazarbayev, who put forward the 
rival concept of Eurasia (see Chapter 7). While the notion of Turkestan as 
the new Central Asia, with Uzbekistan at its heart, did not resonate 
regionally, it had long been embraced domestically by the Uzbek 
opposition. Both Muhammad Salih and Abdurakhim Polatov, for instance, 
belonged to a semi-dissident literary tradition, formed in the 1960s and 
1970s, that called for a more Islamo-nationalist orientation and the 
revival of Turkestani unity.21 Regardless, the reference to Turkestan was 
rapidly replaced by a more Uzbekistan-centric narrative that posited the 
existence of unique national pathways to development.
The so-called Uzbek path aimed to anchor the country in a longue 
durée perspective, as the result of centuries – even millennia – of history, 
and called for the president himself to personalize the historical trajectory 
of the nation-state. However, Karimov’s cult of personality was less 
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extreme than that of Saparmurat Niyazov in neighbouring Turkmenistan.22 
Unlike Niyazov, Karimov was not exalted for any personal (and almost 
supernatural) powers, but for embodying the state and the nation – for 
being, according to Andrew F. March, ‘the Great Uzbek Statebuilder’.23 In 
the 1990s, in particular, the urban landscape was covered with billboards 
of Karimov in the role of the ‘father of the nation’, with slogans celebrating 
the homeland (vatan), which he personified.
The ideology of national independence that Karimov embodied 
took form through a meticulous process of crafting a consistent corpus of 
texts. As Sarah Kendzior notes, some of these texts were published 
immediately, while others were held in reserve to respond to events in the 
country when the time was right. The president himself supposedly wrote 
several books promoting a vision that Uzbekistan was on a unique path: 
Uzbekistan: National Independence, Economic Policy and Ideology 
(O‘zbekiston: milliy istiqlol, iqtisodiy siyosat va mafkura, 1993); Our 
Highest Goal: Independence and Blossoming of the Nation, Freedom and 
Prosperity of the People (Ozod va obod Vatan, erkin va farovon hayot – 
pirovard maqsadimiz, 2000); and The Idea of National Independence: Main 
Aspects and Criteria (Milliy istiqlol g‘oyasi: asosiy tushuncha va tamoyillar, 
2003). All these works, made mandatory reading on school and university 
curricula, celebrate the nation as a fait accompli of Uzbek history. As 
Karimov stated, ‘The ideology must first reflect the spiritual particularity 
and uniqueness of the sacred traditions and aspirations of our nation, 
formulated over many centuries and millennia’.24 
A long list of clichéd values was presented as comprising the core 
of the Uzbek national consciousness: respect for family, elders and 
traditional values; friendship; peace and tolerance; openness to other 
civilizations; patience; hospitality; and industriousness.25 Nevertheless, it 
took several ideologists or court writers to shape this grand narrative, 
including Karimov advisers Rustam Zhumaev26 and Habibullah 
Tadzhiev,27 as well as, more importantly, the academic Ozod Sharafidinov 
(1929–2005), a former secretary for ideological issues of the Uzbek 
Communist Party. The first two men mainly advanced the discourse of the 
millennia-long struggle of Uzbekistan for its independence and national 
identity, while Sharafidinov became the official ideologist of Ma’naviyat, 
the Uzbek term for spirituality or morality (meaning, in Islamic tradition, 
the acceptance of God’s word). 
Obsessed with ‘alien’ influences – particularly liberal values, 
Western consumerism, ethnonationalism and Islamism – the Uzbek state 
aimed to develop ‘ideological immunity’ (mafkuraviy immunitet), 
embodied by Ma’naviyat. The Karimov regime began to use the term 
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Ma’naviyat in 1994, ultimately launching a television channel and 
publishing house with the same name. Following it, classes on Ma’naviyat 
va Ma’rifat (Spirituality and Enlightenment) were introduced to school 
and university curricula. In 2004, Ma’naviyat was further institution- 
alized through the creation of a Republic Centre for Spiritual Propaganda 
(Respublika Ma’naviyat va Ma’rifat Kengashi), a kind of Ministry of 
Ideology. Among its responsibilities, the Centre oversaw the hiring of a 
vice-dean of Ma’naviyat in each higher educational institution. This vice-
dean not only supervised the teaching of the discipline, but also inspected 
the clothing worn by young men and women at the university to be sure 
that this attire reflected the norms of morality and ‘humble’ behaviour.28 
In 2008, Karimov published High Spirituality: An Invisible Force (Yuksak 
ma’naviyat – yengilmas kuch), which encapsulated the quintessence of 
Ma’naviyat. The volume touts high morality as an intrinsic quality of the 
Uzbek people, a virtue that, Karimov claims, has been under threat from 
potential external interference for centuries. The text also defends state 
paternalism, patriotism and respect for traditional hierarchy and elders; 
celebrates mahalla (the neighbourhood community) as the Uzbek version 
of civil society;29 advances conservative social mores, especially male 
superiority;30 advocates for protecting younger generations from Western 
values and mass culture; and integrates Islamic references into the 
Ma’naviyat doctrinal corpus.31
Through the structured doctrine of Ma’naviyat, the Uzbek regime 
positioned itself as the bearer of moral authority for the whole society. 
Ideology has, therefore, become closely associated with social and 
cultural control. It has allowed for the delegitimization of the political 
opposition, which has been accused of colluding with the enemies of the 
nation and of not respecting the principles of Uzbekness; the Andijon 
violence of May 2005, for instance, was framed as having been 
orchestrated by people who were not authentically Uzbek.32 The regime’s 
ideology also justified the establishment of a censorship code based on 
the morality narrative: the state agency for arts, Uzbeknavo, for instance, 
took performance licences away from pop singers such as Lola Yuldasheva 
and film directors such as Zulfikar Musakov on the grounds that they did 
not respect the principles of Ma’naviyat.33 In the early 2000s, the official 
youth movement, Kamalot, which was modelled on the Soviet-era 
Komsomol (Communist Youth), embraced Ma’naviyat by performing 
symbolic collective actions and demonstrating loyalty toward the 
regime.34 
For over a quarter of a century, the Uzbek regime succeeded in 
building a supposed consensus on the essence of Uzbekness. Reminiscent 
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of Soviet ideological language, this Uzbekness was presented as a positive 
force that valued world peace, advanced a unique national development 
path, and was able to resist decadent liberal values, destructive Islamism 
and ethnonationalist principles. The Karimov regime also pioneered the 
narrative on the need to ‘de-Westernize’ the nation’s social and cultural 
values, a discourse that became mainstream across the post-Soviet region 
in the 2010s.
A straightforward nationhood process?
Compared to its neighbours, Karimov’s Uzbekistan has enjoyed a 
relatively painless and straightforward nation-building process. Several 
structural reasons account for this fortunate situation. The first of these 
is Uzbekistan’s rich history. Since the early 1920s, when the Soviet regime 
constructed the first national entities, the country has always presented 
itself – and been seen by Moscow – as the heart of Central Asia. Created 
in 1924, the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic took precedence over its 
neighbours, including all the regions populated by sedentary peoples and 
almost all the ancient cities of Transoxiana. Uzbek elites successfully 
lobbied Moscow to include Bukhara and Samarkand in the republic over 
the opposition of Tajik elites.35 
Tashkent became the obvious capital city of the region thanks to its 
status as the capital of the tsarist governorate of Turkestan, and it 
maintained this prominence until the collapse of the Soviet Union. The 
city hosted prestigious institutions, particularly in academia and higher 
education, as well as the Spiritual Board of Muslims of Central Asia 
(SADUM). The Soviet regime also lauded Uzbekistan as embodying the 
alliance between socialism and the Orient, instrumentalizing this 
narrative as a foreign policy tool when Moscow reached out to the Islamic 
world.36 Moreover, Uzbekistan is home to much of the region’s celebrated 
architectural heritage, which has been interpreted as a sign of the state’s 
historical centrality and continuity. Even though local communist elites 
never actively sought independence, it was easy for them to construct an 
independent Uzbek nation-state on these premises.
The second reason is demographic. Unlike in Kazakhstan or 
Kyrgyzstan, the ethnic make-up of the population did not lead to identity-
related insecurities. Ethnic Uzbeks constituted 71 per cent of the 
population in the final Soviet census (1989), a figure that has reportedly 
increased to about 85 per cent (there has not been an official census in the 
past three decades). The authorities have been accused of forcing citizens 
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to self-identify as part of the titular ethnic group in order to reinforce the 
country’s ethnic homogeneity,37 but even without coercion, Uzbekistan is 
undoubtedly the nation-state of Uzbeks. The only noticeable tensions 
have occurred with the Tajik-speaking segment of the population, mostly 
located in Bukhara and Samarkand, which was forced to Uzbekify – that 
is, to identify themselves as ethnically Uzbek in their passports and not to 
claim the right to speak Tajik in public spaces, administrations and 
educational institutions. Officially, Tajiks now account for less than 5 per 
cent of the population, but this number is not relevant, as many families 
in Bukhara and Samarkand are bilingual and could identify ethnically 
with either group.38 
Other ethnic groups are not considered to pose any risks to the 
country’s ethnic homogeneity. The Russian minority has significantly 
decreased – from 1.6 million in 1989 to about 500,000 (again, there is no 
official data) today – and is concentrated in Tashkent and the city of 
Navoiy, which hosts the country’s main extractive industries.39 Unlike in 
Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan’s Russian minority has never claimed any specific 
rights and has not been associated with any secessionist risks. The 
Karakalpak minority (about half a million people), located in the north 
western part of the country, still formally holds autonomous status, but 
this autonomy is almost nonexistent except in some very limited cultural 
respects.40 The city of Nukus and the whole Karakalpakstan Autonomous 
Region are among the poorest and most remote areas of the country. 
Many Karakalpaks have emigrated to nearby Kazakhstan, which offers 
more economic opportunity and greater linguistic and cultural affinity.
Third, Uzbekistan rapidly built (and has maintained) a straight- 
forward nationality and citizenship policy. It declared Uzbek the only 
state language – with Russian losing any official status – and shifted to the 
Latin alphabet as early as 1993 in order to further cut symbolic ties with 
its Russian past.41 It seems that many official documents, especially those 
that use legal and technical language, are still written in Russian before 
being translated and officially published in Uzbek.42 However, Uzbek is, 
without a doubt, the language used most frequently in public spaces, 
the media and academic institutions, while Russian is increasingly 
marginalized. 
Contrary to its language policy, which was implemented to break 
away from the country’s Soviet past, Uzbekistan’s citizenship policy was 
built on its Soviet legacy: the difference between citizenship and 
nationality/ethnic group has been maintained in passports and 
administrative documents. All persons born in the republic or residing on 
its territory as of 1991 are considered Uzbek citizens, while people who 
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identify as Uzbeks but reside beyond the national borders fall outside the 
purview of Tashkent.43
Political stronghold over academia
Establishing the ideology of national independence required the 
academic world to support the new ideational regime. The Academy of 
Sciences, for instance, was asked to publish a ‘popular-scientific dictionary 
of independence’ that would lend academic legitimacy to the new 
vocabulary of nationalism and serve as an encyclopaedia of Uzbekistan’s 
post-Soviet ideology.44 More importantly, the disciplines considered 
essential to justifying the new national grand narrative – namely, history, 
archaeology and ethnology – were placed under tight supervision.
The authorities visibly strengthened their control over the historical 
narrative in 1998. That year, apparently dissatisfied with the Institute of 
History’s lack of output, President Karimov convened a conference of 
Uzbek historians, after which the Cabinet of Ministers issued a decree ‘On 
the Improvement of the Activity of the Institute of History of the Academy 
of Sciences of Uzbekistan’. The influence of political authorities on the 
discipline of history is affirmed in the first point of this statement: 
‘The Cabinet of Ministers decrees that the main purpose of the activity of 
the Institute of History is the study of the authentic history of the Uzbek 
people and their state’.45 Every semester, the institute was required to 
organize a seminar on the history of Uzbek statehood; to collect 
information on the history of the Uzbek people, its governance and its 
ethnogenesis; and to advance archaeological knowledge and research on 
local written sources (manuscripts). The decree also guaranteed new 
financial resources to promote national history, including the creation of 
the journal O’zbekiston Tarihi. 
Dilorom Alimova was appointed deputy director and then director 
of the Institute of History, a position she held until 2010. A former 
specialist on women’s liberation in the Soviet era, Alimova shifted to the 
study of Muslim modernist movements of the early twentieth century, a 
particularly sensitive issue for the authorities (see below). Under her 
leadership, the Institute became more dynamic: Alimova developed 
contacts with foreign colleagues; had researchers participate in 
international conferences; attempted to revive publications; and recruited 
specialists and PhD candidates in medieval and ancient history, disciplines 
that require the mastery of manuscripts.46 As during Soviet times, 
contemporary history remains the most sensitive topic, as it is entirely 
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subordinate to the official state narrative.47 Historians who wish to 
distance themselves from these schemes must take refuge in more ancient 
history, though even this is not entirely free of political overtones. 
Archaeology, too, has become highly strategic, as it holds the 
power to either confirm or deny the presence of ancient Uzbek people on 
their current territory and to attribute to them or not the brilliant 
sedentary civilizations that developed in Bactria and Sogdiana. Required 
to discover physical evidence of the ancient presence of an Uzbek nation 
on contemporary Uzbekistani soil, the field of archaeology has been 
subordinated to the autochthonist ideology sponsored by the authorities. 
Ethnology remains one of the premier sciences of Uzbek nationhood. 
Where historical sources are lacking, only ethnology can establish a 
foundation for the pre-eminence of the Uzbek people over other national 
groups in their titular state and prove their ethnic continuity since time 
immemorial. Often based on solid empirical research, ethnology focuses 
on material culture: housing, clothing, crafts, folklore, rituals and 
ceremonies. Notwithstanding the discourse on disciplinary renewal and 
its distancing from Soviet-Russian perspectives, which are denounced as 
colonial, the vast majority of Uzbek ethnological work continues to be 
based on Russian sources from the second half of the nineteenth century 
and into the Soviet period.
Political science and sociology, already scarce in the Soviet academic 
tradition, have been further marginalized. While Tashkent’s National 
University had had a chair of sociology (within the philosophy faculty), 
other universities offered very few, if any, courses in the field. Studies of 
new social practices, such as migration – both internal and international 
– were considered too sensitive, as they revealed the failure of the 
Uzbek economic model. Political science was officially banned from 
Uzbek universities in 2015, accused of being a ‘Western pseudo-science’ 
conceptualized by external powers to interfere in Uzbekistan’s domestic 
affairs.48 Some topics deemed neutral – for instance, Uzbekistan’s 
membership in international organizations – were, however, still 
permitted to be studied under the guise of international relations.
The nation’s grand narrative
Independent Uzbekistan rapidly constructed a grand historical 
narrative that insisted on the nation’s ancient history and its continuity 
regardless of the attendant state structure.49 It made extensive use of 
historical commemorations: 660 years since the birth of Tamerlane 
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(1996), 2,500 years since the foundation of Bukhara and Khiva (1997), 
2,500 years since the foundation of Tashkent (2009), and so on. Any 
political or scientific work must begin by commenting on the unique 
ancient lineage of the country. For instance, as mentioned in UNESCO’s 
History of Uzbekistan, ‘Uzbekistan is a country of ancient and original 
history, whose peoples have contributed much to world history. The 
territory of Uzbekistan is one of the sources of development of the original 
man’.50 Based on these premises, the country’s historical grand narrative 
can be schematically divided into three core periods: Antiquity, classical 
Transoxiana and Soviet-Russian domination.
antiquity: the older the better
The first direction is to secure the indigeneity of Uzbeks as far back in 
history as possible, with a triple aim: to deny Iran and Tajikistan the 
legitimacy of the Indo-European legacy; to monopolize the prestigious 
Scythian heritage; and to refute the Western and Russian perception of 
Turkic peoples as nomads who moved from eastern Siberia to Central 
Asia. As seminally discussed by Peter Finke, the conception of the Uzbek 
people as sedentary Turkic-speakers requires striking a balance between 
the legacy of the Iranian oases-dwellers and that of the pastoralists in the 
Steppe51 – that is, to decide which of these two cultural realms should 
receive symbolic pre-eminence, both in time (who can claim indigeneity?) 
and in associated values (which culture is seen as superior?). It also forces 
Uzbek scholars to address the mismatch between the ethnonym of Uzbeks 
(who emerged with the Shaybanid dynasty in the sixteenth century) and 
the earlier presence of a Turkic population in Transoxiana, the Dasht-i 
Qipchaq (who came from the Steppe).
As discussed in the previous chapter, advocacy of autochthonism is 
rooted in the Soviet academic tradition, but it was conspicuously 
magnified by independence. Epitomizing this continuity between the 
Soviet and post-Soviet eras were Karim Shaniazov’s (1924–2000) 
intellectual oeuvre and his institutional status. Shaniazov received his 
candidate’s degree in 1960 and his doctorate in 1975. In 1967, just after 
the arrival of Yulian Bromley at the Miklukho-Maklay Institute of 
Ethnography in Moscow, Shaniazov was elected as head of the Ethnology 
Department of the Uzbek Institute of History. His 1974 book, For an 
Ethnic History of the Uzbek People (K etnicheskoi istorii uzbekskogo naroda) 
focused on Kipchaks, who, along with the Karluks and Oghuz, are 
traditionally apprehended as ethnic ancestors of the Uzbeks. The value of 
the Kipchaks lies in the fact that they are mentioned in Arabic sources 
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from the eighth and ninth centuries. By cross-referencing data sources 
and ancient philological, etymological and geographical information, 
Shaniazov thus positions the Kipchaks as part of what he called the 
‘indigenous people’ (korennyi narod) of South Siberia.52 He argues that 
although medieval sources date the arrival of the western Kipchaks on 
the present-day territory of Uzbekistan only back to the fifteenth century, 
these sources neglected to mention the existence of eastern Kipchaks, 
who had been present since the tenth century. For him, the ‘main features 
of the ethnic Uzbek nationality’ thus date back to the tenth century.53 
After 1990, Shaniazov led a scientific group studying the ethnic and 
ethnogenetic processes of the Uzbeks and supervised all the Institute’s 
theses in ethnology. The only ethnologist who was also a member of 
the Academy of Sciences of Uzbekistan, he continued to publish on the 
question of national ethnogenesis until his death in 2000, pursuing the 
theories enunciated by Iakubovskii and Tolstov half a century earlier.54 
The ideological continuity of his Soviet and post-Soviet works reveals the 
extent to which Uzbek research on ethnogenesis has never called into 
question the founding assumptions developed under Stalin, namely that 
ethnology should search for the oldest possible existence of a national 
consciousness and affirm its continuity on the territory over time.
Already obsessed with demonstrating the existence of a first 
substrate of Turkic people before the arrival of Indo-Europeans during the 
Soviet period, Shaniazov’s search for the most convincing historical 
argument accelerated with independence. In The Kang State and People 
(Kanf davlati va kanglilar),55 published in Uzbek in 1990, Shaniazov 
denied that the Turkic khaganat (around 552 to 744 ce) announced the 
arrival of Turkic peoples in the region. According to him, the first wave of 
Turkic population arrived earlier – in the fourth millennium bce – from 
southern Siberia and Dzhungaria and founded the Kang dynasty in 
Central Asia in the second and first millennia bce. Thus, he argued, 
Central Asian populations mentioned in ancient sources, like the 
Scythians, should retrospectively be equated with the Turks, not with 
Indo-Europeans. 
In a 1998 article, ‘Some Theoretical Questions about the 
Ethnogenesis of the Uzbek People’, Shaniazov returned to the question of 
a founding dynasty for the Uzbeks. For him, Uzbek nationhood can in no 
way be associated with the emergence of the ‘Uzbek’ ethnonym during 
the Shaybanid dynasty in the sixteenth century. Instead, it has to be found 
in the Kang state, dating Uzbeks’ origin back to the second millennium 
bce. If this earlier dating is accurate, then one of the peculiarities of the 
Uzbek ethnogenesis would be its immutability: Uzbek ethnic identity, as 
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defined by language and territory, would show a continuity undisrupted 
over millennia.56 
To emphasize the superiority of the Uzbek sedentary culture over its 
Turkic neighbours, Shaniazov accused nomadic peoples of not being able 
to bypass the tribal stage, a move that allowed him to disparage at a stroke 
the neighbouring Kazakhs, Karakalpaks and Turkmens. The supposed 
territorial continuity between Kang, Karluks, Kara-Khanids and Uzbeks 
was intended to confirm the existence of a sedentary Turkicness that both 
denies Persian-speaking populations their indigenous status and rejects 
the symbolic legitimacy of the Seljuks, the Ottomans and then the 
Turkmens, as well as of the Kazakhs.57 
In this article, Shaniazov also developed arguments that are much 
more about a nation-building ideology than about historical knowledge 
per se. He, for instance, expressed the idea that ‘everyone has the right to 
know the ethnogenesis and ethnic history of his people’.58 He plainly 
rejected the Soviet legacy, affirming the sole right of Uzbeks to write their 
own ethnogenesis and criticizing scholars ‘from the centre [Moscow]’59 
who would have preserved a colonial approach. But despite this apparent 
denial, Shaniazov never genuinely challenged Soviet concepts. He took 
up Bromley’s definition of ethnos, which insists on the unity of language, 
territory, culture and historical destiny. He also affirmed the positioning 
of all peoples on a single timeline, on which evolution proceeds from 
tribe, to nationality, to the nation (Uzbek: kablia, èlat and millat). He 
began his chronology of the Uzbek ethnos with exactly the same historical 
stages as Soviet science: slavery, feudalism, capitalism and socialism.60
Shaniazov built on this reading of national ethnogenesis in a book 
published posthumously in 2001, The Processes of Formation of the Uzbek 
Nation (O‘zbek xalqining shakllanish jarayoni).61 This book is regarded in 
some segments of the Uzbek scholarly community as a seminal reference 
work. Shaniazov’s profile and the fact that he finished this work on his 
deathbed explain the emotion surrounding the piece, the desire to 
disseminate it widely and the Institute of History’s decision to translate it 
into Russian. In an introduction dedicated to President Karimov, the 
author stressed the need to return to Uzbekistan’s national roots in 
order to build the future of the new state: by not fairly assessing the 
significance of the past, he argued, one risks debasing Uzbek culture and 
underestimating its age.62 
The book includes a historical outline that Shaniazov – who sought 
seeking to put forward a final period in the discussion of national 
history  – developed throughout his career, with chapters ranging 
chronologically from ancient times to the nineteenth century. In this 
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outline, the historian-ethnologist first reaffirmed the presence of Turkic 
peoples in Central Asia before the arrival of the first Indo-Europeans and 
interpreted the state of Kang in the second millennium bce as ‘the first 
Turkic population in the region’.63 He praised the state of Kang’s early 
culture and its sedentary nature, endowing it with borders stretching 
from the Urals to the Syr Darya and a political centre in the present-day 
region of Shymkent. The Kang ethnos formed at that time was born of the 
assimilation by the Turkic peoples – who are always presented as 
‘absorbing’ and never as ‘being absorbed’ – of other peoples present on the 
same territory, such as the Bactrians and Sogdians, whose potential Indo-
European origin is pointedly overlooked.64 
Thanks to this primordialist reading of history, Shaniazov was able 
to claim not only a very early ethnogenesis for the Uzbek nation but also 
uninterrupted ethnic continuity stretching from the first century bce until 
the arrival of Russians in Central Asia. Based on his intellectual legacy, 
Sakae and Massagetae are now presented as Uzbek ancestors in national 
history textbooks.65 
reclaiming classical transoxiana
A second core period for Uzbekistan’s national construction is the classical 
heritage of sedentary Transoxiana (Ma wara an-nahr in the Islamic 
tradition), studied with the aim of demonstrating Uzbeks’ pre-eminence 
among Central Asian peoples.66 Immediately after the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, Uzbekistan proclaimed itself the direct heir of Central Asia’s 
‘Golden Age’ (oltin asr, which fell between the ninth and fifteenth 
centuries ce) and claimed all philosophers, scientists, writers and Islamic 
thinkers who lived on the territory of present-day Uzbekistan. These 
thinkers are celebrated with eponymous metro stations in Tashkent and 
their images appear on banknotes.67 
The iconic embodiment of this Golden Age, however, remains 
Tamerlane (Amir Timur, 1336–1405), who ruled over the region from 
1370 to 1405. His likeness replaced the Lenin statue on Tashkent’s main 
square as early as 1992, and Karimov openly identified with him. 
In reality, this choice is quite paradoxical: Tamerlane was Mongol in 
origin (but not from the Chingiskhanid bloodline) and struggled to 
be recognized as a legitimate leader in parts of the Islamic world. 
Nonetheless, he offered a valuable symbol for a regime in need of a usable 
past: he was born in the heart of Transoxiana, in Shakhrisabz near 
Samarkand, and therefore ‘belongs’, territorially speaking, to Uzbekistan. 
He ruled over a large part of Eurasia and Asia, as far as India (the founder 
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of the Mughal Empire, Babur, was a Chaghatay Turk nobleman hailing 
from Andijon), helping to justify Uzbekistan’s claim to regional influence 
today; the Timurid museum in Tashkent, for instance, displays a scale 
model of the Taj Mahal to showcase the export of Uzbek cultural heritage 
to South Asia. Timur also embodied the political authority of the khan, 
the kind of paternalistic ruler Karimov aspired to be.68 Finally, Timur 
acted as a patron of the arts; the artistic and architectural achievements 
realized under his rule and those of his heirs continue to stoke Uzbekistan’s 
aspiration to be at the forefront of Central Asian culture and to strengthen 
its brand abroad. 
The Soviet regime took an ambivalent view of Tamerlane that 
varied depending on the sinuous Soviet nationalities policy. Some 
scholars denounced him as a representative of the culture of the Golden 
Horde, which was distinguished by supposed Asian cruelty and repression. 
Others celebrated his military achievements and centralization of power, 
rehabilitated the era’s architectural legacy, and highlighted the role of his 
grandson, Ulugh Bek (1394–1449), the founder of modern astronomy. In 
the 1970s and 1980s, even if Tamerlane as an individual was not 
integrated into the official pantheon of the Uzbek Soviet Socialist 
Republic, the Timurid dynasty was already seen as a period of high 
cultural achievements. Post-Soviet Uzbekistan, therefore, had relatively 
little to add before confirming Tamerlane’s status as a father of the 
Uzbek state.69
Other key figures of the nation’s pantheon belong to the theological 
or literary realm – for instance, the fifteenth-century literary icon Alisher 
Navoy (1441–1501), also known as Nizām-al-Din Alisher Herawī. Navoy 
is the greatest poet and prose writer in classical Chaghatay, the Turkic 
language that served for centuries as a lingua franca in Central Asia, with 
a strong infusion of Arabic and Persian words. The basis of Navoy’s 
legitimacy is different from that of Tamerlane – it is not territorial, as he 
was born in Herat (today’s Afghanistan), but instead derives from the 
authority of Chaghatay as a precursor of the modern Uzbek language (a 
combination of Karakhanid and Khorezmian). Here, too, the independent 
Uzbek state did not craft this new hero from scratch; Navoy was already 
celebrated in the 1920s as ‘announcing’ the Uzbek language and culture 
and became a key figure of the Uzbek Soviet pantheon in the post- 
war period.70
If Tamerlane, Ulugh-Bek and Alisher Navoy comprise the first tier of 
national heroes, another group ranks just below them. It includes 
scientists such as Al-Fergani (800/805–870), one of the most famous 
astronomers of his time; Al-Khorezmi (d. 850), a mathematician, 
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astronomer and geographer during the Abbasid Caliphate; Al-Biruni 
(973–1048), a scholar and polymath from Khorezm; and Ibn Sina (known 
in the west as Avicenna) (980–1037), an Islamic neo-Platonic philosopher 
famous for his works on medicine. To this scientific lineage should be 
added two key figures in Islamic culture who epitomize the influence of 
Bukhara over the whole Ummah at that time: Imam al-Bukhari (801–70), 
who authored the hadith collection known as Sahih al-Bukhari, which 
is regarded by Sunni Muslims as one of the most authentic hadith 
collections; and Bahouddin Naqshband (1318–89), the founder of the 
main Sufi order, the Naqshbandiyya, and a revered mystical poet. In fact, 
the restoration of Naqshband’s shrine was celebrated by Karimov with 
great pomp in 1993 as a symbol of the nation’s reconnection with its 
Islamic past, while the main street in Bukhara, formerly named for Lenin, 
is dedicated to him.71
There are some glaring omissions in this Uzbek pantheon, however. 
The most obvious one is the Shaybanid dynasty and its founder 
Muhammad Shaybani (1451–1510), who occupies a relatively minor 
position in today’s narrative. Indeed, the Shaybanids arrived too late in 
the nation’s history to be considered founding fathers, and they have been 
shut out of the competition for antiquity that drives Uzbek historiography. 
Moreover, they are too explicitly linked to the Golden Horde, competed 
with the Timurids and shared the same origin as those who would later 
become Kazakhs, all elements that made them unsuitable for the nativist 
claim of the Uzbek grand narrative. The later periods of the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries, too, are largely painted over, as they show 
Uzbek Khanates and a Bukhara Emirate that no longer appear at the 
centre of continental empires or the cultural vanguard of the Persian-
Turkic world, but rather as backward provinces progressively marginalized 
from new trade routes and relegated to the peripheries of new empires.72 
Uzbekistan’s symbolic takeover of the classic Transoxiana-Turkestani 
Golden Age has created tensions with neighbouring republics. This is true 
particularly of relations with Tajikistan (see Chapter 3) but also with the 
other Turkic republics, whose leaders want their legitimate share of the 
same cultural Turkestani tree: Kyrgyz and Kazakh historiographies are 
sometimes forced to define themselves against Uzbekness as Central 
Asia’s cultural benchmark.
a difficult balance: russian and soviet domination
The third core period is the most ambivalent, as it deals with the recent 
past – namely, that of Russian colonization and the Soviet experience. 
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This is the only part of Uzbekistan’s grand narrative that has dramatically 
evolved since the collapse of the Soviet Union, for the obvious reason that 
such transformation was necessary to justify the nation’s independence.73 
In line with Tashkent’s geopolitical stance of rejecting any regional 
alliance under Russian leadership and an early policy of moving away 
from the Russian-Soviet cultural legacy, the historiographical narrative 
on the nineteenth and twentieth centuries focuses on the negative and 
destructive. The whole period from the early nineteenth century (that is, 
even before the Uzbek Khanates and the Bukhara Emirate became tsarist 
protectorates) to independence in 1991 is labelled an era of ‘Russian 
colonial domination’. As noted by Sergey Abashin, this discourse more or 
less reproduces all the anticolonial truisms of Marxist historiography in 
the 1920s and 1930s.74 History textbooks spread this narrative and it is 
also illustrated in the Museum of Political Repressions, established in 
2001 in a Tashkent neighbourhood where many graves from Stalin’s 
purges were exhumed. 
However, while Uzbekistan associates the Soviet regime with tsarist 
domination, it has struggled to find a way to critique the repressive 
aspects of the Soviet system while simultaneously embracing the 
modernization efforts that were part of the Soviet experience and remain 
highly valued by today’s regime: mass urbanization, industrialization and 
a robust literary scene. It also faces difficulties in defining the role that 
Uzbek elites played in the Soviet system and in naming national heroes 
who could be celebrated for their fight against this alleged colonialism. 
Indeed, the dilemma of the Uzbek grand narrative is that those who were 
repressed by the Soviet regime represent a counter-narrative that is not in 
tune with modern Uzbekistan’s ideological principles, while the Uzbek 
communist elites, whose existence challenges the notion of the Soviet 
Union as a simple colonial power, are ideologically closer to the values of 
today’s regime. 
The history of the popular revolts against the tsarist regime (Andijon 
in 1898 and Urkun, the regional uprising of 1916) and then that of the 
Basmachi against the Soviet regime in the 1920s is troublesome for today’s 
regime due to these events’ open references to Islamic values, and even 
sometimes to Shari’a. For a Karimov regime whose secular authoritarianism 
was legitimated by the struggle against religious fundamentalism, 
references to Islam as an ideology of national liberation cannot be publicly 
stated.75 Consequently, the Basmachi movement, presented in the early 
1990s as a movement of national liberation, was progressively downgraded 
to a simple ‘armed movement’ (vooruzhennoe dvizhenie) to avoid associating 
Islam too openly with the idea of national liberation. 
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A relatively similar pattern has been observed with the Jadids and 
the national-communists of the 1920s and 1930s who sought to reconcile 
socialism and nationalism and were later liquidated by Stalin during the 
Great Purges. Academic historiography does not deny them: Dilorom 
Alimova wrote a book praising Jadidism,76 and its main figures, such as 
Abdurrauf Fitrat (1886–1938), are revered by many Uzbek intellectuals 
today. However, the Jadids remain largely absent from the state-
sponsored pantheon offered for broad public consumption. Indeed, the 
Jadids and national-communists mostly arouse suspicion among today’s 
elites on account of their clearly pan-Turkic commitments. Their calls for 
all Central Asian peoples to unite displeased an Uzbek state protective of 
its own sovereignty and, in the early post-independence years, hardly 
inclined to regional integration. 
Moreover, as in Russia, Uzbekistan has found it easier to denounce 
the victims of the Soviet regime than to identify their tormenters, as the 
latter approach would entail pointing the finger at Soviet Uzbek elites. 
The rulers of today are, indeed, unquestionably the heirs of their Soviet 
predecessors, a continuity that is problematic for the regime’s ideological 
claims. That is why the Khrushchev and Brezhnev eras seldom appear 
in Uzbek official historiography and museums, with the single – but 
crucial – exception of First Secretary of the Uzbek Communist Party 
Sharaf Rashidov (1917–83), who reigned over the republic for more than 
two decades, from 1959 to 1983. Rashidov is regarded as a national 
hero who defended the interests of his people against the interests of 
Moscow – even if this celebration partly contradicts the narrative of the 
Soviet Union as a colonial dominator.
Politics and ethnology: the case study  
of The Ethnic Atlas of Uzbekistan
The polemics around The Ethnic Atlas of Uzbekistan are an exemplary 
illustration of how sensitive the Uzbek narrative on nationhood has 
been. Published by the local Open Society Foundation in 2002 and edited 
by Alisher Ilkhamov (a sociologist and executive director of the Open 
Society Institute Assistance Foundation), the Atlas sought to import a 
constructivist view on the question of nationhood, directly confronting 
the prevailing nationalities policy’s official line on the topic. Contrary to 
what the title suggests, the book was not an atlas per se, as it featured few 
maps, but rather a dictionary of the ‘nationalities’ of Uzbekistan.77 The 
first part, written by a large team of local and foreign scholars, provided 
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an alphabetical list of about seventy ‘nationalities’ living in the country, 
while the second part – which was more polemical and was written 
entirely by Ilkhamov – was devoted to Uzbek nation-building.
After the scandal surrounding the Atlas, the Soros Foundation failed 
to renew its registration at the Ministry of Justice and was forced to close 
in 2004. (It had not reopened at the time this book was being prepared 
for publication in early 2021.) The political dimension of the controversy 
only becomes intelligible if placed into the wider political context of the 
‘colour revolutions’ in Georgia and Ukraine and the support given by 
Open Society Foundations to these street movements. In a speech 
broadcast on the main Uzbek television channel, Karimov justified the 
closure of the Foundation by accusing it of having engaged in illegal 
activities and also made discreet mention of the controversy surrounding 
the Atlas:
There have been very serious attempts [by Soros] to mobilize 
splinter elements of the population. For example, on the issue of 
interethnic relations, they began to distribute publications and 
translations on the issue of interethnic relations. Where are the 
Uzbeks derived from, where do the Tajiks come from, etc. These 
editions, books, newspapers have no basis and cannot withstand 
basic criticism. Our historians have spoken and said that. But their 
main objective … was to choose representatives of the Uzbek 
intelligentsia who could support them tomorrow and … go up 
against the constitutional order.78 
The allegations against the Atlas were organized by the Institute of 
History of Uzbekistan. In the autumn of 2003, an article debunking the 
Atlas was published in the electronic journal Etno-Zhurnal. Its author was 
Ch. Kamoliddin, an Arabist by training and programme manager at the 
History Institute. A long article in the very official Pravda Vostoka followed 
on 14–15 January 2004, signed by Alimova, Kamoliddin and Zoia 
Arifkhanova, head of the Ethnology Department. In April of the same 
year, the three authors republished the same article (with slight changes) 
in the leading history journal of Uzbekistan, O’zbekiston Tarihi. While 
Alisher Ilkhamov attempted to address these various criticisms, Pravda 
Vostoka refused to publish his response.79 He then defended his cause in 
two papers published online in Etno-Zhurnal and on the website of the 
Open Society Foundation in Uzbekistan before its closure.
In ‘Objectivity and Accountability: That Which Should Not Be the 
Ethnic Atlas of Uzbekistan’, Alimova, Arifkhanova and Kamoliddin 
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organized an ordered refutation of the work. They began by criticizing 
the nationality entries and the ambiguity of certain terms, such as the use 
of ‘ethnic minorities’, considered in the Soviet tradition to be a derogatory 
term. They denounced what they considered the failure of the rules 
governing ethnographic research, which required the systematic 
description of the ethno-demographic characteristics, specific culture, 
lifestyle, material culture and rituals – in that order – of each ethnic group 
mentioned. The arguments, however, quickly became more political. 
Alimova asserted, for instance, in accordance with official discourse, that 
the Tajiks are not forced to Uzbekify but that there is a natural process of 
symbiosis between Tajik and Turkic peoples, who had existed for 
centuries. Once past these criticisms, all modest and some well-founded, 
the core subject of the controversy appeared: what is permitted to be said 
on Uzbek nationhood. 
In the second part of the Atlas, Ilkhamov openly questioned the 
official narrative. Criticizing the theories of ethnogenesis that have been 
de rigueur in Uzbek science for over half a century, he referred to 
constructivist theories developed in the West, to the idea that the nation 
is a political, intellectual, and state construct, to Benedict Anderson’s 
‘imagined communities’, and posited that it would be ‘naïve to depict the 
formation of Uzbek nation as a natural and objective historical process’.80 
Ilkhamov accused the Soviet classics of contributing to the ‘canonization 
of Uzbek national history’81 and turning the story into the teleology of the 
nation. He insisted that one of the fundamental ambiguities of Soviet 
ethnology, the confusion between ethnos and nation, caused many 
epistemological errors in ethnogenetic science. When publishing the Atlas 
online, Ilkhamov restated his conviction: 
The notion of ethnogenesis seems not to fully reflect [reality] as it 
draws from the arsenal of the biological sciences, representing 
social processes such as natural historical phenomena, where the 
will of individuals, institutions, authorities, groups, and especially 
the elites, in short, social issues remain outside the framework of 
analysis.82 
Ilkhamov also tried to rehabilitate the role of the Shaybanid dynasty in 
national history and devoted an entire chapter to the construction of 
national identity during the Soviet period, placing special emphasis on 
the territorial division and establishment of the Uzbek Soviet Socialist 
Republic in 1924. He insisted on the edification of a codified literary 
language based on only one Uzbek dialect and mentioned three major 
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political forces that had an interest in developing an Uzbek national 
consciousness: the Jadids, the national-communists and the party 
apparatus. 
This iconoclastic reading of national identity raised an outcry from 
official academic circles. In the Soviet tradition, they accused Ilkhamov’s 
points of being ‘unscientific’,83 a term that crops up regularly throughout 
the articles published in response to the Atlas. The many references made 
by Ilkhamov to Western anthropology, which implied its theoretical 
superiority, shocked the Uzbek academic realm, which had limited access 
to the Western texts in question. As Alimova and her colleagues stated:
[Ilkhamov’s] design is based on the theory, widely distributed in 
Western anthropology, of constructivism, which is far from being 
recognized as sound by the ethnological community, since 
constructivism denies the existence of ethnic communities as 
objective realities and recognizes only ethnic characteristics 
constructed by men as a function of circumstances. As such, the 
formation of the Uzbek nation is understood not as a natural 
historical process, but as the result of political construction.84
The Institute of History held an explicitly negative position not only 
toward the constructivist school of thought, but also toward Ilkhamov’s 
attempts to renew with the pre-Iakubovskii’s vision of the Shaybanid 
dynasty as the rupture moment in the history of nationhood. Ilkhamov’s 
insistence on the sixteenth century as a time of Uzbek ethnogenesis was 
seen as an insult to the nation, whose national consciousness – according 
to prevailing narratives – could not be so recent. The main accusation 
reveals the inherent affective and symbolic character of the attack against 
the Atlas: 
By their anti-scientific views and preconceptions, these people 
[Western scholars and people close to them, like Ilkhamov] try to 
depict the Uzbeks and other Turkic peoples of Central Asia as 
uncultured nomads, pastoralists, immigrants and conquerors 
without any cultural traditions in the region … It is therefore 
necessary (for carrying out scientific research) to reject certain 
stereotypes rooted in historical science and misrepresentations of 
the role of the Turkic peoples in history.85 
Other key components of the dispute relate to the Uzbek nation’s auto- 
chthonism and antiquity. Kamoliddin indicted Ilkhamov for implying 
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that the Turkic peoples have always been inherently nomadic, while 
Uzbek historiography is based crucially on the assumption of a prestigious 
sedentary past. Kamoliddin insists that ‘ancient Turks were the first 
inhabitants of Central Asia and constitute a part of the indigenous people 
of the region’.86 According to him, archaeology has proven the existence 
of a large sedentary culture in this area from as early as the second 
millennium bce, even before the arrival of Indo-Europeans. Following the 
tradition of Shaniazov, Kamoliddin obviously wants to attribute this first 
civilization to Turks, claiming: ‘The latest toponymic and linguistic studies 
allow one to suppose that in the second millennium bce, the Dravidian-
speaking peoples lived in close proximity and interaction with the proto-
Turkic peoples, and these ties were broken by the flood of Indo-European 
arrivals’.87 To him, therefore, it is legitimate to state that ‘proto-Turks were 
the first inhabitants of this region and constituted a part of its ancient 
pre-Indo-European population’.88
The controversy around the Atlas can also be interpreted as a 
disciplinary struggle. The Institute of History refused to see the 
ethnological field escape its jurisdiction and be gradually taken over by 
researchers from sociology, much less sociology funded by Western 
advocacy institutions. Kamoliddin, for instance, stated that ethnogenesis 
‘cannot be understood through popular sociological theories, but 
primarily by the principle of historicism’.89 To him, only the historian 
would have the adequate institutional competence to consider ethnic 
processes. Sociology could indeed ‘be useful for communities recently 
formed or being constituted on the territory of other nations, but it cannot 
explain the history of peoples whose national formation occurred on the 
basis of an autochthonous population’.90 Sociology thus encroaches on 
territory considered, in the Soviet tradition, to be the very object of the 
ethnological discipline. 
Alimova confirmed this reading, declaring that ‘it is the Institute of 
History that should have published this Atlas’91 and that it was 
unacceptable for the Open Society Foundation not to have consulted with 
the Institute (‘no recognized ethnologists of Uzbekistan were aware of the 
preparation of this publication’92). The book was, indeed, not overseen by 
local academics licensed on ethnic issues and the Institute of History not 
associated with its publication, although several Atlas authors were 
members of the Institute. A unique combination of political tensions 
around ‘colour revolutions’ and scholarly debates on the constructivist 
versus primordialist vision of nationhood, the Atlas dispute encapsulates 
the heavy symbolism of everything related to Uzbek ethnogenesis. That a 
Western advocacy foundation dared to encroach on such a symbolically 
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significant field was judged unacceptable by both the political authorities 
and the local academic community.
Compared to several of its Central Asian neighbours, Uzbekistan’s nation-
building efforts have been less hesitant. It has faced fewer issues in terms 
of interpreting the past and dealing with the questions of cultural 
continuity, territorial unity and ethnic homogeneity. Many aspects of 
today’s nationhood were already identifiable in the claims of Jadids or 
Uzbek national-communists: the centrality of Uzbekistan, its status as a 
benchmark of Turkestani identity, its historic continuity with the 
Transoxiana legacy, its blend of sedentary and nomad, Persian and Turkic 
features. Soviet institutions in charge of history, ethnography and folklore 
consolidated several segments of Uzbek nationhood in the post-war 
decades. Uzbek history was thus already largely nationalized even before 
the collapse of the Soviet Union. Independent authorities just had to add 
a new layer reinterpreting the Russian-Soviet past and go even further 
back into ancient history to completely nativize the nation in its ties to its 
territory. 
However, Uzbekistan also encountered challenges in the nation-
building process, mostly regarding the articulations between what is seen 
as national and what is considered foreign. As with every origin story, 
Uzbekistan’s nationhood obscured some inconvenient elements in order 
to create the impression of linear development and to avoid disturbing 
paradoxes. Many implicit and ambivalent moments of national history 
have thus been discreetly put to the side. The relationship to the Soviet 
past, officially denounced as colonial – although many citizens display 
strong Soviet nostalgia93 – is probably the most difficult contradiction to 
manage. The place of Tajiks in Uzbek society and the existence of a shared 
identity between the two nations is another theme that remains 
undiscussed because it does not correspond to the strict boundary project 
required by the nation-state. More globally, the role of other Central 
Asian nations in building a Transoxiani and Turkestani culture is obscured. 
Uzbek nationhood does not seem ready to share a common pantheon of 
cultural heroes and continues to capture this common legacy for itself. 
Last but not least, the arrival of Islam in Central Asia is another of these 
silenced moments: for a regime keen to denounce any foreign interference 
and afraid of Islamism, it has proved tricky to admit that Uzbekistan’s 
national religion arrived through foreign influence (Arab conquest).
Like any other country in the world, Uzbekistan can live with a 
nationhood narrative full of ambivalences and unspoken elements. 
However, two challenges that have the potential to dramatically reshape 
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the social and cultural landscape will need to be addressed by the post-
Karimov regime. The first is the articulation of Islam with national 
identity. The previous regime’s posture was, in a sense, schizophrenic. 
Islam was glorified as a national religion in all official speeches, local 
pilgrimage sites were valorised and the great national figures linked to 
Sufism were celebrated. Simultaneously, however, religious practices 
were strictly monitored, sermons controlled, religious education highly 
restricted, and interactions with the rest of the Ummah looked upon with 
suspicion.94 
‘Uzbekness’ remains intimately articulated with ‘Muslimness’ 
(musulmonchilik), but the latter is acceptable only when Uzbekified – 
that is, when it is seen as a national tradition, a cultural and folkloric 
heritage, or an architectural legacy. The space left for Islam in terms of 
practices and norms for behaviours and attitudes, much less in terms of 
invoking Islam to legitimize political claims, has been heavily restricted.95 
As encapsulated by Charles Kurzman, Islam was ‘politically neutered by 
the regime’.96 This contradictory policy will likely become increasingly 
challenging to maintain, as Islamic practices are increasing among the 
younger generations, which see it as part of their individual and collective 
identity. The state secularism inherited from the Soviet regime is thus 
progressively eroding in the face of the population’s development of 
various ways to display ‘Muslimness’. A new Uzbek official narrative will 
have to take these deep societal evolutions into account.97 
The second critical element was the role of labour migration, the 
existence of which was virulently denied by Uzbek authorities under 
Karimov. The President’s declaration that migrants were ‘lazy’ and that 
only the most disgraced go to Russia to work98 exemplified the negative 
connotations of labour migration and the government’s denial of the 
socioeconomic reality that pushed several million citizens to look for 
work abroad. Migration has become a rite of passage for many young men 
and their families in all rural regions of Uzbekistan, helping to structure 
both individual identities and collective mechanisms of solidarity 
and economic strategy.99 Migration also seems to have affected the 
population’s relationship to Islam, as many young migrants are introduced 
to Islamic practices during their time abroad. One way or another, the 
identity-shaping power of migration will have to be recognized and 
integrated into the nation’s narrative, developing it into a narrative that 
is less isolationist and more willing to celebrate Uzbek citizens as 
globalized actors.
The longue durée of the nation’s grand narrative does not preclude 
the existence of changes and evolutions, both abrupt and slow. The death 
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of the ‘father of the nation’ in 2016 reopened windows of opportunity for 
the Uzbek regime to evolve and reformulate its nation-building project. 
Shavkat Mirziyoyev rapidly made several noticeable changes: he criticized 
the Ma`naviyat va Ma`rifat as ‘jingo patriotism’ (ura urachilik)100 that is 
not fit for purpose at a time when greater economic efficiency should 
be the driving ideology of the country; recognized (eventually) the 
importance of labour migration as a unique perspective for many young 
Uzbeks; and relaxed legislation on religion to allow more flexibility in 
everyday expressions of Islamic identity. The disappearance of the ‘father 
of the nation’ figure from Uzbekistan’s politics certainly signified the end 
of an era and the opening of a new one, with profound adjustments to the 
country’s construction of nationhood. The new atmosphere of increased 
academic freedom and the reshaping of the higher education system have 
likewise opened new paths by which the nationhood narrative may be 
rethought and reframed, even if its main features and symbolic 
benchmarks are unlikely to evolve.
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Aryan mythology and ethnicism: 
Tajikistan’s nationhood
In contrast to Uzbekistan, which has constructed itself as the most central 
state in Central Asia, Tajikistan has found its nationhood quite endangered. 
The southernmost and poorest state in Eurasia, the country has faced 
several symbolic handicaps. First, Tajikistan collapsed immediately upon 
the fall of the Soviet Union and plunged into a bloody five-year civil war 
(1992–7) that left over 50,000 people dead and more than half a million 
displaced.1 The memory of this watershed moment makes references to 
the Islamic past of Tajik culture a sensitive topic that the authorities 
cautiously attempt to manipulate. Second, its cultural capitals of 
Samarkand and Bukhara were allocated to Uzbekistan during the Soviet 
delimitation of national territories in the 1920s. The fact that the Tajik 
republic was first created as an autonomous entity inside the Uzbek 
republic before achieving full nationhood status in 1929 contributes to 
Tajikistan’s feeling of victimhood and resentment toward Tashkent.2 As 
Tajik President Emomali Rahmon declared in 2013, ‘Anyway, Samarkand 
and Bukhara will be ours again one day!’3 Third, being the only Persian-
speaking nation of the five Central Asian countries (the rest are Turkic-
speaking) offers Tajikistan an easy way to differentiate itself, yet this 
language difference also contributes to an obsession with encirclement, 
creating tensions with neighbouring Iran and rousing fears of being 
subsumed into a far larger sphere already dominated by Tehran.
Despite these challenges,4 Tajikistan’s nationhood has been able to 
build on the solid foundation left by the founding father of Tajik Soviet 
historiography, Bobodzhan Gafurov. It has developed a narrative that, 
like Uzbekistan’s, stresses autochthonism, precedence over neighbours 
and the nation’s contribution to world culture. A key element of the 
reconstruction of this historical nationhood has been the rehabilitation of 
an Aryan identity, officialized to the point that Rahmon declared 2006 the 
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‘Year of Aryan Civilization’, albeit, as we will see, without any assessment 
of the heavily loaded heritage of the term and its role in the Holocaust. 
Aryanism contributes myriad useful identity references to Tajikistan’s 
nationhood toolkit: it is a sign of uncontested antiquity, it is associated 
with some forms of cultural superiority inspired by nineteenth-century 
Western academic standards, and it allows Tajikistan to bypass an 
unfriendly Turkic environment to symbolically connect with Europe and 
Russia. That being said, Aryanism relies heavily on old-fashioned and 
contestable confusion between ethnic identity and the ideology of race.
Fragile nation-building and the presidential  
rewriting of history
After the 1997 Peace Agreements, Tajikistan stood out as the only post-
Soviet country to recognize an Islamic party: the Islamic Renaissance 
Party of Tajikistan (IRPT), which was a key actor in the civil war but also 
in postwar reconstruction and democratization.5 The IRPT was unique in 
the region in that it was a democratic Islamic party that accepted the 
secular nature of the state and parliamentary representation. However, 
this recognition was short-lived: in 2015, the authorities accelerated their 
authoritarian drift by banning the Islamic Party on the (false) pretext of 
its links with the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq.6
Since the civil war, the relationship between the centre and the 
regions has always been precarious. In the restive Rasht Valley and the 
autonomous region of Gorno-Badakhshan (situated in the Pamirs), 
tensions have regularly flared between local elites and Dushanbe. Labelled 
‘Islamist’ by the authorities so as to strengthen the government’s domestic 
legitimacy and make Tajikistan eligible for international support, these 
insurgencies have involved several conflicts of interest within the shadow 
economy as well as the rebalancing of influences from former warlords 
and central elites.7 As such, scholars continue to debate whether these 
events suggest state weakness or, on the contrary, state success insofar as 
they have recentralized the polity around Rahmon, who has since 
removed presidential term limits and looks set to establish a multi- 
generational dynasty by promoting his son Rustam as his successor.8
Declared ‘Founder of Peace and National Unity – Leader of the 
Nation’ (a title later enshrined in the Constitution and which grants its 
bearer a number of privileges, including the right to run for president for 
life), Rahmon has succeeded in making himself and his family the focal 
point of political power in Tajikistan. Jesse Driscoll advances the notion 
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of Hobbesian Neopatrimonialism to illuminate the roots of the broad-
based social legitimacy Rahmon enjoys. Warlords – both rebel militia and 
pro-regime paramilitary commanders – have progressively built a 
‘warlord state’ based on patronal mechanisms (the only pathway to 
economic security) that relies on kinship and regional rural identities.9
The Tajik regime continues to work hard to control the national 
narrative and has developed a complex process of oblivion and erasure 
around the perestroika years and the civil war. This struggle to control the 
nation’s memory focuses on the relevance of political Islamic activism 
that took shape against the Soviet regime as early as the 1970s and, 
therefore, the significance of Sunni Islam in defining morality and 
collective identity.10 After the 1997 Peace Agreements, the authorities 
attempted to pave the way for the consolidation of the nation-state and 
had to avoid tackling not only the place of Islam in nationhood, but also 
the nation’s difficult relationship with Iran, which is simultaneously a 
brother in Tajikistan’s struggle against Turkic peoples and a potential 
competitor for the country’s ‘Persianness’. As a result, for several years, 
world-famous Persian literary figures who had been re-emphasized 
shortly after independence – such as the poets Rudaki (860–941), known 
as the ‘Adam of Poets’, and Ferdowsi (940–1020), author of the famous 
Shahnameh, one of the world’s longest epics – were somewhat 
marginalized in favour of an identity system that stressed neither the 
Islamic component of these works nor their Persian language.11
Academic circles were asked to contribute to this project through 
the development of a state-backed science of the nation, a science that 
was deeply enmeshed with authoritarian practices and a growing cult of 
personality. The journal of the Institute of History of the Academy 
of Sciences, Merosi niëgon – Nasledie predkov, for example, was regularly 
compelled to devote its first page to the president. The director of the 
Institute of History from perestroika to 2015,  Rakhim Masov (1939–
2018), had to praise the head of state for his decisive role in nation-
building and, in 2003, called for people to vote in favour of Rahmon’s 
extension of presidential mandates as the only meaningful choice to 
secure the country’s stability.12
After hesitating for several years about the historical symbols that 
should be given to the new state, the Tajik presidential apparatus decided 
in favour of the rehabilitation of the Samanid dynasty (875–999) that 
ruled over Transoxiana. By selecting state-builders and not cultural 
figures as their national symbols, the authorities hoped for an easy 
consensus around secular statehood. In 1999, the presidential apparatus 
organized – with great pomp – the 1,100th jubilee of the foundation of 
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the Samanid state, and the dynasty has remained the embodiment of the 
Tajik nation ever since – even if the grave of the dynasty’s founding father, 
Ismail Somoni (849–907), is located in Bukhara. The official newspeak 
asserts a direct link between the Samanids and the newly independent 
state; after more than a millennium of what Rahmon considered to be the 
‘genocide’ of the Tajiks,13 the nation was finally reborn from its ashes as ‘it 
is historical law’ (zakonomernost’) for ancient nations to be reborn.14
In order to promote this reading of history, Rahmon published a 
large, multi-volume historical book, The Tajiks in the Mirror of History 
(Tadzhiki v zerkale istorii, 1999), under his own name. The first and most 
essential volume of this book, From the Aryans to the Samanids, illustrates 
the two core components of Tajikistan’s nation-building narrative: while 
the Samanids are erected as state-builders, they need to be accompanied 
by an older, more ancient reference to prove the unique antiquity of the 
Tajik nation and its precedence over the Turkic peoples. For that purpose, 
Rahmon underlined the Zoroastrian era and an Aryan/Indo-European 
identity as core to the Tajik ethnogenesis. In a Muslim country whose 
intellectual and artistic history is inherently connected to Islam, it may 
seem paradoxical to hear the president claim that Zarathustra was ‘the 
first Prophet of the Tajiks’ and hope that he ‘will be the spiritual leader 
and guide of the Tajik people’.15 According to Rahmon, however, in spite 
of the gap between Zoroastrianism and Islam, there is a close link between 
these two great periods in the history of the Tajik people. Consequently, 
despite being Muslim, he explained, ‘Ismail Somoni remained unfailingly 
faithful … to the elements of Aryan statehood’, and even allowed ‘the 
wise implementation, through the state apparatus, of the spiritual 
standards of Islam and their fusion with the Aryan heritage’.16
Tajik Aryanism: a discourse anchored in Soviet science
This official emphasis on Aryan identity was not born suddenly and solely 
from the mind of the Tajik president, but rather magnifies the research 
carried out by nineteenth-century tsarist science and adapted by Soviet 
ethnology to the ideological conditions of Marxism-Leninism.
In the second half of the nineteenth century, the imperial advances 
of European countries into Asia and Africa contributed to the development 
of a body of literature surrounding white civilization’s so-called mission 
to bring Enlightenment to the rest of the world. The topic of Aryan 
identity, originally developed in a linguistic framework that emphasized 
the existence of an Indo-European language family, became a tool of a 
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heavily politicized agenda – in Europe, to justify anti-Semitism and the 
hierarchy of European nations, and abroad, to legitimize European 
colonialism as a product of the white race’s superiority.17 In the 1850s, for 
instance, the British authorities were instrumental in propagating 
the notion that colonization was just a reunification between one of the 
young branches of the Aryan family, which had emigrated to Europe, and 
the oldest branch, which had stayed in the original cradle.18
St. Petersburg’s expansionist desires – aimed at gaining control of 
Central Asia, Manchuria, Xinjiang, Mongolia and Tibet – also yielded a 
romantic imperialism founded on the Aryan myth. Such an Aryan reading 
of the Russian colonization was promoted by the Turkestan Circle of 
Lovers of Archaeology (Turkestanskii kruzhok liubitelei arkheologii), 
created in 1895 in Tashkent, then-capital of the Turkestan Governorate. 
It presented Russians as the new Aryans, suggesting that they alone could 
bring to light and revive Central Asia’s forgotten past, re-establish its 
Aryan identity and erase its supposedly backward and temporary Turkic 
element. Turkestan Governor General Aleksandr Vrevskii (1834–1910), 
honorary president of the Circle, solemnly declared: ‘Presently, destiny 
has led us, the Aryans, to these very places that our ancestors once left. 
That is why we have the sacred duty to reunite and preserve the historical 
monuments of these lands where an Aryan culture once blossomed that 
we are called upon to restore’.19 A key figure of Russian and then Soviet 
Turkology, Vassili Barthold (1869–1930) denounced the prevalent 
Turkophobia of tsarist circles in Tashkent:
An over-idealized representation of the cultural capacities of the 
Aryans and of the barbarity of the Turks did not fail to influence 
the understanding of Russia’s scientific missions in Turkestan. Thus, 
in 1895, during the opening of a local archaeological circle under 
the direction of the Russian authorities in the area, the suggestion 
was made to study the region’s ancient Aryan culture, which had 
been destroyed by the Turkic barbarians and was experiencing 
a renewal under the domination of other Aryans – that is, the 
Russians.20
This Aryan reading of the Tajiks was continued within Soviet scholarly 
circles in the 1920s and 1930s, especially by Aleksandr A. Semenov 
(1873–1958), whose work bridge the tsarist and Soviet period. Semenov 
played a major role in presenting mountainous Tajikistan, in particular 
the Pamirs and Karategin, as the Aryan brethren, and Tajiks are obvious 
heirs of Aryans.21 The first generation of Tajik researchers, many of whom 
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emerged after the Second World War, re-appropriated the theme. Such is 
the case of the founding father of the Tajik nationhood narrative, 
Bobodzhan Gafurov, who focused extensively on the importance of the 
Indo-European origin in all his works in order to assert the autochthonous 
status of the Tajiks. It is also worth mentioning that Aryanism was a key 
ideological feature of neighbouring Iran under the Pahlavis as well. 
Since the late nineteenth century and in the 1930s as an official ideology, 
the Aryanness of Iranians was praised by Tehran as a sign of cultural 
and racial superiority, as providing an intimate connection with Europe 
and as a means of othering the main enemy – in its case, not the Jews but 
the Arabs.22 In a historical irony, Soviet doctrine and the ideology of the 
Shah thus shared the same myth of Aryan roots.
After completing his studies at the Moscow Communist Institute of 
Journalism and commencing a PhD at the Institute of History in Moscow, 
Gafurov was appointed Secretary of the Central Committee of the 
Tajik Communist Party to produce propaganda. Then, in 1946, he was 
promoted to First Secretary of the Tajik Communist Party. His most 
famous book, The History of the Tajik People in a Short Version (Istoriia 
tadzhikskogo naroda v kratkom izlozhenii), was published in Tajik in 1947 
and in Russian in 1949.23 The book was a huge success and was re-edited 
in Russian in 1952 and 1955. Gafurov held the position of First Secretary 
until 1956, when de-Stalinization compelled him to leave office and 
continue to devote his life to historical research. He was appointed head 
of the Moscow Institute of Oriental Studies and ran the magazine Aziia i 
Afrika segodnia. After the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union, he reorganized the Institute to adapt it to the conception of 
the East promoted by Nikita Khrushchev.24 He continued to work on Tajik 
history, initiating a seminal History of the Tajik People (Istoriia tadzhikskogo 
naroda) with Semenov, published in three volumes in 1963–5, before 
ultimately joining the Academy of Science of Tajikistan in 1968.
Gafurov insisted on the necessity of the nationalization of the 
past, going against a historiographic trend of the 1920s in which authors 
wrote regional (that is, not national) histories of Central Asia. According 
to him, this regionalization distorted history and did not allow each 
nation to be represented fairly.25 He also challenged the historical norms 
formulated by Vassili Barthold in his book, Tajikistan: An Anthology of 
Articles (Tadzhikistan: sbornik statei), which likened the Tajiks to central 
Persian – read: Iranian – culture.26 Gafurov inverted the comparison by 
alleging that the Tajiks were at least as ancient as the Iranians and that 
they had been the mouthpiece of Persian culture. He rejected the idea 
that Iran should be considered the only inheritor of the prestigious 
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ancient period, instead giving historical primacy to the future Soviet 
territory by positioning Tajikistan as the original cradle of Persian culture. 
Gafurov was also the first Tajik scholar to venture out of the geographic 
framework of the Soviet republic – which he deemed too narrow and 
which did not correspond to the reality of the historical Tajik population 
– to claim that the Tajik legacy was visible across the whole of Central 
Asia. This led him into a direct conflict with Uzbek historiography, which 
sought to appropriate the same antiquity.
In his 1947 book, which spans from the origins of the Tajiks to the 
Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, Gafurov aimed to negate the crystallizing 
role of the Samanid dynasty, which he considered too late to embody 
the Tajik ethnogenesis. He reminded his readers that the statehood 
(gosudarstvennost’) of Iranian-speaking tribes dates back to the first 
millennium bce. Ancient Chinese sources, as well as the Avesta,27 
confirmed that the first state in the region was Iranian-speaking and 
located on the easternmost bounds of the Iranian world, putting it within 
the territory of current-day Tajikistan. To support this account, Gafurov 
quoted Nikolai Marr several times; he also asserted that, in the first 
millennium bce, ‘on the ethno-linguistic level, the population in Central 
Asia was Japhetic (iafeticheskii)’.28 If he supported the notion of the 
superiority of the Indo-European peoples, however, he did not – like 
Marr – believe in the massive migration of Indo-Europeans across the 
continent. Instead, Gafurov insisted on the autochthonism of these first 
Iranians/Tajiks:
Iranian nationalities and tribes have never presented a ‘pure race,’ 
they were not ‘pure blood Aryan’, victorious newcomers, as bourgeois 
historians have groundlessly asserted. It is well known that the 
theory of a ‘pure blood race’ is a reactionary lie, a myth. The Iranian 
eastern populations did not come to Central Asia out of nowhere but 
constituted themselves there, on the ground.29
By the logic of this ethnogenesis, cultural supremacy is understood as 
being proportional to the antiquity of the people settled within its national 
territory. Thus, ‘Bactria, Sogdiana and Khorezm turn out to be the most 
ancient centres of the Central Asian peoples and their statehood was 
constituted before that of western Iran’,30 even playing a key role in the 
Achaemenid Empire.31 This claim allowed Gafurov to then kill three birds 
with one stone, claiming that the ethnogenesis of Tajiks is older than that 
of Iranians and that of Turkic peoples, but that it ends – not begins – with 
the Samanid dynasty. On his view, Samanid rulers brought to completion 
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a ‘tendency of a number of sedentary Central Asian peoples toward 
unification and fusion into one – the Tajiks’.32
Gafurov continued his research on the most ancient possible Tajik 
ethnogenesis in his last book, The Tajiks: Antique, Ancient and Medieval 
History (Tadzhiki: Drevneishaia, drevniaia i srednevekovaia istoriia), 
published in 1972. If one compares this new version to the 1947 one, one 
may notice two key differences: the complete disappearance of any 
reference to Marr and the Japhetids (who had fallen into disgrace in the 
1950s) and an increase in criticism of Turkic peoples, especially the Uzbeks.
Indeed, during the 1970s, Gafurov was much more willing to 
distinguish between the Tajiks and the Uzbeks. For instance, in a sub-
chapter specifically devoted to the ‘issue of the ethnogenesis of the Uzbek 
people’ (which, according to the Soviet scholarly division, is a provocation 
in itself in a book dedicated to the Tajiks), Gafurov asserts in no 
roundabout way that ‘the Uzbek people have taken shape on the basis of 
a sedentary Iranian-speaking population’.33 Not only did the Uzbeks 
arrive there tardily, he argues, but they are autochthonous in Central Asia 
only because of their Iranian/Tajik substratum, while their Turkic features 
make them foreigners, invaders from the East. Gafurov also questioned 
the cultural contribution of Turkic peoples: according to him, many 
figures considered Uzbek by Uzbek academia spoke Khorezmi or Farsi 
(that is to say, oriental Iranian) and should therefore be claimed by 
Tajikistan – and even when Chaghatay reached its full development in the 
sixteenth century, half its lexicon remained Arab or Persian.
Such statements obviously sparked indignation in the Uzbek 
republic. As early as the 1930s, Uzbek scientists insisted that Tajik history 
should be limited to the borders of the federal republic and could not 
overflow into neighbouring entities. In 1972, the Academy of Science of 
Uzbekistan complained officially to the Central Committee of the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union about figures considered Uzbek, 
such as Al-Khorezmi, Al-Farabi and Al-Biruni, being presented in a book 
about the Tajiks. Uzbek researchers criticized the fact that the supervisor 
of the book was Boris A. Litvinskii, a Russian whom they believed should 
have been impartial in matters of competition between the Soviet 
peoples.34 Hoping to have these claims validated, Tashkent even attempted 
to get Leningrad Orientalists to make critical revisions to the book. Yet 
despite these actions, Tajik–Uzbek controversies continued unabated. At 
a conference in 1976, for example, Gafurov and Litvinskii once again 
aroused controversy when they claimed that the conclusion of the Tajik 
ethnogenesis was particularly precocious in comparison with that of the 
Turkic peoples.35
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The frantic quest for an Aryan identity  
in post-Soviet Tajik science
President Rahmon’s decision to emphasize the Aryanness of Tajiks 
thus appears as an obvious continuation and even reinforcement of the 
Soviet narrative: Gafurov was declared a ‘hero of Tajikistan’ and his works 
still serve as introductory textbooks for the study of the nation’s history. 
In the 1990s, some Tajik public personalities publicly converted 
to Zoroastrianism, proclaiming it to be the national religion of the 
Tajiks36 – a phenomenon best understood in the context of the civil war, 
during which some people interpreted Islam as a destructive force. This 
conversion movement, however, limited as it was to a small, secular, 
nationalist group of elites, did not have a widespread impact.
The rehabilitation of Zoroastrianism has since moved to the 
academic world. In 2001, the political decision to celebrate the 2,700th 
anniversary of the Avesta prompted numerous publications on 
Zoroastrianism and Aryanism. Considered a reliable historical source by 
the majority of local experts, the Avesta has been read literally. Based on 
this text, some Tajik scholars declared the historicity of mythical dynasties 
such as the Pechdovids or the Kaenids, searching for evidence of the early 
ethnogenesis of the Tajik people as ‘the ancient Aryan society’.37 In this 
literature, Zoroastrianism is systematically presented as a modern faith 
that transformed the ancient Aryan polytheism into monotheism, helped 
to sedentarize nomads, and fostered a developed and urbanized social 
structure.38 Aryan peoples would, they argued, have developed a high 
culture as early as the second millennium bce, and as ‘the new ethnic 
word “Tajik”, used by all Iranians, turns out to be synonymous with the 
ancient word “Aryan”’,39 this prestigious posterity should reflect on the 
Tajiks. This stress on Zoroastrianism remains particularly visible in history 
textbooks, which present it as a native and constructive force – as opposed 
to an Islam that arrived from abroad, through Arab conquests, and 
brought devastation in its wake.40 As in the rest of Central Asia, the 
Zoroastrian past is also indirectly celebrated every year during the spring 
equinox with the Nowruz festival, the Zoroastrian new year.41
The word ‘Ariana’ or ‘Aryanland’ (Oriyozamin) is literally interpreted 
as referring to the ancient country of the Aryans, whose territory would, 
of course, correspond to a contemporary ‘Tajikland’ (Tojikzamin). As the 
archaeologist Igor V. P’iankov summarized:
In Antiquity, Ariana was the territory that corresponded more or 
less exactly to the territorial formation, at some later time, at the 
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beginning of the Middle Ages, of the Tajik people. Ariana as well as 
the question of the existence and formation of an historical Aryan 
community are very closely linked to the prehistory of the Tajik 
people.42
The retroactive affirmation of identity links between Aryans and Tajiks 
also allowed Tajikistan to capture the prestige of the great empires of 
Asia Minor, the Achaemenids, Alexander the Great, the Sassanids and the 
Selevids as precursors of Tajiks, or at least as peoples to whom the Tajiks 
are indebted.43 As Rahmon alleged, ‘the glory and greatness of the Iliad 
and the Odyssey grow dim in front of the famous work of our ancestors’.44
This Aryan-centrism targets a key enemy: the Turkic world, 
particularly Tajikistan’s powerful Uzbek neighbour. Tajik Aryan-centrism 
depicts Turks as foreigners who arrived late in history and should have no 
right to ownership of the region’s ancient past. One can thus imagine the 
scandal that erupted in Tajikistan when Uzbekistan was able to organize 
the Year of Avesta in 2003 under UNESCO auspices. Speaking on this 
subject, Rakhim Masov declared that ‘one could say, quite frankly, that 
once more we are witnessing an organized conspiracy against the history 
of the Tajik people – a conspiracy whose final aim is, as always, to belittle 
the great past of the people and the role of our Aryan ancestors in the 
history of world civilization’.45
However, the reference to Zoroastrianism and Aryanism also creates 
serious points of contention with Iran. As Rahmon stated, ‘our historical 
product becomes often an object of theft’.46 In this historiography, 
Khorassan, Bactria and Sogdiana should be seen not as remote provinces 
of Iran, but as the epicentre of the future Tajikistan, making the latter, and 
not the former, the only heir of this prestigious past. Several articles 
published in the Vestnik Akademii Nauk Respubliki Tadzhikistana 
attempted, for instance, to explain how only the Oriental part of the 
Iranian world, and not its better-known western part, has engendered 
such a developed religion: it is from this Eastern space that the holy 
scriptures of Avesta would have been spread to India, where they would 
have been transformed into Vedas.47 But neighbouring Iran no longer 
really plays the Aryan card, since it considers Aryanism to be a symbol of 
the despised previous regime. Islamic revolutionary Iran has therefore 
advanced cautiously in terms of cultural diplomacy in Tajikistan, avoiding 
the Aryan topic but stressing Persian-speaking solidarity and promoting 
Islamic values in quite soft ways.48
Tajik Aryanism has occasionally been accompanied by radical 
remarks concerning the anthropological specificities – in the Soviet sense 
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of physical anthropology – of Central Asian peoples. Many publications 
use, for instance, the adjectives ‘racial’ (rasovyi) and ‘ethnic’ (etnicheskii) 
synonymously, the aim being to demonstrate the absence of a shared 
subtract between the two peoples and the superiority of Tajiks over 
Uzbeks.
The famous nationalist Tajik historian Numan N. Negmatov (1927–
2011) developed the terminology of ‘racial genesis’ (rasogenez) to explain 
how the ‘racial formation’ of the Tajiks was completed well before the 
arrival of the first Turkic peoples.49 He claimed that: ‘The racial type of 
the Tajiks is ancient, local, and has not suffered any fundamental change 
during the last two millennia, although there was a slight mongoloid 
crossbreeding on the main Europeoid type’.50 Whereas race science has 
been disavowed by post-Second World War Western science, it has 
enjoyed a renewal in Tajikistan since the discovery of population genetics, 
which is interpreted in a very literal sense as providing genetic evidence 
of the historic existence of nations. According to F. Nasirova, for instance, 
molecular genetics will be able to ‘help establish the different ages, 
historical formations, and paths of migration of the various peoples of 
Central Asia’.51 The hope here is to demonstrate – no longer historically or 
linguistically, but rather genetically – that Europe’s cradle is indeed in 
Tajikistan, which has already been ‘proven to be not only the proto-
motherland of Indo-European languages but the cradle of world 
civilization’.52
These narratives have been supported by Rakhim Masov in his fight 
against Uzbekistan. The late Director of the Institute of History was 
famous for his critique of the 1924–9 territorial delimitation that deprived 
Tajikistan of Bukhara and Samarkand – his book, Tajiks: History Stamped 
‘Top Secret’ (Tadzhiki: istoriia s grifom ‘sovershenno sekretno’) is one of the 
few bestsellers of the Tajik publishing market.53 He contributed to posit 
the 1920s as a national tragedy for Tajikistan while simultaneously 
interpreting the Soviet experience as positive for the nation. Masov 
denied that the Soviet discourse, which claimed that Uzbeks and Tajiks 
shared a common racial background, had any legitimacy. For him, ‘there 
cannot be any common roots, any ethnic community between peoples 
originating from entirely contrary races’.54 He also insisted on the Tajik 
origin of many Uzbek national communist leaders, who, in the 1920s, 
accepted the loss of Samarkand and Bukhara; being ‘ethnogenetically 
Tajiks’,55 they must be considered traitors to the motherland.
His condescension toward Turkic peoples expressed itself in many 
of his works. For him, the whole history of the country – from the arrival 
of the Turkic peoples in the first millennium ce until the rebirth of the 
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Tajik independent state in 1991 – should be read as a history of submission, 
humiliation and genocide of the Tajiks at the hands of the culturally 
inferior Uzbeks. ‘The period of the formation of the Uzbeks as an 
autonomous ethnos dates, in historical terms, from yesterday. In such a 
short historical period, it is impossible to create important cultural values 
like those created by the Tajiks over millennia’.56
On the other side of this judgemental statement stands Russia. 
Masov, a member of the International Eurasianist Movement led by 
Alexander Dugin and an advocate for a strong reintegration process, 
regularly and vocally praised the friendship between Tajikistan and 
Russia, whose geopolitical proximity he considered to be based on the 
racial and linguistic closeness between the two supposed Aryan nations.57 
Here, too, Masov’s view has become mainstream: as nicely formulated by 
Helge Blakkisrud and Shahnoza Nozimova, Tajik history textbooks 
present the Russians – both Aryan brothers and Soviet modernizers – as 
the Tajiks’ ‘external self’.58
One can see from Tajik academia’s position on Aryanism that it has 
entirely adopted classic stereotypes of nineteenth-century Western 
science on the superiority of Indo-European/urban cultures and the 
backwardness of Turkic/nomad civilizations. Interestingly, Tajik texts are 
devoid of any reference to more recent Western scholarly production, 
which, over several decades, has questioned the relevance of the Aryan 
reference, the idea of a primary cradle and, crucially, the notion of racial 
supremacy. Local Tajik researchers seem only to have access to nineteenth-
century texts and to Soviet historiography devoted to archaeology or 
Indo-European linguistics. They do not engage with the refutation 
of racial and cultural unity between Indo-European peoples – and 
even of linguistic unity built on a genealogical principle – by contemporary 
science.59
The ‘Year of Aryan Civilization’: a polemical  
performance of the nation
The officialization of Aryanism in Tajikistan picked up steam in September 
2003, when Rahmon ordered that the fifteenth year of independence, 
2006, would be the ‘Year of Aryan Civilization’ – probably in response to 
Uzbekistan’s ‘stealing’ of the Avesta through UNESCO. The presidential 
decree presented the jubilee as aiming ‘to study and make known the 
contribution and the role of the Aryans in the history of world civilization, 
to educate generations in the spirit of national consciousness and 
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self-determination, to develop connections between peoples and 
cultures’.60 However, the appearance of propagandistic billboards 
featuring swastikas announcing the jubilee sparked internal discussions 
with international repercussions. And indeed, Tajik publications on 
Aryanism stand out for their lack of discussion of the German Aryan myth 
and its role in Nazi ideology and the Holocaust.
Several associations of Second World War veterans, in Tajikistan 
and Russia alike, complained about the use of the swastika, forcing the 
authorities to react. Abdukhakim Sharipov, head of the ideological 
section of the administration for the Sughd region, regretted that veteran 
associations who had fought Nazism in Europe had made a false (in his 
opinion) analysis of the swastika and did not understand that it only 
represents the ‘eternal movement of the sun’.61 Nurman Negmatov 
criticized Hitler and German fascism for ‘brazenly offending the good 
name of Ariana and the ancient, agricultural and talented people that the 
Aryans were’. Despite being conscious of the tendentious nature of the 
Aryan reference in the West, Negmatov defended the president’s choice: 
‘Why deprive people of the possibility to specify their objective historical 
origin? Were our Aryan ancestors guilty? … Do we have the right reject 
our ethno-cultural heritage? … The Tajik people are the direct historical 
descendants of the proto-homeland Ariana’.62
This line of argumentation was also subsequently taken up by 
Masov, who called for the rehabilitation of Aryan culture and symbols and 
the restoration of their genuine meaning, for ‘this [Aryan] idea has a 
humanist, cultural nature; it is an attempt to rehabilitate the historical 
reality’.63 The same goes for the president of the Academy of Science, 
Mamadcho Ilolov, who regretted that ‘the theme of the Aryans was 
terribly perverted in the nineteenth century and at the beginning of the 
twentieth century’,64 condemning the Nazi mystification of the subject. 
The Aryan symbol must, he claimed, be linked to democracy, peace and 
well-being, and ‘the restoration of our ancestors’ very rich heritage’.65
The officialization of Aryanism as a state-sponsored ideology for 
Tajikistan also intensified tensions with Uzbekistan. As soon as Rahmon 
announced the jubilee in 2003, the Uzbek historian A. Gershenzon 
denounced the Aryan reference as totally incoherent from a historical 
and linguistic perspective, as well as politically inacceptable.66 The 
following year, a book published in Moscow and Tashkent by G. 
Khidojatov, The Fall of the Samanids (Krushenie samanidov), was perceived 
as a direct attack on the independence of Tajikistan, and as a belittlement 
of the political and cultural role of the Samanid dynasty. In 2005, one of 
the most famous Uzbek archaeologists, Ahmadali Askarov, published an 
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article on the Aryan question entitled ‘The Aryan Issue: New Approaches 
and New Thoughts’, in which he sought to invalidate Tajik claims to an 
Aryan line of descent, denouncing the ‘pan-Iranianism’ of Western and 
Soviet sciences and attempting instead to appropriate the prestigious 
Aryan heritage for the Uzbek people.67 To make his claims convincing, 
Askarov affirmed that Aryans should be differentiated from Indo-
Europeans, with whom they had too long falsely been equated. According 
to him, the Aryans were Turkish-speaking peoples who lived a nomadic 
lifestyle from the Siberian steppes to the Danube; their cradle was not the 
Altay, he claimed, but ancient Bactria and Sogdiana – a narrative that 
makes Uzbeks the obvious heirs of the Aryans, even though they do not 
speak an Indo-European language.
The text sparked a virulent controversy between Uzbek and Tajik 
scholars on the website CentrAsia. This was one of the first uses of an 
online platform to host such debates, which were impossible in more 
traditional printed formats. During the first academic semester of 2006, 
the website published a dozen articles on the topic, and the polemics 
continued through 2007. Masov was, of course, the first to answer 
Askarov’s offensive. According to him, the sole aim of Askarov’s article 
was to credit the Uzbeks as the heirs of the first inhabitants of Central 
Asia, making the article a work of politics rather than of scholarship.68 
Anvar Akhmedov from the Institute of Oriental Studies in Tashkent 
defended Askarov and denounced ‘the creative intelligentsia of Tajikistan, 
[which] has been living for a long time, at least since Gafurov’s The Tajiks 
was published in 1972, with a chauvinistic and national spirit’, even 
referring to the Nazi tradition and accusing Masov of advocating 
Nietzschean principles.69 Masov replied, criticizing the lack of scientific 
evidence marshalled in favour of the Aryanity of Turkic peoples.70 He 
asserted that the Uzbeks’ somatic features made it impossible for them to 
be Aryan: ‘they are in no way similar in terms of their physical appearance 
and their racial origin: … the Aryans had blond hair and blue eyes and 
were tall, while the Turks have large faces, small eyes, squashed noses, 
little beards and a mongoloid physical appearance’.71 Having been widely 
disseminated on the internet, Masov’s answers were collected into a 
volume by the Tajik Institute of History.72 This was accompanied by a 
special issue of Merosi niëgon – Nasledie predkov devoted to Aryanism, 
including an introduction from Masov that refuted both Uzbek and 
Western critiques of the use and abuse of Aryan motives.73
The officialization of an Aryan myth reflects the need for the Tajik post-
Soviet state apparatus to come up with a unifying ideology not based on 
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Islam, as well as the continuation of the Soviet historiographical tradition 
by local academic elites. This Aryan myth enables an isolated and 
peripheral Tajikistan to feel connected to Russia and Europe, which are 
seen as bearer of a form of cultural superiority, and to diminish the 
historical and geographical centrality of its Uzbek neighbour. Although 
Iran is simultaneously apprehended as both a brother and a competitor, 
Tajikistan’s ‘jealousy’ toward Iran appears more easily manageable than 
the heavy grievances it feels against its Turkic neighbours.
Not only is Aryanness a mythical construction – indeed, even 
theories of Indo-European linguistic genealogy are now questioned – but 
the refusal of Tajik elites to comment on what it means, in light of 
Aryanism’s use by the Nazi regime, to treat Aryanism as the nation’s key 
to primacy in the region is problematic. It can be interpreted as a form of 
provincialism in Tajik academia, disconnected from contemporary social 
sciences, or, on the contrary, as a form of post-colonial resistance to 
reading everything through the European prism. However, the latter 
viewpoint does not stand up, as Tajik academia has itself pursued a very 
colonial and Orientalized vision of the region’s history. Indeed, it shares 
the old Russian perspective that the whites/Aryans/Indo-Europeans were 
engaged in a so-called civilizing mission against the backward Turkic 
nomads, believes that phenotypical features reveal civilizational 
characteristics, and upholds forms of cultural superiority borrowed from 
nineteenth-century science.
The Tajik nationhood narrative is also problematic at several other 
levels. First, its victimhood posture does not help the construction of a 
patriotic feeling in the country: a nation cannot be based only on 
grievances, it needs something to be proud of. Second, the Uzbek minority 
(around 15 per cent of the population) obviously does not recognize itself 
in the existing narrative. Third, a usable past alone is not enough; it needs 
to be articulated alongside some vision of the future. The Tajik regime has 
taken that turn of late by investing in symbolic architecture on the model 
already developed by Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. It inaugurated the 
Qasri Millat, or Palace of Nations – the president’s residence, which 
boasted a flagpole that was once the tallest in the world – in 2008; the 
Parchan (or Independence Monument) in 2011; and the National 
Museum in 2013.74 But it is the construction of the Rogun Dam that works 
best as a forward-looking mobilization theme announcing the supposed 
bright future of the nation and its long-awaited prosperity.75
Fourth, and most importantly, the avoidance of Islam – and, even 
more, the indirect critique of Islam hidden within the praise of 
Zoroastrianism – appears to be the central issue of this national 
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construction.76 The excessive rejection of everything Muslim began to be 
readjusted in the late 2000s, which saw the decision to make 2009 the 
Year of Imomi Azam and new centrality given to Rudaki and Ferdowsi in 
the national pantheon. In the 2010s, the Tajik authorities began crafting 
a language of conservative values on the need to respect ‘national 
traditions’, accompanied by repressive policies that primarily entailed 
controlling women’s clothes and body – as always, a symbol of power 
relations.77 The gradual marginalization and then ban of the Islamic 
Renaissance Party, bearer of the Islamic flag, may push the reconciliation 
of symbols even further: the state apparatus can now more easily claim 
Islam without giving the floor to its Islamic/Islamist opponents, even if 
this may lead to the secular nature of the state being challenged in the 
future. Yet just as Uzbekistan’s emphasis on its ancient indigeneity and its 
status as the heir to Transoxiana have remained prominent parts of its 
national narrative even in the post-Karimov era, it is likely that the Indo-
European roots/Aryan myth theme will remain prevalent in Tajikistan 
even once Islam becomes better integrated into its nationhood narrative.
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National unity versus pluralism: 
Kyrgyzstan’s nationhood
Works devoted to nation-building in Kyrgyzstan typically explore the 
ambivalence of the civic versus ethnic models of national identity 
construction and leaders’ failed attempts to integrate minorities and 
symbolically secure the titular nation,1 especially since the 2010 Osh 
riots.2 The civic/ethnic dichotomy has been questioned by many works 
and quite rightly cast as an ‘ideal-type’, unobservable in any reality. 
Studies by ethnologists such as David Gullette and Svetlana Jacquesson 
have shown how insufficient this framework is for grasping the current 
search for a national and state identity in Kyrgyzstan. Past analyses of 
‘clan politics’ have also misconstrued the complexity and modernity 
of political life in the country.3 In this chapter, I argue that what we 
usually see as Kyrgyzstan’s struggle to choose between ethnic and civic 
identity is a misinterpretation: the authorities’ goal is certainly to make 
ethnic Kyrgyz attributes – language and cultural symbols – the bonding 
element around which a civic identity can emerge. The titular group is 
thus urged to merge its ethnic and civic identities, while minorities are 
compelled to embrace a civic identity, many elements of which are 
constituted by ‘Kyrgyzness’.
At stake for Kyrgyzstan, I argue, is not the choice between two 
opposing policies, civic and ethnic, but the evolution from a monopoly 
over the construction of nationhood to an open market shaped by multiple 
actors and narratives. This plurality is perceived by the authorities as a 
threat to sovereignty and a means to weaken attempts at nation-building 
by fragmenting what is traditionally perceived as unified and above 
division. In Soviet times and in the 1990s, the state apparatus and 
academia had a stranglehold over the definition of nationhood. This 
narrative could sometimes be challenged, but it was possible for people 
to differentiate between orthodox and heterodox points of view. Since the 
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2000s, however, it has become more difficult to provide this symbolic 
security, as the discourse on nationhood has been deeply decentralized. 
It is this decentralization, and the accompanying contest for hegemony, 
that is perceived as chaotic, directionless and therefore endangering the 
nation.
This chapter follows the post-independence framework through 
which the Soviet tradition of ethnogenesis was reformulated as a search 
for Kyrgyzstan statehood, with Manasology as the primus inter pares 
argument in favour of the nation-state, and new genealogies developed 
as a legacy of the Soviet-era study of ‘ethnic processes’. It then focuses on 
two layers of decentralization: a plural political environment that 
questions the legitimacy of state-backed nationhood, and a plural 
editorial market that tests academia’s monopoly over the contents of 
nationhood.
From ethnogenesis to statehood:  
Manas and Kyrgyzchilik
The ethnogenesis doctrine posits – implicitly during Soviet times and 
explicitly after 1991 – that the nation-state emerges as the legitimate 
result of centuries of ethnic development. Formulated in a post-Soviet 
framework, this means postulating statehood (gosudarstvennost’) as the 
final goal of the nation. Nationhood and statehood are thought of as 
intimately linked: the supposed presence of an ancient people on its 
contemporary equivalent’s present territory offers political legitimacy to 
that people by implying that the nation’s titular group intersects with the 
state both territorially and culturally.4 Post-Soviet Kyrgyz historio- 
graphy, like that of Kyrgyzstan’s neighbours, is thus built on a teleological 
logic: the history of the nation can only be that of marching toward its 
independence. The idea that futures are multiple and that linearity is a 
retroactive construction is not considered.5 Historical moments that are 
inconsistent with this linearity are conceptualized as transgressions 
standing in the nation’s path toward its destiny and put it into hibernation.
History is also ethnicized. Peasants and nomads are exaggeratedly 
foregrounded as the repository of national authenticity, whereas urban 
cultures, in which minorities are dominant, receive more discreet 
mentions. The nation is seen as an ethnos that possesses a genetic pool 
(genofond) to be preserved, often expressed in the form of cultural and 
linguistic purism, sometimes with a biological note about the supposed 
need for ethnic purity. National history is, therefore, simultaneously 
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populist and statist, as was Stalinist National Bolshevism:6 statist because 
only the state represents the completed form of national consciousness 
in this narrative and populist because the ethnicized people form 
the centre of attention, as evidenced by the incessant references to a 
national mentality (mentalitet) or psyche.7
To pursue the Soviet tradition of patriotic archaeology, the first 
president of independent Kyrgyzstan, Askar Akayev, who reigned over the 
country’s destiny from 1991 to 2005, organized several jubilees, most 
notably the 3,000th anniversary of the city of Osh. However, the jubilee 
also had a clear political aim: curbing the popularity of the former 
secretary of the Kyrgyz Communist Party, Absamat Masaliev (1993–
2004), who received 80 per cent of votes in the 1995 presidential election 
in his native Osh region.8 In 2003, Akayev celebrated ‘2,200 years of 
Kyrgyz statehood’ in the hope of reviving his popularity (which had begun 
to decline following several protests against the cession of territories to 
China) and improving public support ahead of the 2005 presidential 
elections.9 On this occasion, the Academy of Sciences published a new 
history textbook, History of the Kyrgyz of Kyrgyzstan, that was uniquely 
centred on the titular ethnic group.10
However, compared with the history textbooks of neighbouring 
republics, those edited in Kyrgyzstan are more nuanced. As in Soviet 
times, the idea that the Kyrgyz went through a unique ethnogenesis at a 
precise time and place remains contested, with most textbooks giving 
priority to the notion that there were multiple phases of ‘ethnic 
crystallization’ for the Kyrgyz people. The textbooks also recognize that 
the territory of the Kyrgyz has varied enormously, stretching from Altay 
to present-day Kyrgyzstan, whereas their neighbours lay claim to their 
autochthonism or nativism.11 Kyrgyzstan’s historiographic vacillations, 
inherited from the 1950s, have thus been imported into the contemporary 
corpus and accepted as the dominant framework.
Again unlike its neighbours, Kyrgyzstan cannot celebrate a founding 
dynasty whose reign can be commemorated as the golden age of the 
nation, a glory to be reached again in the future. To compensate for the 
absence of any historically proven dynasties or founders, the authorities 
have focused their attention on the hero of the Kyrgyz national epic, 
Manas. The Manas epic, celebrated for being longer than Homer’s Iliad 
and Odyssey, was recorded in written form for the first time by the Kazakh 
ethnologist and historian Chokan Valikhanov (1835–65) in the Issyk-Kul 
region in 1856, then completed by Vasilii Radlov (1837–1918), who, 
between 1862 and 1869, noted down further episodes from the Bugu in 
the Tekes Valley, the Sary-Bagysh of Issyk-Kul and the Soltu of the Tokmak 
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region. During the Soviet period, the great bards Sayakbay Karalayev 
(1894–1971) and Sagynbay Orozbakov (1868–1930) gave the epic poem 
its definitive form. The details related in the epic are, however, vague 
enough to facilitate today’s attempts at ideological appropriation.
In the first years of the USSR, the Manas epic was well received. In 
1925, the poet Kasym Tynystanov (1901–38), first minister of education 
of Kirgizia, supported the publication of Manas, but the rise of Stalinism 
and its suspicion toward anything identified as part of the ethnic 
republics’ nationalism blocked the project. Not until 1946 would it be 
possible to see an extract of the epic poem published in Moscow, when the 
Kirgiz lobby nominated the Manas Opera for the Stalin Prize. But Manas 
fell victim to the ideological hardening in the arts and culture symbolized 
by Andrei Zhdanov (1896–1948), who accused it of ‘bourgeois 
cosmopolitanism’. In 1951–2, the ideological struggle over Manas raged 
between the Kirgiz republic’s two official dailies – Kyzyl Kyrgyzstan, which 
was in favour of the epic, and Sovetskaia Kirgiziia, which echoed Moscow’s 
official line – as well as between the sections of the Communist Party in 
Frunze (today Bishkek) and in Moscow. The major figures of the Kirgiz 
cultural world – such as Aali Tokombaev (1904–88), who was member of 
the Party and a deputy in the Supreme Soviet of the Republic; Kasymaly 
Bayalinov (1902–79), then-president of the Writers’ Union; and writer 
Tugelbay Sydykbekov (1912–97) – took a stance in favour of the epic 
poem.12 In 1952, official discourse shifted, criticizing the epic for being 
anti-Russian, anti-Chinese – a serious political accusation at the time, 
given the Sino-Soviet honeymoon – and pan-Islamic. Celebrated writer 
Chingiz Aitmatov (1928–2008) re-opened the discussion in the 1980s, 
and the first statue to Manas, the hero of the epic, was eventually erected 
in 1985, during the first months of perestroika.
With independence, Manas received acclaim as the embodiment of 
Kyrgyzstan’s nationhood. Manas is now considered to be a historical 
figure who lived in the ninth century, the man who gathered the scattered 
Kyrgyz clans together and launched the great campaign of 840–2, which 
laid the foundation for the first Kyrgyz state. With the support of UNESCO, 
President Akayev organized a jubilee marking the millennium of Manas 
in 1995. The authorities built a historical park, Manas Ordo, in Manas’ 
supposed birthplace, Talas, where a Karakhanid mausoleum thought to 
be his final resting place is situated. Between 120,000 and 150,000 people 
visit Manas Ordo every year,13 confirming its status as one of Kyrgyzstan’s 
main tourist spots.
For the celebration of 2,200 years of Kyrgyz statehood, Akayev 
invoked Manas as the embodiment of this statehood with a book 
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supposedly authored by the president himself, Kyrgyz Statehood and 
National Epos Manas (Kyrgyzskaia gosudarstvennost’ i narodnyi epos 
Manas). In this work, the president did not hesitate to draw religious 
parallels: ‘For the Kyrgyz people, Manas is more than an epic … It is what 
the Bible is to Christians’; ‘My thoughts lead me to draw a parallel between 
Manas and the biblical figure of Moses, who took his people back to their 
native country, leading them out of captivity’.14
During the festivities, the Kyrgyz president also delivered a political 
speech in which he extrapolated ‘seven commandments’ from the epic, 
which he declared the core of his programme of action for independent 
Kyrgyzstan: (1) unity and cohesion of the nation; (2) international 
concord, friendship, and cooperation; (3) national honour and patriotism, 
prosperity through hard work and knowledge; (4) humanism; 
(5) generosity and tolerance; (6) harmony with nature; and (7) con- 
solidation and protection of Kyrgyz statehood. The list reads as wishful 
thinking that lacks any precise political programme beyond that of 
maintaining a collegial relationship between the Kyrgyz majority and the 
Uzbek and Russian minorities. But the goal of this speech was not to 
provide concrete policies but to lay the foundations for a new national 
ideology. As Akayev wrote:
By seeking to evaluate the Manas epic from the viewpoint of the 
idea of the state that it contains, it is easy to see that for the ancient 
Kyrgyz people and its constituents, the epic was a prototype for the 
national constitution, a code of laws and decrees, a code of honour 
and morals, a testament for the Kyrgyz generations to come.15
This elevation of Manas to a form of national ideology has since taken off. 
The discipline of Manasology (manasovedenie) has, for instance, become 
mandatory in many university curricula. It follows a syllabus focused on 
both knowledge of the epic poem itself, its main characters and events, 
the values it defends, and its role in national identity construction.16 The 
Academy of Sciences launched the National Centre for Manasology, 
exclusively devoted to studying the epic, and a group of literature and 
folklore specialists led by the centre’s director, Sagymbai Orozbakov, 
worked from 1994 to 2014 to compile and publish a monumental nine-
volume edition of Manas.17
To Bishkek’s chagrin, China in 2003 launched the first campaign to 
include Manas on UNESCO’s National List of Intangible Cultural Heritage. 
Beijing claimed to be acting on behalf of its Kyrgyz minority in Xinjiang, 
and under China’s lobbying, UNESCO approved Beijing’s application in 
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2009. If the Kyrgyz political authorities are proud of this international 
recognition, they nevertheless had to live down the humiliation of 
China’s having usurped the paternity of the epic.18 Despite this Chinese 
appropriation, Manas remains a hero who embodies the values publicly 
cherished by the Kyrgyz state: a warrior defender of the motherland, a 
representative of the incessant struggle for independence waged by the 
Kyrgyz and their need for self-reliance (although the multi-ethnic 
nature of Manas’ entourage is also emphasized).19 However, the epic’s 
applicability for nationhood purposes is not simple, and it may raise more 
questions than it can answer. For instance, the epos insists on the division 
of the Kyrgyz tribes, depicting them as unable to unify except when 
fighting an external enemy. It does not specify Manas’ tribe either, only 
that he was born in today’s Talas region.20
Aside from Manas, the Kyrgyz have few historical figures with whom 
to construct a national pantheon. Among the oldest is Yusuf Khass Hajib, 
also known as Yusuf Balasagun (d. 1070), an eleventh-century Turkic 
poet based in Balasagun, the capital of the Karakhanid Empire, located 
on the territory of today’s Kyrgyzstan. However, the Uyghurs contest 
this heritage and see Balasagun as theirs. In more modern periods, the 
country can celebrate Atake Baatyr (1738–1854), who initiated contacts 
with the Russian Empire of Catherine the Great at the end of the 
eighteenth century. More recently, the authorities have emphasized 
‘The Queen of Altay’, Kurmanjan Datka (1811–1907), a female tribal 
leader who initiated annexation to Russia and fought against the Uzbek-
led Bukhara emirate and Kokand Khanate, and her adviser Shabdan 
Baatyr (1839–1912). That these are pro-Russian figures presents no 
difficulties for Kyrgyzstan: Kyrgyz nationalist groups are more guided by 
historical rivalries with Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, as well as strong 
Sinophobia, than by anti-Russian feelings.
To make up for the lack of historical continuity in their national 
narrative, the political authorities have turned to campaigns to ‘raise 
national awareness’, making efforts to establish Kyrgyzness as a brand or 
some unique ‘Kyrgyz path’ (kirgizchilik), and to revive Kyrgyz traditional 
genealogies (sanjyras). The celebrated kirgizchilik implies respect for 
ancestral customs (ata babadan kalgan salt), duties stemming from 
kinship (tuuganchilïk) and genealogical belonging (uruuchuluk), and, in 
particular, knowledge of one’s local history (jurchuluk) and lines of 
descent for several generations.21 Parliament is one of the main sounding 
boards for this discourse, as Members of Parliament (MPs) must cultivate 
their constituencies, often of rural origin. As Svetlana Jacquesson 
notes, MPs make use of a simple formulation with significant political 
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consequences – namely, that ‘the best leaders are those with whom 
we share a common ancestor’.22 The political authorities’ interest in 
genealogy was confirmed in 1996 with the publication of the genealogy 
of President Akayev, which claimed to belong to the Sarybagysh clan, 
which has a long tradition of holding power.23
The Soviet prism has thus been at once maintained and transformed 
within the new framework of Kyrgyzstan’s independence. The principle 
of ethnogenesis remains the theoretical foundation of attempts to 
authenticate the nation: the quest to find the overlap between ethnicity 
and state is thus reformulated under the umbrella of an atemporal 
statehood. This linearity materialized in the official appropriation of the 
Manas epic, which, once forbidden, is now sanctified not only as the 
historical origin of the nation but as a living encyclopaedia of the cultural 
and moral values of the Kyrgyz nation. The ethnic obsession of Soviet 
ethnography has been carried over into kirgizchilik, a symbol of the 
quintessence of the Kyrgyz ethnic group, and into the sanjyras, which, 
with official state sanction, make it possible to chart the substructures 
that comprise the modern nation.
Nationhood decentralized? A plural market  
for narratives of the nation
While the nationhood narrative in Kyrgyzstan remains quite in line with 
its Soviet predecessor, it is probably in the production of discourses that the 
change is most abrupt. This change had its full effect not with the immediate 
collapse of the Soviet Union, but rather a decade later, once the political 
and social fabric of Kyrgyzstan had been altered. In Soviet times, the state 
and academia were the sole authorized bearers of discourse on collective 
identity, requiring academics to achieve the political objectives of the state 
apparatus – a model obviously challenged by independence.
The centralized process of stating – and staging – the nation has 
been increasingly tested by the pluralistic nature of Kyrgyzstan’s public 
space. Diversity has emerged both among politicians and within society: 
at both levels, competing agendas use the language of nationhood to 
advance new societal projects. The first plurality pertains to the political 
elites, many of whom raise the issue of nationhood to secure their political 
legitimacy and capture constituencies. The second space of pluralism is 
academia, which is increasingly fragmented due to the emergence of 
competing institutions and, more importantly, of new, popularly produced 
interpretations of nationhood.
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Pluralism and the state
In the 2000s, some segments of the political elites, often originating 
from the southern provinces of Osh, Jalal-Abad and Batken, developed 
a narrative on nationhood that challenged the state-produced discourse. 
From their perspective, state-backed nationhood has several dis- 
advantages. First, it is too oriented toward creating a civic nation that 
offers preferential rights to ethnic minorities – both Russians/
Russophones and Uzbeks.24 According to these elites, the ideology of a 
civic nation, which is sponsored by Western funders, threatens the revival 
and reassertion of the Kyrgyz titular group, its language and its traditions, 
and pushes Kyrgyzstan toward a failing nationhood where the titular 
ethnicity does not control the country’s future.
Second, they denounce the state-backed narrative as being 
produced mostly by northern elites. They criticize the rewriting of history 
as northern-centric (Manas himself is seen as a symbol of the North), 
focused on the relationship with Russia and Kazakhstan, favouring a 
positive reading of Russian colonization and the Soviet era, and offering 
no room for southern elites to express their regional identity and their 
Fergana-centred sensitivities.
This more assertive Kyrgyz nationalism, which emerged as a 
reaction to the civic vision of Kyrgyzstan promoted by the Akayev regime, 
was embraced as a tool by southern political figures – and even supported 
by some northern politicians. For instance, Kurmanbek Bakiyev, 
Kyrgyzstan’s president from the 2005 Tulip Revolution until his overthrow 
in 2010, relied on a different style of political mobilization than 
his predecessor: his legitimacy, both symbolically (through crafting 
new discourses) and pragmatically (by creating consensus among elites), 
was based on a more Kyrgyz-affirming nationalism.25 Two other figures 
have promoted a similar muscular discourse about Kyrgyz identity: 
parliamentary deputy Adakhan Madumarov, who did not hide his ethno-
nationalist convictions when he declared that the ‘Kyrgyz in the country 
are masters of their own house, the others are only renters’;26 and, to a 
lesser extent, Omurbek Tekebayev, a former presidential candidate and 
leader of the opposition group Ata-Meken (‘Fatherland’).
With the 2005 Tulip Revolution and the partial turn-over of elites, 
the state narrative lost the uniformity it had had under Akayev. The new 
ruling elites shared their predecessors’ assumption that the state should 
generate a unifying ideology, but the contents of this ideology became 
more difficult to define once Akayev’s regime was removed. The Bakiyev 
era was marked by a long succession of (failed) attempts to build a new 
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state narrative, with several commissions charged with determining the 
appropriate components. In late 2005, for instance, Bakiyev signed a 
decree establishing a Commission intended to elaborate ‘guidelines 
(kontseptsiia) for the state and national ideology of Kyrgyzstan’. The 
commission was first chaired by Dastan Sarygulov, a former secretary 
of the local Communist Party known for advocating an anti-Muslim, 
ethno-religious revival called Tengrism (see Chapter 5). The Sarygulov 
Commission reported interviewing several thousand people and asking 
them to answer questions about national ideology. Pupils in the last 
classes of secondary school were also required to hand in an essay on the 
question: ‘What should be the ideology of the State of Kyrgyzstan?’27 
Although Sarygulov was quickly forced to resign, calls for a more assertive 
Kyrgyz voice continued. In 2006–7, State Secretary Adakhan Madumarov 
was appointed head of the commission in charge of developing ‘guidelines 
for a pan-national ideology’.28 As the Madumarov Commission proved 
unable to forge a consensus, no guidelines were ever published, and it 
was disbanded as part of the 2009 government reorganization.
State elites were not the only ones trying to formulate a new 
nationhood narrative with a more ethnonationalist colour. Between 2005 
and 2010, the number of political groups using the Kyrgyz ethnic nation 
as their central point of reference multiplied. In 2005, a new nationalist 
party, Uluu Biridik (‘Great Unity’), was created. The party was led by the 
former vice governor of the Issyk-Kul region, Emilbek Kaptagaev, a 
member of the united opposition against Bakiyev. The party’s main 
mission was declared to be the preservation (sberezhenie) of the Kyrgyz 
people, and it called for Kyrgyzstan to be defined as the ethnic state of the 
Kyrgyz.29 Kaptagaev made regular calls to strip Russian of its official-
language status, arguing that such recognition damaged the development 
of Kyrgyz national consciousness.
Then, in 2007, the first kurultai (a traditional assembly or council 
in Turkic and Mongol cultures) of self-described national-patriotic forces 
convened in Osh. This kurultai brought together several dozen small, 
scattered political groups.30 Sarygulov, who was in attendance, accused 
the authorities of having ‘lost their sense of the holiness of the homeland’,31 
and Nazarbek Nyshanov, leader of the small Patriotic Party of Kyrgyzstan, 
made similar remarks. After the overthrow of Bakiyev and the introduction 
of a parliamentary system in 2010, the new political diversity allowed 
ethnic nationalism to be heralded as a legitimate political agenda by 
parties such as Ata-Zhurt, but also by political figures such as the former 
ombudsman Tursunbai Bakir Uulu of the Ar-Namys party, famous for his 
advocacy of political Islam.
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For the past decade, Kyrgyzstan has also witnessed the rise of 
ethnonationalist street movements that act as vigilantes. Such is the 
case of Kyrgyz-Choroloru (or Kyrk-Choroloru, the ‘Forty Knights’, a 
reference to the Manas Epic), which claims to unite several vigilante 
groups of up to 5,000 members,32 although this number is likely inflated. 
Famous for filming their raids and posting them online, the ‘Knights’, 
who use the traditional Kyrgyz hat (kalpak) as their symbol, have 
organized violent raids against foreign businesses, targeting Uyghurs 
working at the Madina market and allegedly illegal Chinese migrants. 
They also target nightclubs and saunas, where they beat sex workers, 
whom they accuse of not respecting Kyrgyz national values and of 
polluting the genetic pool of the nation.33 They likely have patrons 
within the political establishment and law-enforcement agencies – in 
2015, their leader, Zamir Kochorbaev, claimed to have signed 
Memoranda of Understanding with several state institutions, such as 
the GKBN (Kyrgyzstan’s security services, the successor of the KGB), 
the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Emergency Situations, the 
Procurator, and even the Ministry of Youth.34 Another group, the 
‘Patriots’, has been targeting Kyrgyz women dating non-Kyrgyz men, 
especially Russians and Westerners.35 These vigilante groups contribute 
to the spread of narratives – and violent practices – based on the 
rightfulness of ‘Kyrgyzness’ and the need to protect it from so-called 
liberal corrupt moral values, echoing a rising trend in Kyrgyz society in 
favour of social and moral conservatism.
Pluralism and academia
Pluralism has also emerged within Kyrgyzstan’s academic realm. Kyrgyz 
higher education has been deeply transformed and weakened by three 
decades of painful economic transformations. The Academy of Sciences 
and its institutes have lost a significant proportion of their funding, 
human capital and scientific legitimacy. Intellectual circles have become 
more diverse and, due to the country’s openness to foreign initiatives, 
Kyrgyzstan has become a particularly competitive environment for higher 
education.36 Many private universities – including the Slavic-Russian 
University, the American University of Central Asia, the OSCE Academy 
and Turkish universities such as the Turkish-Kyrgyz Manas University – 
have attracted young professionals and the best scholars away from state-
run institutions by providing a more dynamic environment with higher 
salaries for faculty and better international career prospects for students. 
These institutions tend to produce plural narratives that do not necessarily 
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follow the state storyline, and they offer a more diversified market for 
textbook publishers.
Compared with the Soviet era, contemporary Kyrgyz academia has 
also shed its unidirectional approach. If the most conventional academic 
elites still largely share the idea that the mission of intellectuals is to 
substantiate a national ideology, it has become more difficult to identify 
such a unifying ideology. Polemics around reinterpreting the Soviet 
legacy of ethnogenesis among Russian scholars have likewise impacted 
Kyrgyzstan. Long-time Director of the Moscow Institute for Ethnology 
and Anthropology Valerii Tishkov, for instance, was a passionate 
supporter of the constructivist approach,37 and the debates in Russia’s 
main ethnological journal, Etnograficheskoe obozrenie, reverberated in 
Kyrgyz publications such as Izvestiia Natsional’noi Akademii Nauk. 
Physical anthropology, considered a legitimate discipline during the 
Soviet decades, has fallen into obscurity, while the simultaneous rise of 
population genetics has created a new smokescreen for the same work by 
seeming to validate biology-based approaches to nationhood.
Finally, alternative history has become an important component of 
the popular production of narratives on nationhood. The combination 
of freedom of speech and the effect of the market economy on the 
publishing world has created a boom in alternative histories across 
the former Soviet Union and especially in Kyrgyzstan. This genre blurs the 
boundaries between legitimate science and popular knowledge and 
enables numerous autonomous actors to invade public space with their 
own, sometimes highly imaginative, narratives. While some authors label 
these alternative histories as fiction, others position themselves in direct 
competition with what they denounce as ‘official scholarship’. The decline 
of the Marxist meta-narrative has generated new interpretative frames, 
including the notion that no single explanation can be legitimate and that 
‘hidden hands’ have shaped history, giving rise to myriad popular 
conspiracy theories.38
As in Kazakhstan, alternative history in Kyrgyzstan has taken the 
form of pan-Turkic nationalism with the country’s titular ethnic group at 
its centre. The historian Lev Gumilev (1912–92), who advocated for a 
Turkic-centred historical metanarrative, enjoyed unique posthumous 
prestige in Kyrgyzstan. President Akayev quoted him several times, 
repeatedly acknowledging him as a source of inspiration for his own 
analysis of the peoples of the Steppe.39 Gumilev embodies a specific 
version of Eurasianism that gives prominence to Turkic peoples, 
particularly nomads, and projects a magnified history dating back from 
the mass migration of the Huns to the Mongol Empire.40 Gumilev straddles 
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the worlds of academia and pseudoscience, and his scientific output has 
produced heated debates between those who consider him one of the 
greatest historians of the Turkic world and those who see him as a 
marginal figure. His biology-based definition of ethnos and valorization 
of the nomadic past have also made him a key reference for many Kyrgyz 
scholars with nationalist sensibilities.
More clearly identified as promoting alternative histories, Murad 
Adzhi (1944–2018) helped spread an epic vision of the Turkic past and 
its role in world history. Adzhi’s work can be considered the Turkic 
equivalent of the New Chronology movement advanced by Anatoly 
Fomenko in Russia, which states that Russia was the cradle of major 
ancient civilizations but had its legacy stolen by German historiographers 
in the service of European powers fighting against Russia.41 An economist 
by training, Adzhi specialized in the early 1990s in an alternate history of 
the Turkic world, claiming that a huge historiographical plot had been 
orchestrated by the Russians to erase from the eyes of the world the unity 
of the Turkic world and its state, Dasht-i Qipchaq.42 Silently borrowing 
from the ‘sun theories’ of Ottoman Turkey,43 Adzhi proclaimed that Turks 
are the origin of all the great ancient and modern civilizations, that they 
brought Christianity to the European barbarians, and that Turkic 
languages were the lingua franca of Europe and Eurasia until the 
Renaissance. His best-known book, Europe, Turks, and the Great Steppe 
(Evropa, Tiurki, velikaia step’), published in 1998, was widely available in 
Kyrgyzstan – and in Kazakhstan – and inspired many local writers to 
produce similar storylines for popular consumption. His success declined 
in the 2000s, however, with the emergence of more relevant historio- 
graphical production of genealogies.
Indeed, the public space devoted to debating nationhood has 
been deeply transformed by the growing mass production and mass 
consumption of genealogies and local history, which have emerged as 
their own field. As insightfully explored by Svetlana Jacquesson, the 
popular 1990s mass media accounts of Kyrgyz customs and traditions 
accelerated in the 2000s and 2010s into a frenzy of genealogical searches 
(uruu/uruk), narratives and family trees, with an impressive level of 
popular involvement. Fluid oral traditions progressively consolidated into 
fixed narratives that are now presented as reflecting the ‘true’ and 
‘authentic’ roots of the Kyrgyz nation.44 These genealogies have recently 
invaded the educational system, with textbooks that mention the clan-
based origins of the main national heroes,45 and are widely discussed on 
social media and television. As Svetlana Jacquesson explains, ‘The 
relocation of history production from the academy to the realm of mass 
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media and the internet acts as a powerful spur for producing more and 
more history-related “truths”’.46
This process has challenged the conventional state-backed 
nationhood project, largely inherited from Soviet academia, which 
dismissed genealogies as shameful and conflated political clans with 
lines of descent. On the contrary, genealogy is now regarded as the 
embodiment of an authentic Kyrgyz democracy, providing a written form 
to a collective identity and memory in which morality and behaviours 
play an important role.47 The construction of this popular knowledge 
about nationhood has been facilitated by the internet and social media, 
where numerous sites offer genealogical reconstructions or discuss them. 
Once again, academic knowledge seems dispossessed of its right to speak 
at the expense of a nationhood narrative presented as the advent of the 
people.48 Amateurs or connoisseurs of local history have reached such 
levels of notoriety that, from now on, it will be difficult for official 
historiographers to avoid integrating their narratives into the official 
nation-building project.49
What is at stake for Kyrgyzstan is thus not the binary choice between a 
civic or ethnic nation, but the evolution from a monopoly over the 
production of nationhood to an open market shaped by multiple actors 
and narratives. David Gullette and John Heathershaw have correctly 
insisted on the importance of collective emotions to the definition of 
sovereignty, as well as the need for scholars to explore the field of 
affectivity in order to understand the current – diffuse, but sustained – 
feeling among the population that the fundamentals of Kyrgyz sovereignty 
are under threat.50 Cai Wilkinson has shown the degree to which difficult 
interactions with the international community and disagreements over 
what Kyrgyzstan should be have played a traumatic role in reshaping 
nationhood.51 An additional component could be added to their argument, 
namely that present-day Kyrgyzstan lacks a hegemonic voice that could 
achieve a consensus on staging the nation.
The state, in Kyrgyzstan, no longer speaks with one voice: elites in 
power, the presidential apparatus, the parliament and the political parties 
all project multiple, sometimes conflicting, narratives on nationhood.52 
The state itself has become an object of competition among different 
groups, leaving nationhood’s symbols and meanings open to negotiation 
and competition. This decentralization has also hit the traditional places 
of narrative production with full force: academia has lost its uniformity 
but also its legitimacy – among its last exclusive rights is the publication 
of history textbooks for school pupils – and many alternative actors are 
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advancing their own agendas, claiming a right to participate in defining 
the nation.
Exploring the efforts to produce a narrative on nationhood in 
Kyrgyzstan thus opens the door to several broader theoretical debates, 
especially concerning the growing overlap between consumers and 
producers of nationhood. Similar to the world of social media, each 
person can alternate between the roles of consumer and producer. This 
inherent, emerging plurality makes it possible to blur the boundary 
between orthodox and heterodox narratives, between science and para-
science, and between the global and the local. The frenzy for genealogical 
knowledge and local history, often mixed with broad statements about 
globalization and the need to know one’s own roots, highlights the 
‘glocalism’ of Kyrgyz public space. This decentralized, competitive 
production of rival discourses on nationhood gives many actors the 
impression of chaos, echoing fears related to endangered sovereignty.
Two components should be added to this discussion. First, this 
plurality of narratives is increasingly a Kyrgyz-speaking one. The gap 
between the rigidity of the Russian-speaking market on nationhood – 
mostly produced by the state, academia and official institutions – and the 
lively and multifaceted Kyrgyz-speaking public space is growing. Second, 
a new actor has entered this race to produce a narrative on the nation, 
and it is Islam-related. The success of neo-fundamentalist piety 
movements such as Tablighi Jamaat and other proselytizing groups 
is making Islamic proponents fashionable and respectable and, in 
producing new individual and collective identities, adds a supplementary, 
and probably decisive, element to Kyrgyzstan’s decentralized – and 
democratic – nationhood.
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Reborn nation, born-again religion? 
The case of Tengrism
Within the new political context of Central Asia’s independence, and at a 
time of large social transformations, the relationships to meaning and to 
believing have been significantly re-articulated. The reshaping of 
nationhood has impacted all religions, from the already institutionalized 
ones like Islam and Christianity to the more diffuse movements based on 
a form of ‘traditional spiritualism’. Of the latter, Tengrism likely represents 
the most telling of the interactions between a supposed national rebirth 
and a born-again phenomenon around ethnic faiths. The Tengrist 
revivalist ideology is based upon a so-called return to the allegedly 
ancient religion of Turkic peoples. It epitomizes the famous ‘invention of 
tradition’1, studied by Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, that 
accompanies every crafting of nationhood. It illustrates the tensions 
between politics and religion: contrary to the widespread idea of 
secularization as the obvious way forward, we live in a world in which 
new forms of religiosity and beliefs – from proselytizing movements to 
New Age and conspiracy theories – shape worldviews and influence 
politics and national construction. This religiosity is nurtured by a 
decentralization of historical production and consumption in which 
individuals look for their own agency in world history through the 
creation of popular historical narratives devoted to the hidden greatness 
of their nation’s spirituality.
From Tengri to Tengrism: an interrupted trajectory
The word tengr or tergir (tänri in old Turkic) means ‘sky’ in the Turkic–
Mongol languages. The worship of the sky or its deities is confirmed by 
many written and archaeological sources dating back to the Turkic 
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kingdoms of Siberia in the sixth through eighth centuries. According to 
these sources, ‘Sky’ became at that time a political institution connected 
with the Emperor, and it was used as such to unify the Turkic empires 
until their conversion to Buddhism, Manichaeism or Islam.2 Certain 
ancient Islamic texts written in the Turkic language associate tänri with 
Allah, endorsing its use as a synonym for God.3
The term was introduced into the Russian language in the nineteenth 
century to designate the religious system of the ancient Turks, as, 
for instance, in the works of Kazakh ethnographer Chokan Valikhanov 
(1835–65). Danish historian Vilhelm Thomsen (1842–1927) gave it new 
life when he deciphered runic writing of the Orkhon steles in the upper 
Yenisei basin at the end of the century. In the Soviet era, the Kazakh writer 
Olzhas Suleimenov (see Chapter 7) introduced the word tengrianstvo in his 
famous book  Az i Ia, presenting it as ‘the most ancient religion in the world, 
elaborated as a philosophical teaching four thousand years ago’.4
Although contemporary Tengrism asserts historical connections to 
an ancient cult of the sky, it has been unable to demonstrate that any 
Tengrist practices have in fact been maintained throughout the centuries. 
Functioning primarily as an intellectual trend for cultured urban elites, it 
is intended to be a religion of the reborn nation. Since the 1990s, the 
neologism tengrizm has increasingly competed with the word tengrianstvo, 
or ‘practices linked to the Sky’, whose final suffix signals not only its 
conceptual nature but also a possible practical implementation. All the 
contemporary followers of Tengrism present their faith as monotheistic, 
as the existence of a pantheon of divinities does not contradict their belief 
in a superior abstract force. Some Tengrist ideologists, such as the Kazakh 
Nigmet Ayupov, denounce a Eurocentric vision of Tengrism that makes it 
nothing more than a form of paganism. On the contrary, Ayupov argues, 
Tengrism offers a complete cosmogony of the world and gives its disciples 
a system that is at once religious, philosophical, mystical and practical.5
Places and actors of Tengrism
Tengrism is promoted by small intellectual circles in Kazakhstan and 
Kyrgyzstan, as well as in several national republics of the Russian 
Federation, including Tatarstan and Buryatia. In Buryatia, the hero of 
the national epic, Geser, was set up as the nation’s symbol as soon as the 
Soviet Union collapsed. The republic’s authorities as well as academic 
circles have institutionalized this mythic figure and organized official 
celebrations that combine shamanist and Buddhist referents with 
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allusions to Tengri.6 In Mongolia, the expression Höh Mönh Tenger, 
‘Eternal Blue Sky’, which has been associated with the foundation of the 
empire by Chingis Khan in the thirteenth century, is now a major symbol 
of statehood. But whereas revivalist movements in historically Buddhist 
or shamanist Siberia can easily add Tengrism to the national pantheon 
without creating tensions, in the Muslim republics, Tengrism positions 
itself in direct confrontation with Islam.
Tatarstan hosts the main Tengrist newspaper, Beznen-Yul (Our 
Path), published since 1997 in the town of Naberezhnye Chelny, known 
for its Tatar nationalist scene and its active Salafi underground. The 
monthly newspaper was long edited by Damir Shaikhetdin and Zinnur 
Agliullin, the latter of whom was one of the former leaders of the Public 
Pan-Tatar Center (Vsetatarskii obshchestvennyi tsentr or VTOTs), a key 
institution promoting the renewal of Tatar identity in the first half of the 
1990s. Since losing the support of a segment of public opinion in 
the second half of the decade, the Tatar nationalist movement has shifted 
to a more explicit Islamic identity as the only force able to preserve 
national identity.7 Agliullin has moved in the other direction, calling for 
an anti-Muslim Tatar nationalism based on the rehabilitation of Tengrism. 
The journal accordingly tried, though without success, to influence the 
local presidential administration under Mintimer Shaymiev (1991–
2010), who preferred to institutionalize a narrative on the harmony 
between Islam and Orthodoxy at the republic level.
In Bashkortostan, Talgat Tadzhuddin, the Chief Mufti of the 
Central Muslim Spiritual Directorate of Russia (of Tatar origin), drew 
attention to himself several times by speaking out in favour of Tengrism. 
He presented it as the first monotheistic religion and asserted that the 
Tatars prayed to Allah under the name of Tengri well before the birth of 
the Prophet. He claimed that popular Islam is based on a syncretism 
between Tengrism and classical Islam made possible by the maintenance 
of some proto-Islamic rituals and traditions. He also defended the idea of 
local pilgrimages to places such as Bulgary and Biliar, a practice heavily 
condemned by the muftiyat of Kazan, which refuses to acknowledge their 
status as a small hajj.8 Tadzhuddin’s positive assessment of Tengrism is 
rooted in his vision of a Eurasian syncretic unity of religions. He has, for 
instance, showcased his friendship with late Moscow Patriarch Alexey II, 
whom he considered the country’s supreme spiritual leader, and he has 
used the expression ‘Holy Russia’ on several occasions.9 Tadzhuddin’s 
view remains a minority one: the main Islamic institutions and leaders 
are much more critical of Tengrism, which they see as a pre-Islamic 
paganism that should be eradicated.
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There is also a small Tengrist movement among the Krymchaks, a 
community of Rabbinic Jews of Turkic origin living in Crimea, close to the 
Karaites – a Jewish community which does not recognize the Talmud but 
only the Torah. Some Krymchak intellectuals insist on their Turkic identity 
rather than on their Jewishness: since they are Turkic-speaking, their 
‘true’ religion could not be Judaism but must be Tengrism.10
In Kazakhstan, as in Tatarstan, the Muslim Spiritual Directorate 
has refused any syncretic bringing-together of Islam and Tengrism, an 
attempt apparently initiated by some Sufi movements that hoped for the 
assertion of a specific ‘Kazakh Islam’.11 Published in Almaty, Rukh-Miras, 
a quarterly journal launched in 2004, offered several articles praising 
Tengrism. Edited by the writer Murat Auezov (b. 1943), the almanac 
advocates for a civilizationist approach, based on the idea that the world 
is divided into cultures or civilizations, which are conceptualized in an 
essentialist religious mode; the uniqueness of Kazakh civilization would 
be found in its Tengrist conception of the world.12
Yet it is in Kyrgyzstan that the Tengrist movement has achieved the 
highest visibility. It went through a first phase of institutionalization at 
the start of the 2000s, with the founding of the Tengir-Ordo Association 
for the Preservation of the National Heritage (Fond sokhraneniia 
natsional’nogo naslediia Tengir Ordo). The association’s deputy is Dastan 
Sarygulov (b. 1947), a former secretary of the regional Communist Party, 
who, after Kyrgyzstan’s independence, continued his political career as 
governor of the Talas region. Sarygulov is best known for (corruptly) 
running Kyrgyzaltyn, the state-owned company in charge of exploiting the 
country’s gold reserves. Dismissed from office in 1999 by President Askar 
Akayev, whom he accused of ruining him, Sarygulov then defected to the 
opposition. Despite their political disagreements, Akayev has on several 
occasions mentioned Tengrism as the original religion of the Kyrgyz. 
During his 2002 trip to Khakassia, he even made a visit to the runic steles 
on the banks of Yenisei, declaring that they constitute a pilgrimage to a holy 
place for the Kyrgyz just like the pilgrimage to Mecca.13
Sarygulov is not the only Tengrist ideologue in Kyrgyzstan. He 
maintains close relations with less politicized personalities who operate 
in informal networks without any affiliation with academic institutions. 
Among them are individuals such as the philologist and journalist 
Shoyun Omuraliev, his publisher Tailak Abdydabekov, the historian and 
journalist Abdrahman Alymbaev (who goes by the pseudonym of 
Bayas Tural) and the writer Assan Yakchylykov. The Tulip Revolution of 
March 2005, which overthrew Akayev, has enabled Tengrist actors to 
gain greater visibility in the public space. Omuraliev, Alymbaev and 
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Yakchylykov helped former presidential candidate Urmat Barktabasov to 
create his own political movement, known as ‘Mekenim Kyrgyzstan’ 
(My homeland, Kyrgyzstan).14 Their hope was to transform the movement 
into a political party based on Tengrist ideas and, ultimately, to gain 
parliamentary representation.15
A close associate of the next president, Kurmanbek Bakiyev, 
Sarygulov succeeded in getting himself appointed to the prestigious office 
of State Secretary and quickly set about denouncing the absence of any 
national ideology capable of putting the country back on its feet. His 
leadership of the Commission in charge of elaborating the country’s 
national identity provoked virulent criticism from all those worried that 
Tengrism was about to become officially sanctioned. Their fears were 
allayed in May 2006, when Sarygulov was dismissed both from his post 
as State Secretary and from the Commission. Since Bakiyev’s overthrow 
in 2010, Sarygulov has continued a political career close to the so-called 
national-patriotic opposition, but he has done so without again reaching 
his former level of influence.
Tengrism as a New Age movement:  
ecocentrism and natural democracy
Tengrism can be interpreted as one of the Eurasian versions of 
the worldwide New Age movement. A movement that appeared in the 
1960s, New Age has no structured doctrine: its followers believe in an 
eclectic and personalized combination of different religious inspirations 
based on the idea that there are different levels of reality. This loose 
religious conglomeration usually consists of three main poles: alternative 
spiritualities interested in Oriental religions, esotericism, occultism, 
astrology and UFO research; alternative therapies advocating holistic 
medicine and wellbeing; and alternative political or social organizations.16
The followers of Tengrism claim that their faith offers a com- 
prehensive cosmology adapted to the contemporary world, a natural 
religion for humankind.17 The absence of a personification of God would 
confirm that Tengrism represents a forward-looking vision of religion 
adapted to postmodernity and globalization. It indeed combines eclectic 
references inspired by different religious traditions: it questions rational 
knowledge, alludes to the theosophy movement of Elena Blavatsky 
(1831–91), and displays an affinity for some Buddhist and Hindu 
principles. Beznen-Yul referred regularly to Western-style occultism, while 
Rukh-Miras puts forward the notion of traditionalism or perennialism, as 
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founded by René Guénon (1886–1951),18 even mentioning Frithjof 
Schuon (1907–98), one of the main traditionalist thinkers who converted 
to Sufism.
Proponents of Tengrism like to mix their cultural references. Several 
of them praise Shintoism as the only religion that has managed to 
preserve its so-called ‘ethnic feature’ over the centuries. Among the 
admirers of Shintoism is the Tatar thinker Rafael Bezertinov, author 
of Tengrism: The Religion of the Turks and Mongols (Tengrianstvo – religiia 
tiurkov i mongolov), published in Kazan but distributed widely among 
Tengrist circles in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. Bezertinov celebrates the 
supposed religious proximity between Shintoism and Tengrism, claiming 
that this can be explained by the common ethnic origin of the Turkic 
peoples and the Japanese – several centuries before our era, he argues, a 
Hunnic tribe crossed the Sea of Japan to settle on the Japanese islands.19
Although they admire Asian people for their rejection of cultural 
Westernization, the proponents of Tengrism were all raised with late 
Soviet culture. They therefore refer regularly to Russian traditions such 
as Cosmism, especially Vladimir Vernadsky’s (1863–1945) theories on 
the bioenergy of the peoples, and even the neo-Eurasianist ideology of 
the infamous Alexander Dugin (b. 1962).20 Cosmism is a non-conventional 
spiritual tradition that combines strong allusions to Christianity 
(redemption via resurrection), a pan-psychic reading of the universe, and 
belief in still-unknown cosmic forces and an extra-terrestrial future for 
humanity. Its complexity resides in its twofold scientific aspect. It is both 
a science of spatial conquest – construed as conventional, legitimate 
science and endorsed by the Soviet regime as the embodiment of progress – 
and a science of modifying current material realities using the force of the 
spirit, which our societies perceive as illegitimate or irrational.21
One of the central arguments advanced by adherents of Tengrism 
relates to the movement’s environmentally friendly posture: it would 
promote a religious ecocentrism.22 According to Sarygulov, the rapid 
development of technological knowledge has given men the illusory idea 
that they control nature. The West has started down a dead-end path that 
leads the whole of humankind to its downfall; indeed, the Soviet 
experience confirmed the failure of human domination over the natural 
world. This denunciation of industrial modernity is a recurring theme of 
all Tengrist narratives, which rehabilitate the spiritual to the detriment 
of the material.23 They blame Abrahamic religions for humankind’s 
technological madness. Sarygulov, for instance, condemns Christianity 
and Islam as anthropomorphic religions: by asserting that man was 
created in the likeness of God, and by suggesting that the latter could 
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have been incarnated as a man (Christianity) or could have transmitted 
his message through a man (Islam), these two religions have distorted the 
place of humankind within nature. Only nature should be considered as 
the representative of the divine on earth, with humans occupying a 
modest position in this hierarchy.24
Proponents of Tengrism thus position themselves in favour of a 
political and economic deglobalization that would refuse to export 
Western values or neoliberal practices to the rest of the world. They call 
for a return to national traditions, ethnic faiths, nation-states, and a 
doctrine of world peace and non-interference. This postmodernist 
position goes hand-in-hand with the supposed democratic essence of 
Tengrism. According to Sarygulov, Tengrism represents the natural 
religion of the nomads: unlike sedentary people, the nomads would have 
never become slaves to material wellbeing and would have experienced 
neither feudalism, monarchy nor despotism. The Kyrgyz state would have 
differentiated itself from its neighbours by its democratic nature. Power 
would always have been elective and not dynastic; the country would not 
have experienced revolution, uprising nor civil war, and it would have 
been marked by the absence of any institutionalized coercive force. The 
original Kyrgyz people was thus economically and spiritually free until 
the coming of the Russians brought the ‘decline of the national spirit, the 
loss of the national pride’.25
Tengrist followers insist on a direct, unmediated link between 
humans and the divine: Tengrism is a faith without a prophet, without 
a holy text, without any institutionalized place of worship, without a 
clergy, without dogma or interdicts, without rites and prayers. Raphael 
Bezertinov further contends that Tengrism is a religion devoid of any 
social exploitation, without power relations, without any financial or 
institutional reality, whereas Abrahamic religions have always promoted 
the cultural domination of one group over the others and served the 
interests of foreign powers.26
Racialized nationalism as Tengrism’s ideological matrix
Rooted in a post-colonial narrative, Tengrism strikes a balance between 
adhering to postmodern values and anchoring itself into the ethnic past 
of the nation. The latter trend seems to dominate, with heavily ethnicized 
and racialized language largely similar to the Russian neopagan 
movements. As in Western Europe, many ‘new religious movements’ have 
developed in Russia over the past three decades. Alternative spiritualities, 
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Eastern religions, esotericism, occultism, astrology and research on aliens 
first became fashionable among Soviet urban elites in the 1970s.27 Among 
these, the Rodnoverie (ethnic faith or Mother Faith) movement, which 
seeks to restore the pre-Christian religion of the Slavs, has benefited from 
the simultaneous search for spirituality and the paranormal and the 
rediscovery of ancient Russian traditions and folklore: it calls on followers 
to interact with Mother Earth and her gods, but also to find their place 
among the ancestors and thus preserve a supposedly pure Russian ethnic 
identity. The same goes for Tengrism.
For instance, Sarygulov writes that if the Kyrgyz were able to survive 
waves of invasions, whether by Arabs, Mongols, Dzhungars, Chinese or 
Russians, it is precisely because ‘the Tengrist vision of the world was the 
ideological, spiritual, and moral basis of the people and supported the 
state in all stages of its existence’.28 In Tatarstan, Tengrist proponents 
cannot celebrate political independence and thus prefer to insist on the 
antiquity of ancient Steppic peoples and their role in building the first 
Eurasian states. Tengrism can thus ally with pan-Turkic claims. Rafael 
Bezertinov and Beznen-Yul focus on praising ‘the traditional vision of the 
Turkic world’, referring to the Scythians, the Huns, the Bulgars of the 
Volga, and the empire of Chingis Khan, which would all have had 
Tengrism as their main religion. The journal even insisted, in several 
articles, on the links between the Finno–Ugric and Turkic–Mongol 
peoples, as well as rehabilitating the Volga Bulgars as genuine natives of 
the Volga region before the arrival of Mongols.29
All Tengrist ideologists are obsessed with Sumer, seen as the 
older prototype of a developed civilization and ancient stateness 
(gosudarstvennost’) that Turkic people need to reconquer.30 This 
comparison of the Turkic–Mongol languages with Sumerian and Etruscan 
languages, as well as the assertion of close cultural links between them, 
originated in nineteenth-century European linguistics but is still vivid in 
some post-Soviet intellectual circles. Beznen-Yul claimed that Sumerians 
spoke a Turkic language and that their writing would have been close to 
the runic alphabet discovered in Siberia. Nigmet Ayupov also thinks that 
Tengrism was the ancient religion of Sumer.31 According to Sarygulov, the 
kings of Sumer were called Tengir and all the great ethical teachings of 
humankind were born in the Orient because Tengrism was dominant 
there for several millennia.32
Believing in the need for an ethnic faith, defenders of Tengrism have 
taken vocal public positions on what they consider the still-colonial 
situation of their respective countries. Fixated on the dangers threatening 
the survival of the nation, they blend all enemies into one: Russia, the 
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United States, Israel and Arab countries are all accused of ‘ideological 
expansion’33 as well as ‘neocolonialism and the distorting process of 
globalization’.34 In Kyrgyzstan, Sarygulov favours a ‘cleansing’ of the 
country from any foreign influence, whether from Russia, China, the 
Middle East or the United States. In Tatarstan, Beznen-Yul received a 
warning from the Russian Ministry of Justice for incitement to inter-ethnic 
hatred. An article published in 2006, titled ‘Catechism for the Non-
Russians’ and signed by the ‘Movement against the Russification of 
Tatarstan’, denounced the colonial culture of Moscow and the risk of the 
disappearance of the Tatar nation.35 The journal called for a return to 
runic writing, claiming that ‘writing … carries the genetic code of the 
nation’.36 The loss of the ‘national’ alphabet would signal the loss of 
identity: as long as the Tatars continue to use the Cyrillic alphabet or go 
back to the Arabic script, national rebirth cannot be secured.
Proponents of Tengrism do not hide their deeply biological 
definition of the nation and their racial credo. In Kazakhstan, the 
musicologist Assiya Mukhambetova spoke about the existence of a 
‘Tengrist superethnos’, mixing religious belonging with ethnicist theories 
inspired by Lev Gumilev.37 Biological metaphors are also a recurring 
theme in Sarygulov’s remarks: with the disappearance of national 
traditions, he says, Kyrgyz would lose their ‘genetic code’.38 As for Beznen-
Yul, it has on several occasions asserted an opposition to mixed marriages, 
claiming that they would cause hazardous genetic combinations.39 
Bezertinov, too, has contended that ‘the spirit of a nation is defined 
along three main lines: the unity of blood, language, and religion’.40 He 
condemns the Westernization of Tatar society, which he describes as 
coming in the form of alcohol, tobacco, homosexuality, monogamy and 
the elevated status given to women, and calls for the return to a patriarchal 
and polygamist conception of the family. He even denounced the 
existence of an Institute of Blood Transfusion in the USSR, claiming that 
the Institute aimed to weaken the patriotism of each people by decreasing 
its biological defences.
For Tengrist ideologists, Islam should be publicly decried as a faith 
foreign to Turkic peoples and imported by Arab conquerors. The hidden 
narrative here is that Islam, as an Abrahamic religion, has a Jewish 
background and therefore indirectly defends the interests of the alleged 
world Jewish domination: classical anti-Semitism, inspired by the 
infamous Protocols of the Elders of Zion and the conspiracy theory of the 
so-called Zionist Occupation Government (ZOG), has been integrated 
into the ideological portfolio of Tengrism.41 Bezertinov’s biological 
determinism, for instance, is inspired by a virulent anti-Semitism that 
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sees the Abrahamic faiths as a coalition united in favour of Jews: ‘On the 
face of it, all the Semitic religions – Judaism, Christianity and Islam – are 
opposed to each other. But in fact, their representatives in high places live 
peacefully with one another’.42
A famous Kazakh nationalist writer, Aron Atabek (see Chapter 9), 
writing for Beznen-Yul, theorized the link between Tengrist theories and 
racialist doctrines. For him, the Creator is a neutral cosmic force that 
receives prayers from human beings: ‘A man, finding himself in his ethnos 
and in his ethnic religion, prays in his ethnic language to his ethnic, 
natural, and genetic god’.43 He claims that the Jews therefore founded 
three religions – Judaism, Christianity and Islam – in order to receive the 
force of the peoples praying to these gods. By praying to a Semitic god, his 
theory goes, the Turkic peoples thus give their energy to the Jews and not 
to themselves. As we can see, the revival of ethnic faith remains deeply 
anchored into racist and anti-Semitic clichés, with an ideological 
genealogy sometimes descended directly from the Nazi Rassenkunde.
Competing with Islam for the status  
of national religion
In Kyrgyzstan, where Tengrism is the most developed, the movement’s 
main struggle has been to compete with Islam for the status of national 
religion. The ‘invented tradition’ of tengrichilik (the Tengri way) remains 
a top-down ideological creation with little popular appeal. Some 
references to Tengri44 do exist, notably in rural areas, but there are gaps 
between the emic perception of Tengri in a traditional system of 
representation and its ideological and political reinvestment by 
theoreticians. As for the possibility of implementing the mode of 
‘believing’ specific to Tengrism, Shoyun Omuraliev states:
There are some people who practise tengrichilik, but they are very 
few. They form small groups that pray on their own. But they don’t 
know all the rites of tengrichilik, they know only some fragments. 
We must set up a system to unify all the rites. We must reunite all 
that is scattered. Praying five times a day comes from Zoroastrianism, 
but this practice was spread by Semitic peoples. When the Arabs 
pray, they do not do it by praying to the whole universe. But we do 
pray to the whole universe: the Sun, the Moon, etc. For each rite, 
there is a corresponding text. For the moment, all this remains 
scattered, but it exists. We have to revive everything that exists. 
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All the rites have to be written in Kyrgyz, our national language. We 
have to systematize and unify all that refers to Manas, to shamanism, 
everything that appears in the bata [invocations], and the hopes 
expressed by the youth.45
Tengrists’ political aims, which include securing for Tengrism the status 
of national religion, have of course elicited resistance from representatives 
of institutionalized Hanafi Sunni Islam. Yet following the example of 
Tengrist theoreticians, some of these Islamic institutions’ representatives 
have also become involved in promoting Islam as a form of ethnic faith 
specific to the Kyrgyz and devoid of any transnational or universalist 
dimension, save for attention to potential dangers of radicalization and 
politicization. If a certain Islam is held to be specific to the Kyrgyz, it is 
precisely because of the presence within it of Tengrist elements that are 
interpreted by certain Islamic officials as belonging to a ‘national tradition’ 
and not to a theological corpus per se. Kyrgyzstan’s former supreme mufti 
Murataly Zhumanov declared, for instance:
The tengrichilik is not a religion but an organization created in order 
to bolster the nation. To my mind, this does not contradict Islam. 
But we have received complaints on behalf of certain citizens who 
say the persons organizing the tengrichilik do not have good 
relations with Islam. They say that these persons do not like Islam. 
There are many rumours such as these, I don’t know if it is the truth. 
In the Shari’a, there exists a single religion, and that is Islam … 
The word Tengri signifies Kuday [God]. In Arab, it is Allah. In the 
Turkic languages, one says Tengri. In Farsi, one says Kuday. The 
Kyrgyz use expressions like Tengirim koldosun (‘May the Tengri 
protect us’) or Tengirim zharatkan (‘It is Tengri who created us’). 
The word Tengri ought not be confounded with tengrichilik. At the 
same time, during the era when Islam did not exist, when people 
had no education, it was to Tengri that they prayed.46
Omurzak Mamaiusupov, former director of the State Agency for Religious 
Affairs of Kyrgyzstan, even more explicitly asserted the existence of a 
specifically Kyrgyz Islam:
A lot of specialists confuse the Kyrgyz with Arabs, Turks, Uzbeks, 
Tajiks, etc. But it is crucial to know the Kyrgyz way of being Muslim. 
The Kyrgyz are a people which has never abandoned its traditions. 
They have never renounced their kalpak [a traditional Kyrgyz hat 
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worn by men]. They have not changed their highland character … 
We call ourselves Muslims, but we are Muslims with distinctive 
features. Even if they are Muslim, the Kyrgyz do not follow the 
nuances of Islam … We, we have such distinctive features. Religion, 
Islam, has been understood as a tradition. We conceived of Islam 
according to the kirgizchilik. The Islam of the Turks, the Tajiks, the 
Uzbeks, and the Turkmen is clearly different from ours.47
But Mamaiusupov expressed caution about creating stronger ties between 
this local version of Islam, alleged to be ‘specifically Kyrgyz’, and 
tengrichilik:
There are attempts being made today to make certain traditions to 
which we have adhered comply with the principle of tengrichilik. But 
we call Allah either Tengri or Kuday. That is the particularity of 
our mazhab (one of the four juridical schools of Islamic law). The 
Tatars in Russia also call it Tengri. It is therefore quite improbable 
that tengrichilik could ever be accepted here as a religion. One 
thousand years ago, Islam entered into our genes and our blood. We 
have maintained the principle of tengrichilik within us as a tradition. 
It would require a thousand years to make all Kirghiz into tengrichi 
… Nobody can prove whether the fact of tethering pieces of 
fabrics to the mazar, for example, stems from tengrichilik, Sufism or 
tradition.48
Rakhat Achylova, a scholar working on women’s issues who was a 
member of the Presidential Commission for National Ideology in 2006, 
presents tengrichilik as a ‘philosophical outlook’ that cannot be considered 
a religion. She states in a very expressive way the specificity of Kyrgyz 
Islam, which she describes as being mixed with tengrichilik: ‘Tengrichilik 
came into Islam along with its traditions. In our Islam, one can see 
traditions which come from tengrichilik. By accepting Islam, our ancestors 
used tengrichilik to adapt to what we were’.49
As we can see from this brief overview, two ethnic-national 
ideologies, each articulated around a religious reference, Islam or 
Tengrism, have come to compete with one another to define Kyrgyzness. 
With the passage of time, both now find themselves challenged by more 
universalist readings of Islam, which are becoming mainstream. By 
reducing the space for a specifically ‘Kyrgyz Islam’, more universalistic 
readings of Islam have also accelerated the marginalization of Tengrism 
in Kyrgyzstan’s public space.
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Tengrism can be read as an attempt to ethnicize the divine: according to 
it, true religion is not universal but instead rooted in an exclusive 
belonging to a collective, in an ethnic or racial definition of humanity. 
This is one of the key paradoxes of this movement, which in some 
respects – including its rejection of institutionalized doctrine and clergy, 
as well as its ecocentrism – positions itself as a postmodern faith. Tengrism 
is not unique in that contradiction: many ethnic faith revivals, especially 
Europe’s neopagan movements, share a lot with the New Age atmosphere, 
yet rise in a different ideological ecosystem in which ethnicity, if not race, 
is interpreted as a major element of collective identity. Beznen-Yul even 
published the declaration of the Estonian neo-pagans at the World 
Congress of Ethnic Religions and has been supporting efforts to launch an 
‘International of Natural Religions’.50
Even if Tengrism positions itself as highly critical of the Soviet 
Union, which is seen as a form of Russian colonial domination, it remains 
deeply anchored in several aspects of Soviet ideology. Its argumentation 
against Abrahamic religions, for instance the claim that Islam and 
Christianity justified the exploitation of the lower classes and the wars 
between nations, are borrowed from Soviet anti-religious propaganda.51 
Its proponents belong to cultivated urban middle classes that were 
pauperized by the Soviet collapse and changes in habits, as discussed by 
Serguei Oushakine in his seminal Patriotism of Despair.52 They find 
themselves more at ease with a religion that demands no regular ritual 
observance nor theological background and which is limited to the 
praising of Mother Earth.
Tengrists use Tengrism as an allegory to speak about the reborn 
nation, whether centred on the acquisition of independence or integrated 
into pan-Turkic claims. In Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, Tengrism stresses 
the competition with Islam for the title of national religion – a lost 
cause – while in the Russian republics, it is used with more pan-Turkic 
tones to denounce Moscow as a colonial power. In both cases, the central 
notion put forward is that Turkic statehood cannot be completed and 
secured without the officialization of its own ethnic faith. Freeing the 
nation from a foreign religion and reviving ethnic faith is thus advocated 
as the last step toward full, sovereign nationhood.
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Hybridity in nation-building:  
the case of Kazakhstan
All the states that emerged from the former Soviet Union have been 
studied for their state- and nation-building, as well as for the ways in 
which they have transformed the Soviet-era nationality policies. These 
transformations, although featuring some shared elements, have been 
specific to each case.1
In the post-Soviet patchwork of nation-building strategies, 
Kazakhstan constitutes a unique case for several reasons. First, upon the 
fall of the Soviet Union, the Kazakh republic was in the singular position 
of having a titular nationality that comprised a minority of the population 
(only 39.7 per cent of Kazakhstan’s population identified itself as 
Kazakh).2 It was home to the largest Russian minority after Ukraine 
(6.2 million)3 and its territory was settled in segregated fashion, with the 
so-called European minorities residing in the north, north-west and east 
of the country, Uzbeks largely in the south, and ethnic Kazakhs in the 
central regions, albeit with very low population density. Second, 
Kazakhstan developed the most sophisticated version of the post- 
Soviet ‘friendship of peoples’, stressing the notion of a civic Kazakhstani 
nation as well as Eurasianist ideology, which was promptly turned into a 
domestic and an international brand in a more consistent way than it had 
been in Russia. Third, Kazakhstan represents the post-Soviet state that 
best internalized the criteria of a ‘globalized’ nation, adeptly raising its 
transnational potential and displaying unabashed architectural modernity 
largely modelled on the Gulf countries.
Kazakhstan is, therefore, a textbook case for the construction of a 
hybrid state identity.4 It presents several identities, some of which were 
already established in the Soviet period5 and each of which is designed 
for a specific audience. In this chapter, I look at the three identity 
paradigms promoted by the authorities: Kazakhness, Kazakhstanness and 
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transnationalism. Indeed, Kazakhstan defines itself simultaneously as a 
political entity of the Kazakh people, a multi-ethnic Kazakhstani nation 
at the crossroads of the Eurasian continent, and a transnational country 
integrated into world trends. While nodes of competition exist between 
these three paradigms, they also overlap on some occasions and are 
articulated not in opposition to each other but as a hierarchical pyramid. 
Kazakhness has always been seen as the fundament, the cornerstone 
of Kazakhstan’s state identity and the centre around which to develop 
Kazakhstanness. Transnationalism, meanwhile, is seen as a path of 
development that could potentially be emulated by other countries.
The paradigm of Kazakhness
The first discursive paradigm deployed by Kazakhstan is that of 
Kazakhness, which has been operationalized through state-run narratives 
about the country’s identity and two key public policies: ethnic 
repatriation and the promotion of the Kazakh language.
kazakhness as a narrative of the state about itself
The Kazakhness paradigm was the first to be expressed during the 
perestroika years of state-building and preparation for full sovereignty. As 
early as October 1990, in the ‘Declaration of Sovereignty of the Kazakh 
Soviet Socialist Republic’, the reference to Kazakhness began to be 
flaunted: the Declaration states that the republic ‘bears the responsibility 
for the Kazakh nation’ and that the ‘rebirth and development of a specific 
culture, traditions, the language, and the reinforcing of national pride of 
the Kazakh nation and the other nationalities living in Kazakhstan 
constitutes one of the main missions of the statehood of the republic of 
Kazakhstan’.6 The new constitution, adopted in 1995, takes up this call by 
stipulating that the creation of the state is being carried out on indigenous 
Kazakh land: ‘We, the people of Kazakhstan, united by a common historic 
fate, creating a state on the indigenous Kazakh land’.7 The symbolic 
identification of Kazakhstan with Kazakhness is thus unambiguously 
stated in the highest legal text.
Kazakhness is equally cultivated in presidential speeches. Former 
President Nursultan Nazarbayev’s work V potoke istorii (In the Flows of 
History, 1999), for example, is an ode to Kazakh identity. In it, Nazarbayev 
insists on the Kazakhness of Kazakhstan as a historic legal accomplishment 
recognized by the international community: ‘A legal, constitutional and 
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international foundation has been given to the fact that all Kazakhstan is 
the historic-genetic territory of the Kazakh nation’.8 The central argument 
of legitimacy used in such presidential narratives is that of historical 
precedence: Kazakhs were present on the territory of present-day 
Kazakhstan before the Russians came to settle there. Any historiography 
based on the idea that there was a free space available for settlement, as 
proclaimed in Russian conceptions, thus pertains to colonial untruths.9 
This line of argumentation was affirmed in the 1996 Concept for the 
Formation of a State Identity of the Republic of Kazakhstan, which 
proclaimed that, as Kazakhs do not possess statehood anywhere else in 
the world, Kazakhstan must be a national, Kazakh state.10
Kazakhs’ pre-eminence is not supposed to reduce the rights of non-
Kazakhs but to urge them to internalize values identified as specifically 
Kazakh. ‘The culture of the Kazakhs must be seriously assimilated by the 
representatives of the other ethnic groups, just as the Kazakhs, in their 
own time, earnestly studied Russian culture’.11 Kazakhness is thus 
promoted as a driving force behind building Kazakhstanness: ‘The 
formation of Kazakhstani citizenry (grazhdanstvennost’) … is impossible 
without the transition to a higher level of spiritual development of the 
Kazakh nation’12 since ‘Kazakh culture has to be objectively the kernel 
around which will grow … the cultural community of all the Kazakhstani 
people’.13 This ambivalence between Kazakhness and Kazakhstanness is 
a direct legacy of the paradoxical Soviet nationalities policy, in which the 
Russian people constituted the backbone of Soviet integration and the 
link connecting all other identities to each other.14 In this context, 
Kazakhness would also constitute a factor of horizontal integration 
(between all ethnic groups) and vertical integration (between the state 
and its citizens), such that it allegedly does not stand in contradiction to 
Kazakhstanness.
Kazakhness is proudly displayed at all levels of Kazakhstan state 
symbolism. The state emblem includes a shanyrak (the round aperture at 
the top of a yurt), and many features inspired by the Kazakhs’ nomadic 
heritage (for instance, the eagle) are used in official iconography as 
well as semantics. The Golden Man – a Scythian warrior discovered in a 
kurgan (a tumulus constructed over a grave) at Issyk – became the symbol 
of the country’s independence and nomadic past and is one of the most 
reproduced artefacts in Kazakhstan. Renaming streets in honour of 
Kazakh historical figures has made it possible to build a distinctly 
ethnicized national pantheon. Kazakhifiying city names (either by giving 
them back their original Kazakh names or by creating such names from 
scratch) has helped to territorialize the nation and thereby legitimize its 
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contemporary borders. The Kazakh Khanate has increasingly been 
considered the main political entity confirming the Kazakhness of the 
contemporary state since the fifteenth century. State-sponsored cinema 
from the film company Kazakhfilm has also contributed to elaborating an 
ethnocentric narrative of the national history. Films such as Nomad 
(Kochevnik, 2005), Mustafai Shokai (2008), The Sky of My Childhood 
(Nebo moego detstva, 2011), Warriors of the Steppe (Myn Bala, 2012), 
Kazakh Khanate: Diamond Sword (2016) and Tomiris (2019) aim to instil 
pride in Kazakh heroism throughout the centuries by staging the national 
epic on screen.15
Kazakhness also appears in the architecture of the new capital 
city, Astana (now Nur-Sultan). Although Astana was originally a Russian 
and Soviet city, its anointment as capital city was legitimized by 
archaeological digs that unearthed the existence of an ancient nomad 
settlement there, demonstrating the Kazakhness of the city’s territory.16 
References to Islamic motives and to Central Asian blue ceramics are 
part of the general design of the new capital’s architecture. The 
masterpiece of the city’s left bank, Baiterek, which symbolizes the 
country’s independence, is inspired by Kazakh folklore and features a tree 
with a golden orb at its top. The Khan Shatyr building, a giant and very 
elite-oriented entertainment centre, serves an architectural metaphor for 
the traditional Kazakh yurt.17
Nor was the narrative of the Kazakhness of Kazakhstan deployed 
only during the first years of post-Soviet state-building.18 On the contrary, 
it is continually updated, occupying a growing share of public debates. 
Between 2008 and 2010, preparations for a Doctrine of National Unity 
revived the question of the pre-eminence of Kazakhness over 
Kazakhstanness. In launching this doctrinal project, the regime surely did 
not think it was opening a Pandora’s box. Nevertheless, the first draft 
released by the presidential administration aroused very strong reactions 
among nationalist groups and Kazakh-speaking intellectual milieus, with 
some threatened to go on a hunger strike, and rapidly published an 
alternative document.19
After several months of debate, President Nazarbayev approved a 
new National Unity Doctrine. This version, radically different from the 
original draft, integrated over 500 proposals from nationalist leaders, 
political parties and academics. Although the draft of the text contained 
the term ‘Kazakhstani’ no less than 17 times, this word was entirely absent 
from the final text, which used the term ‘Kazakh’ to refer to both the 
ethnic and civic nation.20 This evolution is not unique to Kazakhstan: it 
can also be found in Russia, where the term russkii (a person who is 
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ethnically and culturally Russian) increasingly replaces the term rossiiskii 
(a person with Russian citizenship) and is now open to being interpreted 
in both a civic and an ethnic way.
In the new doctrine, the Kazakhs are referred to using the term 
‘people’ (narod), whereas the ‘political nation’ (natsiia) is implicitly 
understood as being Kazakhstani. The final text proclaims that ‘in new 
historical conditions, the Kazakh people, having given its proud name to 
the country, has the responsibility of a historical mission to become the 
consolidating centre of the unity of the Nation (konsolidiruiushchii tsentr 
ob”edineniia Natsii)’.21 The text also proclaims that one of the state’s 
missions is the ‘promotion, preservation and development of the ethnic, 
cultural and linguistic identity of Kazakh ethnic groups’.22 The use of the 
plural ‘groups’ raises questions: Does it refer to different Kazakh ethnic 
groups (tribes, juz or hordes) or to all the ethnic groups that make up 
Kazakhstan? As in Russia, muddying terminology is an integral part of the 
state strategy to keep things related to national identification malleable 
in their interpretation.
kazakhness and the regime issue
Kazakhstan’s foundational ambivalence in deploying narratives 
about Kazakhness can largely be explained by reference to the founding 
years of perestroika and the birth conditions of the republic. Early in the 
perestroika years, the Soviet order and Moscow’s legitimacy in supervising 
local affairs were undermined on the basis of national motifs. The 
December 1986 riots symbolized this seamlessly: the Zheltoksan (Kazakh: 
‘December’) Riots occurred as a response to Gorbachev’s dismissal 
of Dinmukhamed Kunayev (1912–93), then-First Secretary of the 
Communist Party of Kazakhstan and an ethnic Kazakh, and sub- 
sequent appointment of Gennady Kolbin, an outsider to the republic 
and an ethnic Russian. The student crowds protested against the 
nomination of a Russian for a position that had been traditionally given 
to a Kazakh, seeing this as an unacceptable act of humiliation on 
Moscow’s part.23
The Zheltoksan events deeply marked the political culture of the 
independence decades in Kazakhstan. Nursultan Nazarbayev, Prime 
Minister under Kunayev since 1984, came to power in this context; he was 
obliged to take a stand against the riots because they challenged 
the policy that Moscow had implemented, but ultimately came out as the 
winner by being named party leader in 1989 and then Chairman of 
the Supreme Soviet in 1990. From the outset, then, Nazarbayev had to 
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manage the contradiction of being both an opponent of and a product of 
Zheltoksan. As president of independent Kazakhstan, he had to celebrate 
the event as the rebirth of the humiliated nation against the Soviet 
colonial centre, while, as a politician, he could not base himself on the 
legitimacy of having personally participated in the revolt. In Almaty in 
2006, for the twentieth anniversary of the events, he inaugurated a 
Dawn of Liberty monument, pointing to Zheltoksan as the epitome of 
Kazakhstan’s struggle for independence.24
This ambivalence toward the national question continued in the 
first years of independence. The three main nationalist parties that 
formed in 1989–90 – Zheltoksan, Alash and Azat – positioned themselves 
as the rivals of the local communist elites.25 From the outset, therefore, 
Nazarbayev conflated political opposition and nationalism: with the 
exception of the Russian associations,26 the Kazakh nationalists were his 
most fervent opponents. On several occasions throughout the 1990s, they 
tried to form opposition coalitions and defy the increasingly authoritarian 
regime. This situation was reproduced in the 2010s: anti-Nazarbayev 
narratives are no longer crafted by Russian minorities or by pro-Western 
liberal advocacy groups, but are borne by young generations of Kazakh 
political activists who use social media and wield increasingly nationalistic 
themes, particularly directed against a Russia-backed Eurasian Economic 
Union (see Chapter 9).27
The Kazakhness paradigm therefore finds itself in a permanently 
ambivalent status: it is promoted, especially toward the Kazakh-
speaking part of the population, as the fundament of state identity – and 
ethnic Kazakhs do display the highest rate of identification with the 
state28 – but it is also looked at with suspicion by the authorities, which 
see in it a potential competitor proffering a rival ideology. Another 
element explaining the ambivalence of Kazakhstan’s authorities toward 
the Kazakhness paradigm is linked to the latter’s relationship to Islam. 
The authorities are very cautious not to conflate Islam and national 
identity. As analysed by Mariya Omelicheva, ‘President Nazarbayev 
opted for the superordinate concepts of “religion” and “faith” as the 
substitutes for Islam’,29 stressing the role of religious values in general, 
instead of Islam, as a source of unity of the nation. Growing debate over 
the place of Islam in the public space and the collective identity of 
Kazakhs is interpreted as a threat to the secularist state ideology. The 
mobilization potential of an ethnic nationalism partnered with 
Islam could indeed challenge the political status quo built over three 
decades.
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kazakhness as public policy
The ideology of Kazakhness rarely shapes the country’s public policies, 
with two main exceptions: the policies of repatriating ethnic Kazakhs 
from abroad and prioritizing Kazakh as the state language.
About five million persons who identify as Kazakh live abroad: 
1.5 million in Uzbekistan, 1.5 million in China, 1 million in Russia, 
100,000 in Turkmenistan, 80,000 in Mongolia and several tens of 
thousands in other neighbouring countries.30 In two decades, a total of 
about one million Oralmans (repatriates) have been repatriated, mostly 
from Uzbekistan and Mongolia, or have emigrated to Kazakhstan 
on their own.31
The repatriation policy was initiated in November 1991, just before 
the collapse of the Soviet Union. The Law on Immigration, adopted in 
1992, stated that all ethnic Kazakhs abroad are potential volunteers to 
‘return to their historical homeland (vozvrashchaiushchiesia na 
istoricheskuiu rodinu)’.32 Here, the term homeland is above all symbolic, 
since the majority of these potential repatriates have always lived outside 
of Kazakhstan’s contemporary borders, even though a number of them 
are the descendants of Kazakhs who fled Soviet persecutions in the 1920s 
and 1930s.33 In the same year, this policy was complemented by a 
document on internal migration designed to encourage ethnic Kazakhs 
already residing within the republic to move to regions dominated by 
non-Kazakhs,34 a text published with the unconcealed aim of avoiding the 
division of the country along ethnic lines, a Russified north versus a 
Kazakhified/Uzbekified south.
Contrary to the compatriot policy launched by Russia, which makes 
anyone who considers Russia to be his or her homeland eligible for 
repatriation without ethnic distinction, Kazakh law defines Oralman on 
exclusively ethnic grounds. Some texts specify that an Oralman is ‘a 
person of indigenous nationality’ (litso korennoi natsional’ nosti)35 or ‘any 
foreigner or stateless person with Kazakh ethnicity who resided outside 
the boundaries of Kazakhstan on the day of independence and who 
entered Kazakhstan in order to settle on a permanent basis’.36 Russians, 
Uzbeks or Uyghurs who might like to benefit from this policy or can prove 
they had ancestors who lived in the territory of current-day Kazakhstan 
are unable to take advantage of it.37 For a time, the Oralmans even enjoyed 
an exemption that allowed them to retain dual citizenship, but the 
authorities abolished this in 1995 to avoid being accused of ethnic 
discrimination.
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The repatriation policy has a double purpose: first, to overcome the 
disadvantageous demographic position of ethnic Kazakhs within 
Kazakhstan, and second, to rebalance the geographical distribution of 
Kazakhs within the national territory. While it was relatively successful in 
reaching its first goal, it has largely failed to achieve the second. Oralmans 
were invited to settle in the northern regions in order to counter Slavic 
domination, but the majority settled and continue to settle in the south of 
the country or the already rather Kazakh-dominated western regions 
(particularly Mangystau).38 Moreover, this state-run process of ethnic 
Kazakhization of Kazakhstan has failed to address several social problems 
experienced by Oralmans: high levels of unemployment, difficulties in 
educating their children, a lack of integration mechanisms, and – for 
those who came from outside the former Soviet realm – a lack of 
familiarity with Soviet cultural codes and the Russian language.39 Much 
though the authorities might try to downplay it, the level of xenophobia 
toward Oralmans among the Kazakh/Kazakhstani population reveals the 
difficulties inherent in trying to artificially strengthen the Kazakhness of 
Kazakhstan.
The second Kazakhifiying policy implemented by the state relates 
to language policy. During perestroika, the Kazakh language was 
established as a symbol of the nation under threat and was at the heart of 
demands made by nationalist circles for the protection of Kazakh 
culture.40 Declaring Kazakh the state language was one of the first 
symbolic measures taken to express the sovereignty of what was then still 
the Kazakh Autonomous Soviet Republic. Throughout the three decades 
of Kazakhstan’s independence, the laws and decrees that attempt to 
enshrine the state status of the Kazakh language (with Russian retaining 
its status as a language of communication) have multiplied,41 but it has 
been difficult to enforce them, since linguistic habits do not change via 
top-down decisions. The state has made knowledge of Kazakh a 
mandatory requirement for entering the state administration, as well as 
for students to receive public funding and grants. It has increased the 
proportion of Kazakh-language broadcasting and funds the development 
of Internet sites that use the state language.42 However, the quality of 
Kazakh-speaking schools is still considered lower than that of Russian-
speaking ones, minorities continue to be (self-)excluded from the Kazakh-
speaking environment, and many members of the elite (albeit fewer than 
before) still have trouble navigating their careers and everyday lives 
in Kazakh.43
The Kazakhification of Kazakhstan’s public space is indeed well 
underway.44 Minorities have largely internalized the idea that not 
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knowing Kazakh curbs their potential for professional advancement in 
certain sectors.45 Russian-speaking Kazakh elites feel guilty about their 
lack of fluency in Kazakh and tend to apologize for this situation, a sign 
that they have internalized the idea that mastering the official language 
is expected of them not only by the state but also by their fellow citizens. 
According to the 2009 census, the share of Kazakhstani people who 
fluently write, read and understand Kazakh has risen sharply with the 
younger generations (see Figure 6.1). In the educational system, Russian 
is progressively being displaced by Kazakh. In 2003, 55 per cent of 
Kazakhstani students were studying in Kazakh and 41 per cent in 
Russian.46 10 years later, in 2013, 66 per cent were studying in Kazakh 
and just 31 per cent in Russian.
Figure 6.1 Proportion of Kazakhstan’s age groups with various levels 
of command of the Kazakh language. Source: Statistical Agency of 
the Republic of Kazakhstan, ‘Natsional’nyi sostav, veroispovedanie 
i vladeniia iazykami v Respublike Kazakhstan—itogi Natsional’noi 
perepisi naseleniia 2009 goda v Respubliki Kazakhstan’, 2010. Calculated 
from command of Russian by age group (p. 269) and total size of age 
groups (p. 4).
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Added to this is the difficult question of Kazakhness being a discriminatory 
selection tool in the job market. Minorities in Kazakhstan claim that 
they are excluded based on unofficial ethnic criteria, and indeed, the 
statistics seem to bear this out: whereas Kazakhs represent about 60 per 
cent of the country’s population, more than 90 per cent of state 
administration positions are occupied by ethnic Kazakhs.47 However, 
there are other elements that are difficult to measure statistically that 
come into play here: minority individuals may self-select into the private 
sector, which allows for a greater degree of transnational interaction and 
makes it possible for them to prepare for emigration if necessary. 
Moreover, many jobs are gained through clientelist networks: selection 
on the basis of kinship ties unintentionally favours ethnic Kazakhs over 
minorities.
The Kazakhstanness paradigm
Kazakhstanness, as a civic definition of national identity, constitutes the 
second paradigm deployed by Kazakhstan’s authorities. It relies on the 
Soviet dissociation between citizenship and nationality/ethnic 
identification, which is still recorded in Kazakhstan’s passports (the 
famous fifth point after family name, first name and patronymic, date, 
and place of birth). The Soviet-style celebration of multi-nationalism has 
indeed been kept alive more by Kazakhstan than by any other former 
Soviet state. Official discourse vaunts the harmony in which its more than 
130 nationalities live thanks to the frequently-mentioned ‘hospitality’ 
(gostepriimnost’) of the native Kazakh people. This multi-nationality is 
alleged to have engendered a supra-ethnic civic identity. The articulation 
between multi-nationality and civic identity is not, however, a given: 
citizens can feel free to display their ethnic culture without identifying 
with a supra-ethnic identity.48
The Assembly of the People (previously the plural Assembly of 
Peoples, hereinafter ‘the Assembly’), created by presidential decree on 1 
March 1995, posits itself as the institutional embodiment of Kazakhstan’s 
multi-nationality. The birth of this new institution, led by the president 
himself, can be explained by the political context of its time: to compete 
with the Parliament, which was considered too rebellious against the 
regime, Nazarbayev wanted to institutionalize a civil society that was 
more supportive of his policies. The authorities’ strategy was thus to 
replace formal representative democracy with the expression of a civil 
society in which the structuring element would not be social class or 
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political orientation, but national belonging.49 Although it is merely a 
consultative body, the Assembly has initiated two referenda, one about 
extending the presidential term of office and another about the new 
Constitution. Its 350 members are not elected but appointed by the 
president. In 2007, the Assembly gained the right to elect nine deputies 
to the Mazhilis (Parliament).
Using terminology that is still very Soviet, the Assembly is presented 
as the ‘laboratory of the friendship of the peoples’50 and functions 
according to the principle of co-option.51 It represents all minority cultural 
centres, from the smallest (Assyrians) to the most numerous (Russians), 
overseeing about 800 associations that represent almost 50 ethnic groups. 
It also finances about 170 weekend schools teaching about 20 native 
languages, several minority-language newspapers, and the Kazakh, 
Russian, German, Korean, Uzbek and Uyghur national theatres.52 Debates 
on politicized issues, such as minority representation in political life and 
in the higher echelons of the economy, are absent from the preoccupations 
of the Assembly, which is devoted to folkloric activities, such as days of 
Slavic culture, Armenian music, Tatar chorale, Korean cuisine and so on.53
Propaganda related to the nationalities policy remains characterized 
by a hierarchy of ethnic identities. The place of each nationality largely 
depends on what it brings to the country’s international branding. The 
authorities tend to celebrate national minorities that represent countries 
with which Kazakhstan has developed close economic and diplomatic ties. 
In this framework, Germans and Koreans are at the top of the symbolic 
pyramid thanks to their active involvement in the development of 
Kazakhstan as well as the country’s close relationship with Germany and 
South Korea.54 Poles, Armenians and Greeks are also viewed positively, 
although Kazakhstan has fewer economic links with their kin states. 
Russians, meanwhile, have been prevented from becoming intermediaries 
in the relationship with Russia, which remains controlled by Kazakhstani 
elites.55 For other minorities, symbolic integration is more complicated. 
This is the case, for example, for the Uyghurs, Chechens and Uzbeks, who 
face greater discrimination, are often suspected of being hidden Islamists 
and are associated with the difficult political situations in their kin state.
The Assembly thus fulfils several missions: it celebrates the country’s 
national diversity for both international and domestic audiences; supports 
small and depoliticized minorities that are satisfied with the cultural 
rights they are given; and marginalizes minorities with the potential for 
political mobilization, like Russians, Uyghurs or Uzbeks.
A similar, albeit less elaborate, strategy has been developed to 
present Kazakhstan as a harmonious place for religions, symbolized by 
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the Congress of World and Traditional Religions (hereinafter ‘the 
Congress’). Launched in 2003, the Congress takes place every three years. 
It is hosted in Astana at the Palace of Peace and Accord, a Norman Foster 
construction built in the form of a pyramid, the four sides of which are 
supposed to symbolize openness to the world’s four cardinal points.56 
The Congress sessions offer an occasion to brand Kazakhstan inter- 
nationally by inviting foreign heads of state and high-level diplomats 
and religious figures, as well as to regulate religious issues around a 
consensual narrative of the ‘dialogue of civilizations’ or ‘dialogue of 
religions’. The Congress promotes so-called traditional religions over non-
traditional ‘sects’ and radical groups: it recognizes Islam (Sunni), 
Christianity (above all Orthodoxy, but also Catholicism and Lutheranism), 
Buddhism, Judaism, Daoism, Shintoism and Hinduism, and excludes 
both proselytizing Protestant groups and Islamic movements that do not 
recognize the authority of national religious institutions.57
The Kazakhstanness paradigm has thus succeeded in combining the 
old Soviet trope of the ‘friendship of people’ with a more fashionable 
narrative on the ‘dialogue of civilization’. It speaks to the older generations 
as a continuation of Soviet memory and to some of the younger ones as a 
fashionable multiculturalism.
The transnationalism paradigm
A third paradigm emerged as early as the mid-1990s. Boosted by the 
financial manna flowing from oil redistribution, it would become 
Kazakhstan’s main discursive currency by the second half of the first 
decade of the 2000s. This paradigm can be described as transnationalism 
– the idea that interconnectivity and globalization alter the nation-state 
and its integration into the world community. For both domestic and 
international audiences, this paradigm is intrinsically linked to the 
regime’s legitimacy and purposely conflates the Kazakhstani state and the 
Nazarbayev regime. It is endowed with certain characteristics of the cult 
of personality: the president is supposed to embody not only the unity of 
the nation beyond ethnic and political differences, but also its different 
temporalities (past, present and future).
the transnational narrative of the nation
The physical embodiment of this third paradigm is the new capital city, 
Astana/Nur-Sultan. The change of capital, announced in 1994 and 
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accomplished in 1997, has often been interpreted as a gesture in favour 
of the country’s Kazakhness: the Soviet-era capital, Almaty, was seen as a 
linguistically and culturally Russified city (as well as being the home of 
the majority of human rights activists and Russian-speaking political 
opponents) at a time when fears of the secession of the northern regions 
made it imperative that the country’s capital be more centrally located.58 
However, Nazarbayev’s project went much further: the point of building 
a new capital was to position Kazakhstan within the international 
community and to plot a bright future for it, a future materialized in the 
futuristic appearance of the city.
Soviet references are not totally absent from the city’s storyline: 
Nazarbayev has often mentioned reprising the Virgin Lands campaign 
(Astana is built on the site of the small town of Akmola, centre of the 
Khrushchev-era Virgin Lands campaign) and was partly inspired by 
similar Soviet projects to build new towns from scratch in challenging 
climatic regions. However, Astana is, above all, a showcase of Kazakhstan’s 
desired modernity, as well as a laboratory for its efforts to overcome the 
traditional dichotomies (north/south, urban/rural) and to metaphorically 
extend this new integration to the country as a whole. Astana’s 
architecture, particularly the left bank, displays monumental avenues 
and buildings (the Presidential Palace, Baiterek, Atameken, the Pyramid, 
the Central Mosque, the National Museum and so on) that are meant 
to erase inequalities between social groups, display a globalized 
consumerism and project Kazakhstan as being on the ‘path of progress’.59 
The city is largely forward-looking and the past ever less celebrated. Both 
the Memorial to the Victims of Political Repression and the Memorial to 
the Defenders of the Homeland were, for instance, placed in peripheral 
neighbourhoods at the time of their construction. As the city developed, 
these areas became more central, leading to decisions to change the fate 
of both sites. The former was transformed into a host for the world’s 
fourth-largest national flag,60 inaugurated by Nazarbayev in 2009: any 
mourning of the past has been replaced by a Guinness-Book-of-World-
Records-style prestige.
Although building Astana was Nazarbayev’s pet project (including 
for financial reasons: the construction of the city seems to have allowed 
him to offshore millions of dollars),61 the transnationalism paradigm has 
been operationalized in many other ways. Some are discursive in essence, 
as with Kazakhstan-2030, a programmatic document released in 1997 
that describes what the country will supposedly have achieved by 2030 
and delineates the steps that must be taken to make these achievements 
a reality. Its strong utopian motives are ‘directed at transforming the 
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country into one of the safest, most stable ecologically sustainable states 
in the world, with a dynamically developing economy’.62 The exercise was 
repeated a decade later with the Strategy 2050 paper, which set the goal 
of Kazakhstan’s becoming one of the 30 most advanced countries in the 
world by 2050.63 The presidential address of 2014, entitled ‘Kazakhstan’s 
Way 2050: Common Aims, Common Interests, Common Future’, was 
distinctly forward-looking, making little mention of the common past.64
The 2050 Strategy was commissioned as a commercial branding 
project, a kind of SWOT (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and 
Threats) analysis identifying the country’s opportunities. Nation-
branding has indeed been understood by the authorities as a central 
instrument of prestige and a symbol of globalization.65 The government 
and its various ministerial branches, as well as its embassies, have been 
financing costly public relations actions in a bid to capture the attention 
of the world community and especially that of international business 
circles: these actions range from buying pages in major Western 
newspapers to vaunt the country’s merits and attract foreign direct 
investment to trying to counter the negative images of the country that 
emerged with the blockbuster film Borat (2006).66
These actions can also resemble genuine electoral campaigns on the 
international stage. This was the case, for example, when Kazakhstan 
made a bid for the presidency of the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe in 2010 with a roadmap called the ‘Path to Europe’, 
the idea of which was to consolidate economic relations with major 
European companies. It reproduced a similar campaign, promoting its 
Islamic identity, to bid for the presidency of the Islamic Cooperation 
Organisation the following year, inviting Islamic financial institutions 
to invest in the country. This nation-branding was reactivated with 
Kazakhstan’s application for UN Security Council non-permanent 
member status in 2016, a status that enabled the country to capitalize on 
its steady support for multilateralism at the UN since independence and 
its contribution to many UN regional frameworks.
Added to this is the authorities’ very early cognizance that the 
country’s status as a denuclearized power (since 1994) gave it untapped 
potential to engage in unique ‘nuclear diplomacy’. In a context of growing 
tension between states that possess nuclear weapons, which promote 
non-proliferation, and states that do not, which emphasize disarma- 
ment, Kazakhstan is uniquely attuned to both non-proliferation and 
disarmament values thanks to its victimization by past Soviet nuclear 
experiments and its ambitious civilian nuclear programme (Kazakhstan 
is the world’s largest uranium producer).67 This nuclear diplomacy 
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has been a central tool deployed to brand Kazakhstan on the inter- 
national scene.
Lastly, Kazakhstan has implemented a third stage of nation-
branding based on strategies of development with far longer-range 
consequences. Two examples demonstrate the diversity of these 
strategies. The first is the political decision to invest in sports – one 
example is the visibility gained by the Astana Team in cycling – in 
accordance with the idea that a great nation is a sporting nation. The 
Kazakhstani authorities learned from their socialist past that sports are a 
form of soft power that may allow a country to overcome international 
criticism concerning the nature of the regime.68 The second is the 
selection of Kazakhstan as the host of Expo 2017 (the first time this event 
was held in a country from the former communist bloc), which gave 
Kazakhstan unprecedented visibility for a year. In this way, Kazakhstan 
hoped to obtain the recognition that it believes it deserves, as well as to 
get itself on the radar of new business circles so that it can transcend its 
current status as a producer of raw materials. The authorities also 
hoped to use the Expo to stimulate Kazakhstan’s domestic innovation 
economies – in particular, green economies – by hosting companies that 
specialize in new technologies, launching technological parks and 
renewing state support for the hard and applied sciences.69 One of the 
next stages of this nation-branding will likely involve proposing that 
Kazakhstan join the circle of MINT economies (Mexico, Indonesia, 
Nigeria and Turkey), an acronym that designates the booming economies 
that look set to follow in the footsteps of the BRICS countries (Brazil, 
Russia, India, China and South Africa).
Other projects embodying the transnationalism paradigm are 
based on the idea that the country needs to invest in its human resources. 
The Bolashak programme, established way back in 1993, was the first to 
enable the country to endow itself with a new elite workforce trained 
abroad. This was followed in 2000 by the establishment of the Foundation 
of the First President of Kazakhstan, which offers a broad range of 
cultural, educational and scholarly activities targeting youth and 
promoting patriotism – and hosts one of the country’s main think tanks, 
the Institute for World Economy and Politics (IWEP).70 At the end of the 
2000s, the authorities embarked on a multiplicity of new initiatives in the 
human capital sector, mostly targeting an elite corps of technocrats and 
engineers. They created new educational institutions, often distinctly 
oriented toward the applied sciences and geared to industrial needs.
Nazarbayev University, established in Astana in 2009, is the flagship 
of Kazakhstan’s educational reform, following an internationalized 
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Anglo-Saxon model that is also replicated in the Gulf countries.71 It is 
accompanied by a Nazarbayev Endowment Fund financed by large 
Kazakhstani energy and mining firms. The University network is 
completed by the Nazarbayev Intellectual Schools, 20 primary and 
secondary schools that focus on the hard sciences and biology, with 
trilingual instruction in Kazakh, Russian and English. These new 
educational institutions have established a two-tier education system: 
the new schools, which are directly dependent on the presidential 
administration, are criticized for siphoning funding away from the 
Ministry of Education and the rest of the educational system.72 Lastly, in 
2012, the Nazarbayev Centre was launched as a ‘multifunctional research 
and educational public institution dedicated to advancing research and 
broadening the information available on the history of statehood of 
Kazakhstan’.73 All these initiatives aim to create a globalized elite that is 
able to promote Kazakhstan in the current world order and speak a 
globalized language of economic interconnectedness and prosperity.
transnationalism or ‘nazarbayevism’?
It is striking that this transnationalism paradigm is intimately linked with 
the figure of Nazarbayev himself as a charismatic, almost magical, leader.74 
Is transnationalism, then, a synonym for a kind of ‘Nazarbayevism’? All 
the initiatives related to improving Kazakhstan’s human capital, from 
universities to schools, have been named after him. Astana Day, which 
celebrates the new capital, was placed on July 6, the date of the first 
president’s birthday. The city also hosts a Museum of the First President of 
Kazakhstan, which describes Nazarbayev’s early life in the Soviet Union as 
having laid the foundation for the country’s independence and exhibits 
myriad awards, honours and gifts that the former president received 
from abroad. It is said that Nazarbayev himself rewrote the lyrics of the 
national anthem. In Baiterek, citizens place their hands in bronze casts of 
Nazarbayev’s hands to make a wish, and his hand was even included for 
some time in the design of certain banknotes. Nazarbayev has become the 
subject of films, plays and even children’s fairy tales, in accordance with a 
model that combines the Soviet tradition of youth upbringing via the life 
stories of their most famous men and locally based traditions of considering 
the sultan’s personal destiny to encapsulate the destiny of the country.75
Last but not least, in 2010, both Houses of Parliament voted to 
endow Nazarbayev with the pompous title of ‘leader of the nation’ 
(Kazakh: Elbasy).76 The attribution of this epithet can be interpreted as 
the growing megalomania of an aging leader. However, the stakes reside 
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elsewhere: at issue were the preparations for the presidential succession. 
In a context in which the mechanisms of succession were not explicit, the 
title ‘leader of the nation’ made it possible for the authorities to grant 
Nazarbayev a privileged status during his lifetime. The bill guaranteed 
him this title for life and protected him, his family and their property from 
civic or criminal prosecution. The aim was thus to ensure immunity for 
his goods (following the model that Vladimir Putin set up for Boris Yeltsin 
in 1999), as well as the privilege of having the high ground.
How to interpret the meaning of this paradoxical personality cult? 
Obviously, Nazarbayev’s personality is closely bound up with the three 
paradigms of state identity, but it is more noticeable in the third than in 
the first two. Despite being the ‘leader of the nation’, Nazarbayev’s 
personality is largely absent from narratives of Kazakhness. As the latter 
was partly structured as an ideology of protest against Nazarbayev’s 
regime, Kazakhness is, in a sense, in opposition to Nazarbayevism. This 
is not the case for Kazakhstanness, however: both the rhetoric of 
multi-nationality and the Eurasianist ideology were instrumental in 
Nazarbayev’s crafting of both the state identity at home and abroad and 
his personal legitimacy as head of state.
Then why is it in this third paradigm that Nazarbayev’s cult appears 
the most plainly? Several explanations can be put forward. The first is 
that the transnational paradigm is endowed with particular personal 
value for Nazarbayev, whose international ambition has often been noted 
by local and foreign observers. He thought of himself as Kazakhstan’s best 
export brand, a status he acquired upon the country’s independence 
thanks to his own role in the negotiations linked to denuclearization and 
his personal commitment to any and all regional and multilateral fora. 
The second is that the more ‘denationalized’ the paradigm is (transitioning 
from Kazakhness to Kazakhstanness and from thence to trans- 
nationalism), the more it needs to be embodied by a figure that 
metaphorically represents the nation. The state narrative about 
Kazakhstan as a transnationalized country should thus be seen not as 
going against nationhood but as an integral part of it, and the president’s 
personality encapsulates this connection.
The third explanation is that Nazarbayev sought to bequeath a 
legacy to his country concerning its destiny in the twenty-first century. 
The fact that deputies from Nur Otan, the pro-presidential party that 
proposed the bill on the title of ‘leader of the nation’, compared 
Nazarbayev to George Washington, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk and Mahatma 
Gandhi77 is not simply to be dismissed with a smile. It reveals seeing 
Nazarbayev as having given birth to a new nation-state (Washington), 
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brought an old nation into modernity on the ruins of an empire, 
secularized state structures and the public space (Kemal) and having 
contributed to peace at home and abroad (Gandhi).
These three explanations are probably all true, and nor are they 
contradictory. But I argue here for a fourth. In my view, the difference 
between the first two paradigms and the third, which illuminates the 
over-investment in Nazarbayev’s personality, is the following: Kazakhness 
and Kazakhstanness are self-referencing. Their only role is a kind of self-
celebration of the nation’s identity, regardless of how it is described (that 
is, as an ethnic or civic nation). The third paradigm, on the other hand, 
transcends the mere identity of the nation by offering content that 
decentres it from itself: it aims to demonstrate a path of development that 
can be adopted by other countries and which is not linked in essence to 
the Kazakh(stani) nation. It is likely that the aging Nazarbayev hoped 
to establish a state ideology and legacy that would not only sustain 
the country after he was gone, but also shape Kazakhstan’s future in a 
way that transcended the nation, inspiring a path of development that 
could be called Nazarbayevism, much like Kemalism, Thatcherism, or 
Reaganism. He was probably also inspired by the mark left by Lee Kuan 
Yew on Singapore’s development.78
Kazakhstan is a fascinating case of state-identity crafting, wherein at 
least three paradigms coexist. Each of the three targets a different 
audience: the first aims mostly at a Kazakh-speaking and, especially, rural 
audience; the second is directed at the Slavic minorities, the Russian 
neighbour, and other post-Soviet states; and the third is probably the 
most inclusive, as it targets a broader, internationalized audience as well 
as a domestic one that includes the new elites.79 In speaking to 
Kazakhstan’s domestic audience, the third paradigm hopes to transcend 
the Kazakhness/Kazakhstanness dichotomy by de-ethnicizing the 
national narrative and seeking to transform this old narrative into a 
‘civilizational’ path of development. This ability to switch between 
different ideological codes is a sign of the regime’s flexible pragmatism 
and the instrumental character of these official narratives.
One might wonder about the medium-term survival of these three 
paradigms: Will one discursively overwrite the others? It is likely that the 
Kazakhstanness paradigm will ultimately vanish. Demographically 
speaking, Slavic minorities are bound to make up an ever smaller part of 
the population: the Russian minority fell from 37 per cent of the 
population (6.2 million) in 1989 to 20 per cent (3.5 million) in 2018.80 
While minorities may see their rights preserved in a folkloric way in an 
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increasingly Kazakh-centric and Kazakh-speaking state, the engine of 
consensus remains the country’s economic success and its ability to 
deliver the improvements in living standards that it promises. The chances 
are low, therefore, that a movement contesting the Kazakhness of 
Kazakhstan will emerge in the years ahead. Instead, Kazakhstanness will 
probably be subsumed into the larger transnationalism paradigm, with 
the idea of Eurasian multi-nationality gradually becoming simply a 
historical legacy of Soviet times.
The most challenging articulation is still to be created between the 
first and the third paradigms, especially now that the country is gradually 
entering a post-Nazarbayev era. How will the transnationalism paradigm 
evolve without the figure of the ‘leader of the nation’? Will the state 
identity narrative suddenly be decoupled from the regime’s legitimacy? 
Can a post-Nazarbayev Nazarbayevism be built? This period may open the 
door to some new identity reconfigurations. One may also witness 
the birth of new paradigms – for instance, an Islamic paradigm, whose 
relationship with the Kazakhness paradigm could be either competitive 
or complementary.
Regardless, the core of these evolutions is probably contained in the 
Kazakhness issue alone. Kazakhness is the only one of the three narratives 
that is not monopolized by the regime and is instead crafted by political 
forces and social groups whose legitimacy challenges that of the regime. 
The coming rebalancing between Kazakhness as a contesting political 
force, transnationalism as a political project based on the country’s 
economic achievements, and the ‘Nazarbayevism’ of the post-Nazarbayev 
regime will help to shape the future of the country’s state identity.
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Ideology of the ‘crossroads’: 
Eurasianism from Suleimenov  
to Nazarbayev
The Kazakhstanness paradigm goes hand-in-hand with the Kazakhstani 
authorities’ officialization of Eurasianism as a state ideology. This is 
true to a greater degree than in neighbouring Russia, where Eurasianism 
has had to compete with other metanarratives, such as the ‘Russian 
World’. As demonstrated in Luca Anceschi’s seminal work on the topic, the 
Kazakhstani version of Eurasianism is a ‘regime Eurasianism’ that is fully 
integrated into the mechanisms of policymaking.1
Eurasianism emerged in the interwar period among Russian émigré 
intellectuals such as Nikolay Trubetzkoy (1890–1938) and Piotr Savitsky 
(1895–1968), who sought to demonstrate that Russia belonged more to 
the world of the Steppe than to European civilization.2 Developed in the 
Soviet Union by Lev Gumilev, it has enjoyed an impressive Renaissance in 
Russia during the post-Soviet period, both as a revanchist ideology 
inspired by fascist traditions (as embodied by the infamous Alexander 
Dugin) and as a pragmatic project of regional integration under Russian 
leadership (as called for by Vladimir Putin and some of his advisers, 
including Sergey Glazyev).
Kazakhstan’s Eurasianist profession of faith has remained steady 
over three decades. Admittedly, 2014 – the year of both the Russia-
Ukraine war and the signing of the Eurasian Economic Union treaty – 
marked a geopolitical turning-point that made Eurasianism suddenly 
appear less attractive and overly dominated by Russia. But Kazakhstan’s 
embrace of Eurasianism is far more than a short-term choice that can be 
overturned by current hesitations about using a narrative already 
monopolized by Moscow. Rather, it is rooted in a long intellectual history 
of interpreting the Steppic realm as the crucial link between the Slavic 
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world (and European civilization more globally), on one side, and the rest 
of Central Asia (as well as, more globally, the Middle East and the Asia-
Pacific), on the other.
Given Kazakhstan’s geographical location, this Eurasian commitment 
makes sense as both a national positioning on the international scene and 
a commitment to a multilateral vision of the world. But much more than 
that, it also paints a picture of the nation as being centred on the notions of 
syncretism, crossroads and diversity. It advances a relatively positive 
view of Kazakhstan’s interaction with Russia and the Soviet experiment 
yet suggests a path of development inspired not by Russia or Central Asia, 
but by distant Asian countries such as South Korea, Singapore, Malaysia 
and, closer to home, Mongolia. As an idealized spatial construct, Eurasia 
allows Kazakhstan to challenge its peripheral status by crafting a 
new centrality.
Eurasianism as a literary tradition: Olzhas Suleimenov
In Kazakhstan, Eurasianism is rooted in a long-standing intellectual 
tradition personified by Olzhas Suleimenov (b. 1936), a key representative 
of Kazakh culture since the 1960s. A Russian-language writer and poet 
impassioned by Eurasian history, during the Soviet times, Suleimenov 
expressed Kazakh national feeling within the framework then set by the 
‘friendship of peoples’, which implied the superiority of the Russian ‘older 
brother’. Since Kazakhstan’s independence in 1991, one of his main aims 
has been to rehabilitate the Turkic cultures by proving their ancient status 
and their major role in Eurasian and world history.
A geologist by training, Suleimenov in April 1961 submitted to the 
editor-in-chief of Kazakhstanskaia pravda a poem honouring Yuri 
Gagarin, who had just undertaken the first inhabited space flight in 
human history. The poem enjoyed such success that it rapidly propelled 
its author to the status of the key representative of Kazakh Soviet 
literature. Suleimenov was employed by Kazakhstanskaia pravda the 
following year and sent to the famous Moscow Institute for Literature, 
where he associated with the great Soviet writers of the time, including 
Mikhail Sholokhov, Vsevolod Ivanov, Ilia Ehrenburg, Yevgeni Evtushenko, 
and more. The atmosphere of the shestidesiatniki – the liberals of the 
1960s who, in the wake of de-Stalinization, challenged the Soviet 
ideological stranglehold on arts and letters – had a decisive influence on 
his intellectual and political development. Suleimenov went on to 
accumulate prestigious prizes, including the Komsomol Prize for 
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Kazakhstan, the State Prize of the Kazakh Autonomous Soviet Socialist 
Republic, the title of National Poet of Kazakhstan and so on.
But Suleimenov was not simply a writer; he has always also been a 
major figure in the public life of Kazakhstan. A member of the Communist 
Party, he joined his republic’s Central Committee in the 1970s, served as 
Minister of Culture in the Kazakh SSR, and was named president of the 
Union of Writers of the Republic in 1983. In 1989, he was elected deputy 
of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and started a political career as 
leader of the Nevada-Semipalatinsk ecological movement, which was 
instrumental in bringing about the closure of the country’s nuclear test 
site, the Semipalatinsk polygon. After 1991, he took up the leadership of 
the party that he founded, the People’s Congress of Kazakhstan, and was 
appointed Speaker of the Parliament, a position he held until 1994. He 
thus engaged in several political fights against Nazarbayev, which resulted 
in him being rapidly removed from positions of decision-making: he was 
appointed ambassador to Rome and then permanent representative to 
UNESCO in Paris. Despite this rapid political marginalization, Suleimenov 
has remained in the public eye as a ‘cultural enlightener’, enabling him to 
remain a popular figure without having to stand up against the regime.
Suleimenov is part of an old intellectual tradition that has, since the 
nineteenth century, promoted the cultural syncretism of the Kazakh 
people. This heritage includes, among others, Chokan Valikhanov (1835–
65), a former student of the Omsk Cadet Corps who entered into the 
service of the tsarist Empire and participated in several ethnographic 
expeditions in Central Asia; Abay Kunanbayev (1845–1904), the son of 
one of the leaders of the Middle Horde, a great translator of Western 
works into Russian and the author of The Book of Words (Kara Sozder), a 
lyrical work that advocates for strengthening ties with Russian culture in 
a way that would not undermine Kazakh identity; and, lastly, Ibrahim 
Altynsarin (1841–89), one of the major figures of Kazakh pedagogy and 
founder of the first system of modern Russian-Kazakh schools. Suleimenov 
also owes much to Mukhtar Auezov (1897–1961), whose renowned Path 
of Abay (Put’ Abaia), devoted to Abay, is considered to be a major text of 
Soviet Kazakh literature. Lastly, Suleimenov can be seen in parallel with 
his Kyrgyz alter ego, Chingiz Aitmatov (1928–2008), who also sought to 
write the history of his nation within the larger framework of Eurasia.
Suleimenov’s manifesto on Eurasianism is his seminal work, Az i Ia, 
which was published in 1975 in a print run of 60,000 copies and 
unleashed a heated debate in the Soviet Union. The book brought about 
a profound change in his career and forced him into a semi-dissident 
position until perestroika. Immediately after its release, the book received 
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vehement criticism from Russian nationalist journal Molodaia gvardiia. 
Leading the attack was Apollon Kuzmin, a historian who had also spoken 
out against Lev Gumilev’s theories of a Eurasian common destiny based 
on a Slavic-Turkic cultural fusion and who accused Suleimenov of hostility 
toward Russians, of Turkic nationalism and of pro-Zionism. Following 
another attack in a different nationalist journal, Russkaia literatura, the 
debate reached the culture sub-department of the Central Committee’s 
ideology department. In 1976, the latter forced Suleimenov to explain 
himself to the Academy of Sciences, which condemned his writings for 
national chauvinism and for glorifying feudal nomadic culture. The 
director of the publishing house was fired, and Suleimenov’s publications 
as well as all books quoting him were withdrawn from bookstores and 
libraries. The writer received an instruction to write a self-critical letter; 
in the letter, published in Kazakhstanskaia pravda in 1977, Suleimenov 
acknowledged his errors and historical inaccuracies but refused to 
repudiate his conclusions. He was subsequently restricted to publishing 
poetry for many years. Only the intervention of the First Secretary of the 
Communist Party of Kazakhstan, Dinmukhamed Kunaev (1912–93), who 
took up the matter with Leonid Brezhnev, saved him from more serious 
legal problems.
Both supporters and opponents of Suleimenov’s theory perceived 
the book as a work of historiography, even if its scholarly worth was 
questioned by his adversaries. The literary historian Harsha Ram has 
proposed another interpretation. Looking at Az i Ia as a work of literature, 
Ram suggests that the blending of genres – poetry, history and linguistics 
– was intentional: Suleimenov, Ram argues, needed the metaphor of 
Az i Ia to elaborate a new science of language.3 In the title of the book, 
which may be read as the Russian term for Asia (Aziia), Ia stands for the 
first letter of the Old Slavonic alphabet and the last letter of the modern 
Russian alphabet, and also means ‘I’ in both languages. This pun 
introduces the book’s two parts, the first of which is devoted to the 
Russian/Slavic world and the second of which is a critique of Indo-
European linguistics. Thus, for Harsha Ram, the book’s title signifies at 
once ‘the Slavs and the Turks’ and ‘me and I’, making it a subtle synonym 
for ‘Eurasia’.
In this polemical book, Suleimenov attempted to rehabilitate the 
role of Turks in Eurasia’s history. Az i Ia is a refutation of Soviet Orientalism 
and, more generally, of Russian historiography, much of which, 
Suleimenov argued, is based on a denial of the antiquity of Turkic 
peoples.4 The book aimed to reconstruct the heretofore fragmented 
history of Turkic peoples and to demonstrate the Turkic acculturation of 
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medieval Russia.5 To that end, Suleimenov mounted a frontal attack on 
the famous Lay of Igor’s Host, a monument of Russian literature. A 
medieval Russian text supposed to have been written in the twelfth 
century, it recounts the defeat of Prince Igor of Novgorod at the hands 
of the Polovtsians and appeals for the political unity of Russian 
principalities. The original manuscript, discovered at the end of the 
eighteenth century, perished in the burning of Moscow in 1812 and hence 
cannot be dated using modern techniques. Although corroborated by 
Soviet historiography, its authenticity remains highly contested; in fact, 
the document is probably a forgery, perhaps written in the fourteenth 
century.6
Though Suleimenov does believe in the manuscript’s historical 
authenticity, he proposes an iconoclastic interpretation of it that stands 
in stark contrast to the Russian reading. He argues that the text’s 
numerous stylistic and lexical borrowings from Turkic languages show 
that the political and economic elites of the time were bilingual – evidence 
of ethnic and cultural symbiosis between the Slavs and the Turkic peoples. 
The Turks, he argues, built the political and military structure of the first 
Russian state. According to him, the famous Polovtsian incursions into 
Kievan territory, described in the medieval Slavic chronicles as calamities 
sent from Heaven, were merely a response to a demand from the Russian 
princes, who were fighting amongst themselves.
Since the implosion of the Soviet Union, Suleimenov has not 
concealed his Eurasianist convictions: he states that though the communist 
regime was destined to disappear, the unity it brought between Eurasian 
peoples can only temporarily be destroyed and will re-emerge. The future, 
he asserts, belongs to a Eurasian Union, a belief that has led him to support 
all the various iterations of post-Soviet integration: the Russia-Belarus 
Union launched in 1996, the Eurasian Economic Community initiated by 
Nazarbayev in 2000, and Putin’s Eurasian Economic Union in 2011. As he 
stated in 2005:
We are destined to live together, by each other’s side; there is no 
force that can move one of the countries to another continent. We 
are all Eurasian; our continents cannot be separated. Historically, 
geographically and in all other respects, we ought to be together. 
Our economies and our cultures form a united space.7
From this point of view, Suleimenov is in accord with the policies 
implemented by the Kazakhstani presidency.
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The second part of Az i Ia is a more poetic reflection on the Turkic 
peoples’ place in the world and their universality. Suleimenov criticizes 
Soviet linguistics, inspired by Western linguistics of the nineteenth 
century, for its Eurocentrism, which privileges Indo-European languages 
and consigns prestigious Turkic-language sagas to the dustbin of history. 
According to him, the rivalry between these two linguistic families reveals 
Europe’s cultural colonialism. To show that the Turkic populations have a 
lineage that is just as ancient and as prestigious as that of the Europeans, 
Suleimenov draws on linguistics, specifically a nineteenth-century 
conception of etymology and philology. On the basis of this linguistic 
study, Suleimenov concludes that the Turks are the worthy heirs of the 
ancient Mediterranean civilizations, especially the prestigious Sumer. 
He claims that Sumerians spoke a Turkic language whose script is close to 
a Runic alphabet discovered in Siberia. He also emphasizes the cultural 
proximity of Turkic peoples to the Scythians, seen as the first state-
builders of Eurasia.
Since Kazakhstan’s independence, the writer has pursued the 
Sumerian and ‘statist’ line of argumentation that he first elaborated in 
the 1970s. In three books – The Language of Writing (Iazyk pis’ma, 1998), 
The Turks in Prehistory (Tiurki v doistorii, 2002) and Intersecting Parallel 
Lines (Peresekaiushchie paralleli, 2002) – he advances new etymological 
arguments in support of the claim that Sumerian and Etruscan are Turkic 
languages. What he thereby hopes to demonstrate is that Kazakhstan is 
not a recent state, born of a Russian and Soviet construction, but rather 
the last stage in a long Turkic history of statehood (gosudarstvennost’).
Though Suleimenov is part of Eurasianist thought, he also draws 
inspiration from cosmist postulates, as evident from his poem devoted to 
Gagarin. Cosmism, one of the main streams of Russian religious 
philosophy during the first half of the twentieth century, claims that 
humankind is intrinsically linked to the cosmos, that its historical and 
political development is governed by physical laws that apply to the 
totality of living beings, and that humanity is only ever on the right path 
when it moves with an awareness of this belonging to the cosmos.8 
Suleimenov also contributed to the rehabilitation of Tengrism; he was 
one of the first Soviet scholars to reintroduce the term into Russian, 
presenting it as ‘the most ancient religion in the world, elaborated as a 
philosophical teaching 4,000 years ago’.9 Once again, these philosophical 
and religious motives separate Suleimenov from the re-Islamization trend 
visible in some segments of the Kazakh intellectual world, placing him 
closer to the Russian ideational landscape.
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Suleimenov’s personal trajectory is revealing of Kazakhstan’s 
experience as a multinational and multi-confessional polity. Soviet 
culture provided an extraordinary cultural incubator for intellectuals like 
him: after starting out in the hard sciences, Suleimenov was able to 
pursue a brilliant literary career, associate with the great names of Soviet 
literature, engage in perestroika-era politics on questions of ecology and 
peace, and then to promote Kazakhstan’s brand by serving as its 
representative to large international organizations such as UNESCO. 
Suleimenov thus embodies a face of today’s Kazakh culture that has been 
gradually ignored or held in contempt, a face that is Russophone and not 
Kazakhophone; nostalgic about the lost unity of Eurasian peoples; 
advances a postmodern and ecumenical vision of religions without giving 
any specific role to Islam; and convinced of the major historical role that 
the Kazakh Steppe played in ancient and contemporary world history. 
This is perhaps not all of his paradoxes: he also claims a Kazakhness that 
is unashamed of its Russification and Sovietization but is celebrated 
through the rehabilitation of the role of Turkic peoples in world history.
Eurasianism as Kazakhstan’s state ideology
Far from being merely a Kazakh literary tradition elaborated during 
Soviet times, Eurasianism has been officialized as Kazakhstan’s state 
ideology, functioning, as Luca Anceschi puts it, in ‘quasi-symbiotic 
relationship [with] authoritarianism’.10 Immediately after independence, 
in the first half of the 1990s, Kazakhstan began branding itself as ‘the 
heart of Eurasia’. As Nazarbayev declared: ‘Kazakhstan is a unique state 
in Asia where European and Asian roots are intertwined … The 
combination of different cultures and traditions allows us to absorb what 
is best in European and in Asian culture’.11 This geographical centrality in 
Eurasia is captured by a sculpture in Zhastar Ayabagy Park in Astana 
through the explicit metaphor of a heart whose central red point suggests 
Kazakhstan.12
To compete with Uzbek President Islam Karimov, who advanced the 
notion of Turkestan, Nazarbayev referred to Eurasia in many of his texts. 
His 2005 book In the Heart of Eurasia (V serdtse Evrazii) encapsulates 
this Eurasianist commitment. He institutionalized this allegiance to 
Eurasianism by founding, in 1996, the Lev N. Gumilev Eurasian University 
in Astana on the foundations of the city’s former pedagogical institute. 
During the celebrations of ten years of independence held at the university 
in 2001, the famous Kyrgyz writer Chingiz Aitmatov spoke favourably 
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about Kazakhstan’s Eurasianism and the decision to name the University 
after Gumilev, which he called a confirmation of Kazakhstan’s status as 
the epicentre of Eurasia.13
Nazarbayev gave his personal blessing to this official reference to 
Gumilev: just as in Tatarstan, the Kazakhstani authorities subscribe to a 
positive view of Gumilev’s legacy, both in Eurasian history and ethnic 
theories. Since then, the university has regularly organized conferences 
on Eurasianism as well as lectures on Gumilev’s work. It even launched its 
own Eurasian Centre, which was charged ‘to define a conception of 
Eurasianism that would respond to Kazakhstan’s national interests; to 
develop a geopolitical methodology for the historical, socio-economic, 
and ideological interpretation of the development of contemporary 
civilization; and to advise state, educational, and academic organizations 
on Eurasianism’.14 One of its former directors, Seit Kaskabasov, buttressed 
the president’s vision of Kazakhstan’s Eurasian mission with more 
elaborate historical arguments. He stated, for instance, that there exist 
three Eurasian states – Russia and Kazakhstan (both heirs to the Mongol 
Empire), and Turkey (with its Byzantine and Ottoman heritage) – that 
must jointly constitute a new trans-Eurasian axis. According to this logic, 
Kazakhstan holds the status of first among equals, as it finds itself 
geographically located between the other two powers.15
This state-backed Eurasianism results from the regime’s need for 
securitization. At its independence, Kazakhstan had to deal with a 
massive Russian minority and the risk that northern regions might 
secede. A pragmatic way of ensuring stability was thus to promote the 
birth of a civic and supra-ethnic Kazakhstani identity, to offer an official 
status to the Russian language and to insist on Russia as the country’s 
main partner. At the same time, Nazarbayev could not afford to lose his 
political clout to Kazakhstan’s nationalist opposition: he had to appear to 
be defending the Kazakh nation. As he stated, ‘The president is personally 
responsible for not letting the nation disappear in the coming century or 
two’.16 Kazakhstani Eurasianism therefore had to find a way to reconcile 
the notion of being a bridge between cultures – a core Eurasianist 
principle – with that of the Kazakh nation as the quintessence of Eurasian 
cultures and/or the Turkic realm. Kazakhstani Eurasianism is thus Janus-
faced, combining a multicultural profession of faith inspired by Soviet 
internationalism with more classical ethnonationalist rhetoric.
In the 1990s, the prolific field of Eurasianist publications exhibited 
a discursive line similar to that of Kazakh ethnonationalism, advancing 
the same historical arguments. A book by Bolebay Tashenov denounced 
Russia’s presence as a ‘colonial takeover’17 that shattered Kazakh unity by 
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reinforcing inter-juz struggles and thus destabilized the whole of Eurasia 
by obliterating its centrepiece, the Kazakh state. Tashenov also criticized 
the Russian peasants who settled in the steppes and are said to have 
learned everything from the nomads without offering anything in return 
except for the destruction of the nomads’ traditional lifestyles. Another 
book, by K. A. Berdenova, insisted that Kazakhs’ centuries-old struggle for 
independence began not in the eighteenth century but in 1585, with the 
clashes between the Cossack Ermak and the Khan of Siberia, Kuchum: 
‘With Kuchum begins the Kazakh people’s struggle for liberation against 
Russian conquest’.18
In this Eurasianist literature, Kazakhs are celebrated as the quintes-
sence not only of Eurasia but of the Turkic world: ‘Contemporary 
Kazakhstan encapsulates the entire historical experience of the Turkic 
peoples, from the Yakuts to the Bolgars [the predecessors of Tatars], 
from the Seljuks to the Ottomans’.19 This Kazakh-centric pan-Turkism 
stresses the supposed continuity of the Kazakh state from ancient times: 
from the Scythians and the Huns to the Turkic khaganate and the 
Dasht-i Qipchaq, the Steppic medieval realm. This Turkic legacy would 
come to definitive bloom in independent Kazakhstan: ‘The Kazakh people 
may be seen as heir to the historic-cultural legacy of all the Eurasian 
spaces’.20 The rationale for this is that ‘the Kazakhs, known as a people 
under the name of Kipchaks, were the core of all the Turkic tribes’.21 
Similarly, one of the main official historiographers of the Kazakh republic 
from Soviet times, Manash E. Kozybaev (1931–2002), claimed there is a 
‘Eurasian racial type’, which he presented as having all the features of 
Kazakhness.22
Kazakhstani Eurasianism has remained poorly conceptualized, with 
very few scholarly-based historical or philosophical works.23 It has to take 
into account the existence of already well-formulated Russian versions of 
the same ideology and find a way to dissociate itself from its Russian 
competitors. It generally rejects the founding fathers of the interwar 
period and ‘Soviet Eurasianism’ – that is, Moscow’s nationalities policy, 
which, Kazakhstani Eurasianists argue, was intended to erase national 
differences. For them, only Kazakhstan, not Russia, can demonstrate a 
continuous Eurasian destiny. Kazakhstan is, for instance, often presented 
as the heir of the Khazar khaganate of the ninth century, characterized by 
a spirit of tolerance and a rejection of extremism, as demonstrated by the 
conversion of the Khazar elites to Judaism and the presence of Nestorian 
Christians.24 The Russified Kazakh elites of the nineteenth century – 
Chokan Valikhanov, Abai Kunanbaev and Ibrahim Altynsarin – would 
have formulated Eurasianist principles well before the Russian émigrés 
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appropriated them in the 1920s. In the Soviet period, the Eurasianist idea 
would have survived in the works of Suleimenov and Murat Auezov (b. 
1943), before being personified by Nazarbayev himself.
Kazakhstani publications also condemn the fascist tendencies of 
Russian neo-Eurasianists, such as Alexander Dugin, with several articles 
in academic periodicals criticizing the ‘revival of Russian messianism and 
imperialism’.25 However, in 2004, Dugin published a book glorifying 
President Nazarbayev, The Eurasian Mission of Nursultan Nazarbayev 
(Evraziiskaia missiia Nursultana Nazarbayeva),26 commissioned by some 
official structures in Kazakhstan. The Russian thinker organized a tour to 
present his book in Almaty and Astana, at the Academy of Sciences and 
the Gumilev University, in the presence of several high-ranking officials 
(including Nazarbayev’s oldest daughter, Dariga), and was invited to air 
his views in a show on the official Rakhat TV channel. His meeting with 
the Kazakhstani members of his International Eurasianist Movement, 
including Gani Kasymov, the leader of the small Party of Patriots of 
Kazakhstan, was widely publicized.27
Despite Dugin’s short-term success, Kazakhstani political circles 
plainly state that Nursultan Nazarbayev’s Eurasianism must be considered 
the third and final stage in the development of that ideology. After 
the founding fathers in the interwar period and Gumilev during 
Soviet times, the Kazakhstani president, they say, has established a 
definitive understanding of Eurasia, finally abandoning political 
philosophy to start implementing Eurasianist ideas in practice.28 Indeed, 
Kazakhstan operationalizes Eurasianism not only as a state ideology 
targeting a domestic audience but as a fundament of its foreign policy. 
In this version of the ideology, Eurasianism appears as a pragmatic 
project of regional integration that is integral to the country’s multi-
vector policy.
Nazarbayev proposed a Union of Eurasian States as early as 1994. 
The organization was to have supra-national bodies and replace the 
ineffective CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) with a new post-
Soviet economic and political space that would be free of communist 
ideology. Nazarbayev’s project spelled out the union’s mode of functioning 
in detail: a referendum on membership in every candidate country; 
Russian as the working language; a consultative council for each sector of 
the economy; simplified procedures for changes of citizenship between 
member states; a rotating presidency; supra-national bodies, including a 
consultative parliament; a new common currency; a capital (Nazarbayev 
proposed Kazan or Samara) and so on.29 The project was, of course, never 
implemented; at the time, it met with a rather disapproving response 
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both in Yeltsin’s Russia and in neighbouring countries, which were then 
busy moving away from their former Soviet brothers.
Throughout the 1990s, Kazakhstan and Nazarbayev himself 
constantly stood out on the post-Soviet scene for their commitment to 
regional cooperation between the Soviet-successor states. Several 
economic and customs treaties were signed, mainly between Russia, 
Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan, but Nazarbayev’s greatest victory was 
the creation, in 2000, of the Eurasian Economic Community (including 
Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, later joined by 
Uzbekistan), even if it never stimulated genuine regional integration. It 
took until 2011, when Vladimir Putin launched his version of a Eurasian 
Union, for a regional institution to start affecting economic realities on 
the ground.
Kazakhstan at first enthusiastically supported Putin’s idea, and 
Nazarbayev was probably personally pleased to see Putin recognize that 
the initial motivation for the Union came from Kazakhstan, not Russia.30 
However, this enthusiasm progressively transformed into reluctance with 
Russia’s reassertion on the international scene, the war with Ukraine in 
2014 and the subsequent US and European sanctions against Russia. At 
the highest levels of the Kazakhstani state, there is now therefore a quiet 
desire to slow down the process of integration.31
Indeed, Kazakhstan finds itself in a contradictory situation. In the 
long term, Astana sees itself not as a loyal second to Russia but as an equal 
partner. Nazarbayev formulated Kazakhstan’s posture on the Eurasian 
Union project unambiguously and repeatedly. First, he claimed that 
those who would draw a parallel between Kazakhstan and the Soviet 
Union, either to denounce the current integration dynamic or in hopes 
of reviving the defunct Soviet structure, are in the wrong. He emphasized, 
‘There have been many rumours of Kazakhstan reportedly losing its 
independence, about the USSR allegedly being revived. Complete 
nonsense. Those willing to get the USSR revived are not in their right 
mind. We have gone a long way away from that’.32
Second, the Eurasian Union is an economic project, not a political 
one, and the Kazakhstani authorities have expressed strong reservations 
about any supranational institutions or parliament, as well as joint 
citizenship. On this point, Nazarbayev stated, ‘Economic interest, rather 
than abstract geopolitical ideas and slogans, is the main engine of the 
integration processes’.33 Third, Kazakhstan’s membership in the Eurasian 
Union is the result of a choice that can be reversed if the country believes 
its interests are not being protected. Here, too, Nazarbayev has expressed 
his perspective plainly: ‘If the rules which were previously established in 
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the treaty are not fulfilled, then Kazakhstan has the complete right to 
end its membership in the Eurasian Economic Union. Astana will never 
be in an organization that represents a threat to the independence of 
Kazakhstan’.34 He could not be clearer.
Regardless of this insistence, however, Nazarbayev’s Eurasianist 
stance, which was supposed to ideologically justify the country’s multi-
vector foreign policy, now seems to have lost its meaning. The competing 
interpretation of Eurasia as a Russia-backed integration project has risen 
in influence with the Customs Union and the ratification of the Eurasian 
Economic Union.35 These new integration projects create a serious 
imbalance in favour of Russia, sparking debate among Kazakhstan’s elite 
and expert community. As a result, the Kazakhstani authorities now 
have to manage an unanticipated dilemma – that the Eurasian brand of 
their foreign policy, in which they have invested so much since their 
independence, has unexpectedly created an imbalance favouring Russia 
rather than guaranteeing the country’s multi-vectoralism.
Looking for a third way? The Kazakh Eli solution
Since Kazakhstan has been partly dispossessed of its Eurasian terminology 
and could not avoid the centrality of Russia in the use of the term, could 
the country turn toward its Central Asian neighbours? Kazakhstani elites 
have always been ambivalent regarding the place of their country in the 
Central Asian historical and cultural space. Official discourse celebrates 
the region’s cultural achievements dating back to ancient times and 
places Kazakhstan within Islamic tradition. At the same time, officials 
frequently emphasize the distinctiveness of the country compared to its 
southern neighbours, citing its late adoption of Islam and proud Steppic 
identity.36 Indeed, Kazakhstani officials sometimes regard other Central 
Asian states with thinly veiled contempt, disparaging them for their 
perceived economic and cultural backwardness. Implicitly, being a part of 
the Central Asian region – including two other -stans, Afghanistan and 
Pakistan – is seen as a negative that allegedly carries with it the risk of 
Islamist spillovers. These threat perceptions have spurred strong criticism 
from some scholars, including Farkhad Tolipov of Uzbekistan, who as 
early as 2006 attacked Kazakhstan’s choice of Eurasia as illusory due to 
Russia’s overwhelming dominance; he invited Kazakhstan to remain 
a -stan and be proud of that.37
The change in direction of Uzbekistan’s regional policy since the 
death of Islam Karimov in September 2016 has given some hope to those 
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in Kazakhstan calling for more Central Asian integration: the new 
Uzbek president, Shavkat Mirziyoyev, has shown a strong commitment 
to re-establishing neighbourly relationships with Tajikistan and 
Kyrgyzstan, as well as to reintegrating the country into its regional 
environment. New economic perspectives and a transformed geopolitical 
context shaped by the overdominance of Russia and China have pushed 
Kazakhstani elites to look more favourably toward Central Asian 
cooperation. Yet to avoid having to choose between a Eurasian or Central 
Asian destiny for Kazakhstan, some look for a third way: one that would 
frame Kazakhstan as a specific, unique country following an Asian-
leaning development path. In February 2014, during a visit to one of the 
new Nazarbayev Intellectual Schools in the Atyrau region, the president 
floated the idea that Kazakhstan could drop the suffix -stan:
In the name of our country, as in many other countries of Central 
Asia, there is the suffix -stan. At the same time, foreigners show 
interest in Mongolia, with only 2 million inhabitants, and whose 
name has no suffix -stan. Maybe in the future we will have to address 
the question of changing the name of our country to Kazakh Eli 
[meaning ‘the land of the Kazakhs’ – ML], but before that it needs 
to be discussed with the people.38
Nazarbayev’s allusion to the necessity of popular debate implied that 
this decision should be left for post-Nazarbayev generations. However, 
this was not the first time that the country’s -stan had been identified as 
problematic. In 2013, Dariga Nazarbayeva herself stated that, ‘Kazakhstan 
borders Central Asia geographically, but it is not a Central Asian country. 
We are a Eurasian state … We are not one more –stan for the media world 
and some politicians. Our historical orientations are not toward Saudi 
Arabia, but Norway, and countries such as South Korea and Singapore’.39 
The association of Central Asia with Saudi Arabia and of Kazakhstan with 
Norway, South Korea and Singapore is revealing of the identity projections 
of the Kazakhstani elites and their vision of the country as a developed 
European or South Asian one that unambiguously rejects everything 
associated with Islam.
One week after Nazarbayev’s statement at the Intellectual School, 
the minister of foreign affairs denounced the name change proposal as a 
media trick, offering reassurance that the country did not intend to 
change its name.40 Despite this immediate denial, public debate sprang 
up around the term Kazakh Eli on websites such as Tengri News and 
Azattyq. However, the domestic discussion did not revolve around 
ideoLogy of the ‘Crossroads’ :  eurasianisM froM suLeiMenov to nazarbayev 147
Kazakhstan’s belonging to the Central Asian –stans, but around the 
multinationalism inherent in the term ‘Kazakhstan’. The country’s name 
not only refers to Central Asia through the shared suffix -stan but is also 
perceived as a legacy from the Soviet Union, since the word Kazakh comes 
from the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic, Kazakhstan’s direct 
predecessor. Kazakh nationalist movements have therefore supported the 
idea of renaming the country Kazakh Eli (or, in some case, Qazaq Orda41) 
to reaffirm the preeminent role of ethnic Kazakhs. Some Kazakh 
nationalists of Tengrist persuasion have also argued for distancing the 
country from the –stans, which they see as overly Islamic.
It should also be noted that in the Russian-Soviet tradition, the 
Kazakh Steppe/Kazakhstan is indeed dissociated from the rest of Central 
Asia. In Russian, Sredniaia Aziia (Middle Asia) refers to the Turkestan 
Governorate, established in the final third of the nineteenth century – 
that is, at a time when the Kazakh Steppe was already part of the Siberian 
Governorate. The Soviet regime actively pursued this dual terminology. 
On several occasions, for example during the Khrushchev era, Moscow 
grouped Kazakhstan with Siberia, not Central Asia, in terms of its 
development trajectory. While Kazakhstan was still associated with 
Central Asia, the term Sredniaia Aziia i Kazakhstan stressed that it was not 
really part of Middle Asia.42 It was not until the collapse of the Soviet 
Union that the Western term Tsentral’naia Aziia (Central Asia) came to be 
widely adopted in Russia and Central Asia, effectively erasing the 
historical distinction between the ancient Transoxiana (today’s Uzbekistan 
and Tajikistan) and the Steppic world.
The fact that Nazarbayev evoked a possible name change in parallel 
with a reference to Mongolia invited the inclusion of foreign policy in the 
debate. The weakness of ties between Kazakhstan and Mongolia is 
striking, as only a 50-mile strip of Russian territory separates the two 
countries. Diplomatic relations between them are marked by the presence 
of a large Kazakh minority of about 160,000 people in western Mongolia, 
in the province of Bayan-Ölgii. Astana has ‘repatriated’ about 60,000 of 
these people as part of its compatriot programme. But beyond bilateral 
relations, Mongolia is paving the way for another kind of Eurasian identity 
that is attractive to Kazakhstan: neither a Russia-dominated Eurasia 
project nor a Central Asian ‘stan-ization’ but a more Northeast Asian 
approach.
This Mongolian brand makes sense for Kazakhstan on a number of 
counts. Nazarbayev has always made positive references to what he 
considered an ‘Asian model’, lauding the economic dynamism of Asian 
countries as well as regimes that combine features of both liberalism and 
CENTRAL PERIPHERIES148
authoritarianism. At the end of the 1990s, Astana even translated the 
symbolism of the Asian Dragons (Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea 
and Taiwan) and the Asian Tigers (Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, the 
Philippines and Vietnam) into a snow leopard symbol, insisting on 
Kazakhstan’s prospects for a high-tech future and growing ties with Asia-
Pacific nations.43
In this vein, Malaysia has quickly become the South-Eastern Asian 
country to which Kazakhstan looks as a potential model. A country with 
a Muslim majority that is also multi-ethnic and multi-religious, one of the 
best performing economies in Asia and the third-largest producer of 
computer components after the United States and Japan, the Malaysian 
model is one that Kazakhstan seeks to emulate. Kazakhstan’s presidential 
party, Nur Otan, and the United Malays National Organization (UMNO) 
have established links between their parliamentarians and party 
structures, and the Malaysian strategy formulated in the Vision-2020 plan 
inspired Nazarbayev’s Kazakhstan-2030 plan. The new administrative 
capital of Malaysia, Putrajaya (located twenty kilometres south of Kuala 
Lumpur and near the new city of Cyberjaya, which specializes in new 
technologies), was one of the models that the Kazakhstani authorities 
considered for Astana. The transformation of KLIA (the Kuala Lumpur 
International Airport) into a leading aviation hub for Southeast Asia also 
interested Kazakhstan, as did Malaysia’s ‘multimedia corridor’, which 
overlaps with Kazakhstan’s development objectives in innovative 
industries. Malaysia is further considered as a model for Kazakhstan in 
terms of its Islamic norms: Malaysian halal-food firms have been 
established in Kazakhstan since 2005 and Kazakhstani authorities have 
chosen to define their halal standards according to those of Malaysia.44
The ‘Kazakh Eli’ future that Nazarbayev mentioned is thus not only 
a response to pressure from increasingly nationalist public opinion. It also 
fits into a new potential foreign policy agenda. The proposed name 
change could both distance Kazakhstan from Central Asia should the 
region sink into economic crisis and state failure and offer an alternative 
to a Russia-dominated Eurasian identity and integration. Mongolia and 
Malaysia are seen as the archetypes for a possible third identity for 
Kazakhstan that would not deny the dominant role of Russia and China, 
but would draw up a more Asian future for the country.
For three decades, non-ethnic Russian intellectual circles have been 
criticizing the revival of Russian Eurasianism as a new form of imperialism. 
However, one can see from the Kazakh case that Eurasianist beliefs are 
intimately intertwined with nationalism. While Eurasianism always 
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speaks of a large civilizational area spanning the centre of the Old 
Continent (with borders that may be more or less precise, and indeed 
often deliberately imprecise), it also celebrates one nation in particular 
(Russian or Kazakh) in much more conventional terms. The Eurasianist 
credo, once genuinely open to cultural influences from Russia and positive 
about Soviet internationalism with Suleimenov, has evolved into a 
Eurasianism that uses the same historical argumentation as Kazakh 
nationalism, denouncing Russia’s domination as colonialism and 
celebrating the uniqueness of the Kazakh nation as the heart of the 
Turkic world. The state use of Eurasianism to express the country’s 
domestic harmony around Kazakhstanness and its multi-vectoral policy 
on the international scene thus appear closer to Suleimenov’s original 
vision, proposing a pragmatic path to its implementation. However, it also 
leaves room for a more nationalist, Kazakh-centric understanding of 
Eurasianism. This ‘regime Eurasianism’ thus appears as a post-colonial 
tool for pursuing, as Luca Anceschi states, ‘Kazakhstan’s continuous 
entanglement and its sudden disentanglement with the former centre of 
the Soviet Union’.45
Since its independence, Kazakhstan has preferred Eurasian 
integration under Russian leadership to Central Asian integration with a 
difficult Uzbek neighbour. However, the effects of the Eurasian Economic 
Union on Kazakhstan’s economy do not seem to have lived up to their 
promises,46 while post-Crimea Russia has partly jeopardized Astana’s 
tradition of multi-vectoralism. In comparison, Central Asian emerging 
markets offer particularly easy expansion for Kazakh investors and could 
serve as a testing ground for Kazakhstan’s private sector before reaching 
further afield. Additionally, post-Karimov Uzbekistan advances a more 
region-friendly agenda.
But perhaps more important than a choice in regional integration 
strategy is the challenge of self-representation. Historically, Kazakhstan 
was not fully a part of Middle Asia, even if its interaction with the 
Transoxiani/Turkestani world was intense. Another face of Kazakhstan, 
its Steppic identity as a state historically largely integrated in the Siberian 
world, serves as a ‘push’ factor to orient Kazakhstan more toward Russia. 
However, Russia is already such a dominant power on Kazakhstan’s 
political, strategic, economic and cultural landscapes that an identity 
project oriented toward it would not make sense, and would in fact be 
more likely to reignite already vivid internal debates around the ‘colonial’ 
nature of the bilateral relationship between the two countries.
The prospect of renaming the country Kazakh Eli, therefore, offers 
a third approach that is neither Russian-Eurasian domination nor a 
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difficult Central Asian integration. First, it allows Kazakhstan to position 
itself as a ‘neither/nor’, creating its own distinctive brand rather than 
being subsumed into a regional entity. Second, it highlights the ethnic 
Kazakh component of the country and the historic destiny of its Steppe 
culture, something that the younger generations increasingly support. 
Third, it takes Asian countries that are seen as successful in achieving 
economic modernity and globalization as its model while still preserving 
a strong national Kazakh identity. However, the Kazakh Eli idea sidelines 
the important issue of the role of Islam in the public sphere in Kazakhstan. 
Is Islam compatible with the mythology associated with the Kazakh Eli 
brand or would this element of the country’s religious diversity prevent 
Kazakhstan from positioning itself as the next Mongolia? A growing 
Islamic identity could indeed help strengthen ties with the rest of Central 
Asia and encourage the progressive stan-ization of Kazakhstan.
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Media and the nation: searching for 
Kazakhness in televisual production
Television is the most widely consumed form of media in Kazakhstan, as 
well as the most trusted,1 even if competition from the internet is rising, 
especially among the younger generations. As in any other country in the 
world, television offers cheap entertainment and a mirror through which 
the nation can project itself as an ‘imagined community’. It creates shared 
social touchstones among viewers, emphasizes common cultural 
denominators, minimizes socioeconomic gaps, sets family rhythms 
according to the schedules of news and primetime shows, and influences 
collective fashions and values. Television thus plays a critical role in 
building and shaping ideas of nationhood and citizenship. In Kazakhstan, 
the authorities waited a long time before investing in the small screen. 
The fact that the principal station, Channel One-Eurasia, aired mainly 
Russian programmes until around 2015 is a good example of this state 
disinterest. However, change has been underway since the Ukrainian 
crisis and the launching of the Eurasian Economic Union. Since then, 
Kazakhstani media and think tanks have been discussing the place and 
influence of Russian media and the lack of a state response.2 The 
Kazakhstani authorities have come to understand the need to make better 
use of this powerful medium to advance their nationhood messaging, and 
private channels have also invested in national cultural productions that 
can strengthen patriotic feelings.
Profiling Kazakhstani television channels
In the late 2010s, Kazakhstan hosts 14 channels and more than 
90 internet and cable television operators. Of this large diversity of 
channels, seven of the free channels receive the vast majority of 
Media and the nation: searChing for kazakhness in teLevisuaL ProduCtion 153
viewership in about equal proportions.3 The many satellite channels, 
which are available for a small fee, tend to target smaller segments of the 
audience with dedicated music, sports or regional programming.4 Worth 
mentioning is Asyl Arna, an Islamic channel started in 2007 that 
broadcasts primarily in Kazakh but also in Russian in order to bring 
its programmes on Islamic values and the Quran to the Muslim 
communities of Kazakhstan (such as Chechens, Dagestanis, Tatars, 
Bashkirs, Uyghurs and so on).5
According to a 2014 study by J’son & Partners Consulting, 53 per 
cent of the available televisual content on the main channels available 
for free to every Kazakhstani viewer was domestically produced, while 
47 per cent was internationally produced (mostly Russian).6 However, 
this figure is not indicative of the audience share that each type of 
programming receives: Russian-produced content continues to attract the 
most viewers.
Similarly, domestic Kazakhstani productions filmed in Russian are 
more popular than those filmed in Kazakh. The debate over the place of 
language in the republic’s media is anything but new. Until the early 
1960s, Radio Kazakhstan aired more than half its programming in 
Kazakh, but that figure fell by one-third under Nikita Khrushchev, with 
another radio station, Shargar, partially offsetting the decline. The local 
television channels only broadcasted for three hours per day in Kazakh. 
As William Fierman has noted, in the Soviet era, Kazakh-language 
programmes were targeted at rural audiences, mostly covering topics 
related to agricultural life. In the case of both radio and television, 
material produced in Moscow and in Russian was more appealing 
and varied.7
Surprisingly, the situation evolved little between Kazakhstan’s 
independence in 1991 and very recently. The domination of Kazakhstan’s 
television market by Russian-language productions lasted well through 
the 1990s and 2000s. It took time for the authorities to interpret this lack 
of informational sovereignty as a danger to the national project and to try 
to counter the situation. The 1999 law on language in state media 
mandated that, at a minimum, Kazakh must be used at least as much as 
all other languages combined;8 however, it was not possible to enforce 
this. In 2012, a new law on television and radio mandated that pro- 
gramming be at least 40 per cent nationally produced by 2016 and 50 per 
cent by 2018. In 2013, it was decided that each Kazakhstani channel 
should broadcast at least 35 per cent in Kazakh, rising to 50 per cent in 
2015.9 The majority of channels circumvented these laws by broadcasting 
in Kazakh at night so as not to lose their audience share during the day. 
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It also took time for the authorities to invest in supporting media; the 
state budget for media companies producing Kazakh-language pro- 
gramming jumped from 2.8 billion tenge in 2013 to 43 billion in 2013, 
reaching 53 billion in 2016, with a large share of that amount (30–40 per 
cent) devoted to television.10
Some channels, such as Channel One-Eurasia and Channel 7, draw 
a distinctly Russian-speaking audience. At least until recently, Channel 
One-Eurasia has mainly rebroadcasted programming from Russia’s 
Channel One (called ORT and ORT-Kazakhstan before 2001). It is a joint 
project controlled 20 per cent by the Russian Channel One and 80 per 
cent by the Kazakhstani state – a rare case where a state channel is 
co-owned by another state. The small channel Mir (and its news channel 
Mir-24) constitutes a similar case, as its ownership is partly based in 
Russia. Mir began in 1992 under a mandate from the CIS and reaches 
most post-Soviet states as well as Central Europe and Germany, where its 
primary audience is made up of Russian-speaking diasporas. The channel 
broadcasts in Russian and targets audiences sympathetic to the Soviet 
past, airing programmes dedicated to the cultures of Eurasia and 
deploying a political discourse that supports regional integration.11
Some other channels are oriented more toward the Kazakh-
speaking public. The most obvious example is the Kazakhstan state 
channel, which also airs in neighbouring countries with Kazakh minority 
populations (Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Mongolia, China) and, by 
government decision, became entirely Kazakh-language in 2011.12 The 
effect of this decision is mostly symbolic, as the channel ranks only sixth 
in viewers, with less than 10 per cent of the Kazakhstani audience. Other 
examples include Khabar, which broadcasts in both languages but attracts 
few Russian-speakers, and two smaller channels, Astana and El Arna.13
The Kazakhstani television market reproduces many of the 
characteristics of its Russian neighbour. In 2014, 44 per cent of total 
broadcasting time was devoted to miniseries.14 Private channels are 
primarily commercial and finance themselves through advertising. 
They thus specialize in profitable programmes, which are mostly 
entertainment – music, sports, films and series, reality TV shows, and talk 
shows – and tend to be clones of Russian productions.
The TV Media Advertising Agency study of the Kazakhstani 
television market provided precise figures for 2013.15 On Channel One-
Eurasia, the most-watched programmes were largely Russian: the 
X-Factor music competition and the main miniseries of the time (such 
as Giulchatay, Rusalka, Znakharka, and Dom maliutki). Among Kazakh- 
language programming, only a speech by Kazakhstan’s president 
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Nursultan Nazarbayev attracted enough viewers to make it into the top 
six most-viewed programmes for the year. The first Kazakh-language 
miniseries, Kasym, which follows the adventures of a young Kazakh hero 
during the Second World War, came in seventh. On Khabar, a Turkish 
series about Suleyman the Great had the most viewers of any show for 
that year, followed by the Nazarbayev speech and several Russian 
miniseries. On Kazakhstan, the entirely Kazakh-language channel, Kelin, 
a Kazakh miniseries, came out on top, followed by Kazakhophone 
entertainment programmes, concerts and talk shows. The channel KTK 
set itself apart from the others, as all of its top shows are made in 
Kazakhstan and its programming includes local news broadcasts on 
various sensitive issues, such as corruption, as well as interviews with 
public figures.
The entertainment blockbusters from Russia continue to draw the 
largest audiences, and only a few local productions – news, concerts and, 
to a lesser extent, miniseries – can compete. The reason for this imbalance 
has been pointed out by many specialists: advertising revenue. As stated 
by Arman Shurayev, former director of KTK: ‘To produce one hour of a 
good series, one can easily spend about 200,000 dollars in Russia … 
Here in Kazakhstan for the same hour I can spend maximum 10–15,000 
dollars’.16 The Kazakh-speaking advertising market will likely never 
be profitable enough to feed private advertising revenues back to Kazakh 
production companies; the latter will therefore have to continue to rely 
on state support. This is the paradox of Kazakhstani television: while it is 
largely regime-controlled and promotes official policy, the channels do 
not actually have a captive audience. The most enticing cultural products 
win, and in this race for viewers, Russian channels are much more 
competitive.
Concerns regarding this situation are regularly raised among state 
officials and the Kazakh-speaking part of the population. Accordingly, 
Kazakhstan has embarked on a more active state policy of producing 
Kazakh televisual products, efforts that have been particularly visible 
since the 2014 Ukrainian crisis. In early March of that year, the 
presidential administration reorganized the Ministry of Culture and 
Communications and upgraded its communications role into a State 
Agency for Communication and Information that was not attached to the 
government directly but functioned as a central executive organ.17 Two 
months later, the government published a ‘Strategic Plan of the State 
Agency for Communication and Information for 2014–2018’ that calls for 
the modernization of internet infrastructure, as well as the reinforcement 
of national productions on television.18
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The authorities also passed an explicit policy to avoid rebroad- 
casting Russian political talk shows. All the main channels now produce 
their own weekly prime-time analytical/political news shows. The 
popularity of these shows is rising: the programme Analitika on Channel 
One-Eurasia was among the top ten broadcasts in terms of viewership in 
2019.19 Notwithstanding some nuances (Khabar is more official, KTK 
more critical), they all remain inside the official line and do not criticize 
the government. While Kazakh-speaking production was once mainly 
confined to fiction and entertainment, since 2017 the authorities have 
also supported the growth of political and social talk shows in Kazakh. 
The first of these appeared on the Kazakhophone state channel 
Kazakhstan in 2017 and has been inviting an increasing number of 
nationalist-minded figures. In 2018, Channel One-Eurasia even launched 
the programme Basty bagdarlama as a Kazakh-language analogue to 
Analitika.
Raising patriotism: national history on the small screen
It remains difficult to identify the main decision-makers that oversee the 
production of televisual content, even if many of my local informants 
mentioned the name of then-State Secretary Marat Tazhin. Far easier to 
trace are those who push for the state to commission historical 
documentaries, a specific cultural production that has been on the rise in 
recent years.
The first figure in this group is former minister of culture and 
information Mukhtar Kul-Mukhammed, one of the members of the 
intergovernmental study group on national history (Mezhvedomstvennaia 
gruppa po izucheniiu natsional’noi istorii).20 This intergovernmental group 
was created in 2013 under the leadership of Marat Tazhin to oversee all 
activities linked to the ‘rebirth of national historical memory’, including 
‘the study of the blank pages’.21 Mukhtar Kul-Mukhammed is an influential 
politician close to Nazarbayev who has repeatedly held the posts of 
minister of culture and communications and state secretary. He was born 
in Xinjiang and was one of the Kazakhs of China repatriated to Kazakhstan 
in the 1960s. Many such Oralmans advocate for a more nationalist vision 
of Kazakhstan, driven by their memories of Stalinist repressions, forced 
collectivization and emigration to China. Mukhtar Kul-Mukhammed 
defended, for instance, a thesis on Alash Orda and ran several groups in 
charge of identity issues: a terminological and onomastic commission 
that oversaw the Kazakhization of place names and official terms; a 
Media and the nation: searChing for kazakhness in teLevisuaL ProduCtion 157
commission on relations with co-ethnics abroad; and a commission 
supervising language policy.22
The second figure is film director Anvar Mamraimov, who also 
served as the director of the press-service of the Institute of Archaeology 
and is the author of several monographs popularizing the ancient history 
of the Steppe world and the Silk Roads. He began his career in the 1980s 
with a film about the mausoleum of Ahmed Yasavi in Turkestan, which 
was censored in Alma-Ata but finally found acceptance from central 
television in Moscow.23 Since then, he has become the champion of 
Kazakh historical films, with more than 200 to his credit, of which 
20 have been documentary films released by the state studio Kazakhfilm.24
The first historical documentary films commissioned by the Ministry 
of Education were part of the Cultural Heritage programme (Kul’turnoe 
nasledie), which President Nursultan Nazarbayev launched to collect 
thousands of archival documents about the history of the Steppic world 
from various world capitals. This state-sponsored programme kicked 
off new archaeological excavation campaigns, restored historical 
monuments, and republished significant works of Kazakh literature 
and classics of traditional Kazakh music to put them back in popular 
circulation.25 Just before the closing of the programme, in 2010–11, 
Kazakhfilm studio was commissioned to produce 20 documentaries 
on national history. Although this number is mentioned in several 
documents, fewer than a dozen can be found online, and it is likely that 
the rest were not released.
An analysis of the documentaries that have been released illuminates 
which historical and cultural elements the state wished to emphasize in 
its national construction. They cover topics including Korkut, one of the 
most famous epics of the Turkic world; the mausoleum of the founder of 
the Sufi order, Ahmed Yasavi, in Turkestan; the Tamgaly petroglyphs, a 
huge collection of 5,000 rock carvings that testify to the rich prehistory of 
the region; and the Zharkent mosque, famous for its Chinese style. The 
only film to deal with more contemporary history looked at one of the few 
pre-revolutionary buildings, the tsarist officers’ headquarters, which 
remains in place in the former capital, Almaty. These documentaries are 
filmed in a very conventional way that is boring for a non-specialist 
audience. They feature steppe landscapes and extras playing historical 
figures on parade (with voice-overs in Russian), regularly interspersed 
with interviews with museum curators, historians, archaeologists and so 
on. The narrative tone is emphatic, celebrating the wisdom of the Steppe 
world. The entertainment value is reinforced with a series of colourful 
New Age portraits of the figures being celebrated.
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In 2013, the Kazakh-speaking channel Kazakhstan was chosen by 
the authorities to release three new historical films on the Sakhas, Huns 
and Usuns, the Steppe peoples who formed in the early Middle Ages the 
first state structures on the territory that would become Kazakhstan.26 
That year, it also premiered an eight-episode series commemorating the 
tricentennial of Abylay Khan (1711–81), who unified the three hordes 
and was recognized by Russia and China as the leader of a Kazakh-unified 
world. It is worth noting, however, that while selecting the only fully 
Kazakh-speaking channel to air these new documentary films was an 
important symbolic gesture to celebrate Kazakhness, it also reduced the 
ability of the stories to reach Kazakhstan’s majority Russian-speaking 
viewers and educate them on that version of national history.
In choosing subjects for these state-sponsored historical 
documentaries, authorities gave priority to the region’s ancient history. 
Kazakhstani television seems content to stage the less controversial 
aspects of national history that were celebrated during the Soviet 
period – namely ancient and medieval figures – and to avoid more 
sensitive subjects. It was not until the end of the 2000s that television 
finally reached for more contemporary issues, namely the integration of 
the Kazakh world into the Russian Empire in the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries. The channel Khabar inaugurated this bolder 
approach by commissioning and airing a film about Alash Orda, the 
modernist Kazakh elites from the early twentieth century who constituted 
a provisional Kazakh government from December 1917 until August 
1920. Many Alash Orda members, among them their main leader 
Alikhan Bukeikhanov (1866–1937), rallied behind the Bolshevik regime 
and formed the first generation of national-communists, who were 
repressed progressively in the 1920s and then massively at the end of 
the 1930s.
On the whole, however, Kazakhstani television approaches the 
‘blank pages’ of national history linked to Kazakhstan’s interactions with 
the Russian world with a notable timidity. With the exception of the film 
on Alash, several short documentaries on its members, and a film about 
Mustafa Chokay (which is frequently replayed), Kazakhstani television 
has largely avoided discussing the difficult moments of Soviet history. 
Moreover, these films are often aired only in Kazakh and thus do not 
reach urban, educated Russophones. The Madeniet (Culture) Channel, 
launched in early 2014, screens many historical and cultural document- 
aries, but like its Russian counterpart Kul’tura,27 it targets a cultured 
audience and its viewership is limited. That being said, the situation has 
evolved in recent years, with rising nationalist voices calling for a more 
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open discussions of sensitive topics such as the repression of national 
elites and the famine of the 1930s (see Chapter 9).
More recently, the Kazakhstani authorities decided to prioritize the 
nationalization of the shared Soviet history and focus on the consensual 
period of this shared history: the Second World War or Great Patriotic 
War. In 2013, Khabar devoted a four-episode series to the only Kazakh 
general in the Soviet army, Bauyrzhan Momyshuly (1910–82), a series 
based on Alexander Bek’s novel, Volokolamsk Highway (Volokolamskoe 
shosse, 1944). Momyshuly’s career trajectory reveals the ambiguities of 
Soviet policy on promoting minorities. A platoon commander in the 
Central Asian Military District’s 315th Regiment, he was sent to the front 
in 1941 and tasked with defending the highway passing through the city 
of Volokolamsk. Momyshuly gained recognition for his military exploits 
but was also known for his ‘nationalist’ views, about which he had been 
vocal since the 1930s and which prevented him from receiving the title of 
Hero of the Soviet Union during his life. The honour was bestowed on him 
posthumously in 1990, at the insistence of Nursultan Nazarbayev, who 
was then chairing the Kazakh Supreme Soviet. The series, however, 
pays greater attention to his Kazakh identity than to his loyalty to the 
Soviet regime.
In 2014, Talgat Bigeldinov, twice named a Hero of the Soviet Union 
and celebrated for his achievements in Soviet aviation, became the subject 
of another documentary, To Rise in the Air! (Podniat’sia v vozdukh!).28 
Then, in 2015, preparations for the 70th anniversary of the end of the 
Second World War led to the release of several films. These included a 
piece on the Panfilov division (which played a crucial role in the capture 
of Berlin and consisted mostly of soldiers from Kazakhstan and 
Kyrgyzstan), a film celebrating the role of Kazakh soldiers in the liberation 
of Kiev29 and a series commemorating Kazakh hospitality in welcoming 
deported peoples and Russian soldiers during the war.30
Tensions around Ukraine in 2014 reinforced the Kazakh authorities’ 
desire to invest in celebrating national history. At the Seliger youth 
camp in August 2014, Putin answered a question about the growth of 
nationalist feelings in Kazakhstan with an ambivalent statement. He 
celebrated Nazarbayev, who ‘has performed a unique feat’ because ‘he has 
created a state on a territory where there has never been a state. The 
Kazakhs never had a state of their own, and he created it. In this sense, 
he is a unique person in the post-Soviet space and in Kazakhstan’.31 The 
statement stirred Kazakh public debate, especially among young, 
nationalist-minded elites. In response, Nazarbayev announced that 2015 
was the 550th anniversary of the birth of the Kazakh state, embodied by 
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the Kazakh Khanate created by Kerey and Zhanibek in 1465. He posits: ‘It 
may not have been a state in the modern understanding of this term, 
within the current borders … [But] it is important that the foundation 
was laid then, and we are the people continuing the great deeds of our 
ancestors’.32
Even more than previously, the festivities for the Day of Independence 
on 16 December 2014 were an occasion for muscular discourse on 
patriotism. There, Nazarbayev recalled: ‘Independence was hard won by 
many generations of our ancestors, who defended our sacred land with 
blood and sweat … Independence is the unflinching resolution of each 
citizen to defend Kazakhstan, their own home, and the motherland to the 
last drop of blood, as our heroic ancestors have bequeathed us’.33 A few days 
later, in his address to the nation, the President insisted on the need to 
develop patriotism among the younger generations, who no longer learn 
about history from books and should therefore have it delivered through 
public commemorations.
The authorities then allocated a significant budget to the festivities 
celebrating the half-millennium of Kazakh statehood: 3 billion tenge, or 
16 million US dollars, are said to have been invested in exhibitions, video 
productions, conferences and archaeological expeditions, as well as a 
large historical re-enactment.34 Television has been one of the premier 
tools deployed to impart this revived patriotic message. On Nazarbayev’s 
order, a new series on the history of the Kazakh Khanate began production 
in January 2015.35 Originally planned to be 20 episodes, it was reduced 
to 10 episodes, probably for planning reasons (it had to be written 
urgently for broadcast by the end of the year) but was then coupled with 
a series of documentary films and an animated movie.36
Rustem Abdrashev, known abroad for his movie Gift to Stalin 
(Podarok Stalinu, 2008) was chosen to direct the series, probably in 
recognition of his directorship of a film celebrating Nazarbayev’s youth, 
The Way of a Leader (Put’ lidera). The miniseries covers three centuries of 
history, beginning with the figures of Kerey and Zhanibek, who rejected 
the rule of Khan Abulkhair Sheibanid and moved to the Semirechie 
region, in the south-eastern part of present-day Kazakhstan, to create an 
independent khanate, and ending with Kenesary Kasymov (1802–47), 
the last khan, who tried to resist Russian advances in the steppes in the 
first half of the nineteenth century. Following the series, Abdrashev went 
on to direct the patriotic super-production Kazakh Khanate: Diamond 
Sword, also devoted to Kerey and Zhanibek, a TV show that many have 
dubbed the Kazakh Game of Thrones.37
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Entertainment, religiosity and patriotism:  
the series Signs: Legends of the Steppe
The aforementioned documentary films are official productions com- 
missioned by state authorities. Whatever their quality, they reach only a 
limited audience, which sees them as a state narrative that is often 
unattractive and unconvincing. Other, non-state-backed approaches 
allow viewers to familiarize themselves with national history in a more 
playful way, and to identify more directly and personally with their 
country. An in-depth analysis of Kazakhstani-produced miniseries and 
their role in staging the national ‘us’ is, however, still lacking from the 
scholarly landscape. For this chapter, I decided to focus on one series that, 
in my opinion, has renewed the genre: the 30-episode Signs: Legends of the 
Steppe (Znaki: Stepnye legendy), screened on Channel 7 since 2013.38 
During informal interviews I performed in Kazakhstan on the topic of the 
country’s media landscape, many of my local informants mentioned 
Channel 7 as being the most innovative channel, indicating that it offered 
slightly different cultural products and was known for the dynamism of 
its team.
In Signs: Legends of the Steppe, Nuriddin Bidosov, one of the channel’s 
most famous journalists, dressed in a relaxed way – jeans, T-shirt and 
cap – travels all over Kazakhstan to visit historic and religious sites. The 
staging is modern, inspired by reality shows such as Survivor. The series 
glorifies the adventure style; the narrative promotes technical feats, such 
as crossing more than 10,000 kilometres of the Kazakh Steppe in an SUV, 
often on unpaved roads in the desert, far from any urban centre. It also 
focuses on human exploits: the journalist and interviewees recount how 
they have reached ‘their limits’ in confrontations with supernatural, 
physical or spiritual risk. Indeed, the novelty of the series lies in its 
presentation of a trip that is simultaneously geographical, historical and 
spiritual. Distinctive landmarks provide structure for the trip: the 
journalist’s route stops at every famous shrine (mazar, the tombs of 
saints, often spiritually elevated ascetics from Sufi mystical orders, but 
also mythical figures linked to the Prophet Mohammed’s family) to which 
locals make pilgrimages.39 This tradition was partly obscured during the 
Soviet era, but the regime never directly repressed it; it was seen as a 
national tradition and relic of the past (perezhitki), not as a religious 
practice that threatened the official atheism.
This practice of pilgrimage has taken on an unprecedented scale 
since Kazakhstan became independent.40 The authorities have funded the 
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rehabilitation of these shrines, not because of their religious value but in 
order to Kazakhify the national territory and showcase the national, 
Kazakh footprint thereon (with the indirect goal of avoiding any territorial 
confrontation with Kazakhstan’s neighbours, especially Russia). Some 
of the chosen locations are natural landmarks – Charyn canyon, a cave 
with supposed magical springs, lakes with curative powers and so on – or 
mythical places from local legends. Others celebrate famous knights 
(batyr), as in the case of the cave of Konyr-Aulie, the supposed hidden 
tomb of Chingis Khan. The programme also visits the graves of great 
national figures (Bidosov calls them ‘great men’, or velikie liudi) such as 
the founder of the Sufi order Ahmed Yasavi,41 the writer Abay Kunanbayev 
and the poets and akyn (folk singers) Suyunbay Aronuly and Zhambyl 
Zhabaev.
At each site, Nuriddin Bidosov recounts the associated local legends. 
The custodians of the shrines give colour to the lives of those buried there 
and explain different rituals linked to the sanctity of the place. They read 
verses from the Quran to visitors and introduce them to sacred lineages, 
promoting a discourse of rediscovery of authentic Kazakh values forgotten 
during the Soviet era.42 They also sometimes act as fortune-tellers or 
blessing mediators.43 Bidosov participates in these rituals and attends 
prayers. The ‘evidence’ of the holiness of a site is most often demonstrated 
by cases of miraculous healing – a young boy who had never spoken a 
word until entering the shrine of Suyunbay Aronuly, for example, or 
a paralyzed person who regained the use of his limbs by drawing water 
from the sacred spring of Charyn canyon. The revelation may also be of a 
more intimate nature, as in the case of a poet who found inspiration by 
visiting the shrine of Abay and an infertile woman who finally became 
pregnant after visiting the mausoleum of Aisha-bibi.
In each new place, the star reporter speaks to people who 
experienced dramatic changes in their lives’ trajectories during their visits 
to that shrine. Many of them could be described as ‘born-again’, to borrow 
from the Christian vernacular: pilgrims often claim to have undergone 
spiritual regeneration following their visits to the shrine, enabling them 
to stop indulging bad habits and become respectable men or women. 
Shrines, healing and morality thus go hand-in-hand.44 In most cases, 
deceased family members visited the interviewees in their dreams, 
inviting them to make the trip to the shrine. In the nomadic Central Asian 
tradition, ancestral spirits (arbaks) interact with humans and are 
worshipped in order to gain favour and benefit from their protection. 
Since ancestral spirits form the link to the world of the dead, they also 
symbolize the social and ethnic continuity of the nation.45
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Bidosov emphasizes the eminently national character of these 
shrines. He recalls the historical context in which a saint or historical 
figure lived; mentions that ancient Turkic-Mongol peoples believed in 
heaven, Tengri; celebrates the popular devotion that surrounds these 
national figures; and recites verses or songs to commemorate their 
exploits on behalf of ‘the good of the people’ (na blago naroda). The 
programme is not content to rehabilitate Sufi spirituality or the arbaks. 
Rather, it links the places visited to extreme spiritual experiences. Many 
of the people Bidosov encounters describe having had extra-sensory 
experiences in their encounters/confrontations with the spirits of the 
place. Some say the spirits have physically challenged or injured them. 
For instance, the Ukash-ata shrine, which supposedly contains the tomb 
of a soldier of the Prophet Mohammed, is believed to ‘punish’ those who 
lack pure souls. Others have seen spirits in human form or via the 
unexplained movement of objects, or been saved from a mortally 
dangerous situation at the final moment through inexplicable coincidental 
circumstances. The production alternates between the narratives of the 
custodians and interview excerpts with dramatic reconstructions of these 
encounters with forms of higher consciousness. At the end of each 
episode, Bidosov leaves viewers with some concluding remarks about the 
need for spirituality, morality, national awareness and respect for 
ancestors.
The series represents a successful merging of genres. It borrows 
from the US genre of adventure and ‘inexplicable phenomena’ shows, 
employing the same set of staging techniques, lighting and special effects. 
It also borrows from similar shows on Russian channels, but offers a 
specifically Kazakh national take. The series combines the revival of 
Islamic piety with reflections on the growth of domestic religious tourism 
via pilgrimages to shrines. It also cultivates a fascination – present since 
the Brezhnev era throughout what was then the Soviet Union – with 
extrasensory phenomena, UFOs and vanished civilizations, as well as 
energetic healing, Asian medicine and East Asian-inspired philosophies.46 
In this, the programme is an accurate reflection of Kazakhstani citizens’ 
contemporary spiritual quests, which blend elements of so-called 
traditional Islam with a New Age atmosphere.
The programme is also an innovative way to impart patriotic feelings 
to viewers. The audience discover new, often very remote, places in 
Kazakhstan and enjoys a fun and patriotic journey during which they get 
to know their own country and its forgotten corners. The programme 
sketches a new geography of Kazakhstan, focused mostly on the southern 
areas of the country (the region most famous for its shrines and historical 
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monuments) as well as central Kazakhstan, around Kzyl-Orda, and 
eastern Kazakhstan, around Semey. In all the episodes available on 
YouTube, there is a noticeable absence of northern and western 
Kazakhstan, aptly reflecting the general symbolic marginalization of the 
latter in spatial representations of the country. The programme also plays 
on regionalist clichés. In Shymkent – the region known as the Texas of 
Kazakhstan47 – for instance, Bidosov appears in a cowboy hat and Western 
film music plays in the background. However, he never mentions the 
different Kazakh hordes and clans, a sensitive issue in public opinion. 
Instead, in each episode, Bidosov stresses the country’s unity by insisting 
on the fact that visitors from ‘all regions of Kazakhstan’ visit these 
holy sites.
The subtext of Signs: Legends of the Steppe also provides fascinating 
insight into Kazakh identity. The programme is aired entirely in Russian, 
and when interviewees speak Kazakh, their words are translated. Almost 
all participants in each episode are ethnic Kazakhs, although some 
Russians appear in secondary roles (only in one episode is a young 
Russian woman the main interviewee). All the places visited are linked to 
Kazakh identity; nothing in the landscape or discourse is reminiscent of 
Kazakhstan’s Soviet past or current links to Russia. The programme 
celebrates rural life, a rarity in a Kazakh cultural arena that is more 
focused on the urban world. The show is a far cry from the Emirati-style 
buildings of the new capital, Astana, and its avant-garde architecture,48 
and equally distant from the opulent apartments of the upper-middle 
classes that are the setting of many Kazakh miniseries.49 The everyday 
heroes of the series tend to be young people, but they often encounter 
members of the older generations – arbaks and shrine custodians – who 
are dressed in ‘traditional’ clothes and wear Muslim hats.
Paradoxically, the Steppe world is not actually celebrated in the 
series. Ancestral transhumance, adopted to graze cattle and symbolized 
by the yurt, is not a part of the displayed repertoire, even though this 
nomadic theme has become widespread in pop music.50 On the contrary, 
because the programme focuses on pilgrimage sites, it insists on the 
sedentary heritage of the Kazakh nation – in accordance with the official 
Kazakhstani historiography since independence.51
In the show, Bidosov often emphasizes the importance of better 
knowing and understanding the ‘Kazakh mentality’. The programme 
summarizes this supposed Kazakh mentality as being shaped by the 
spiritual legacy (dukhovnoe nasledstvo) of the ancestors, who could be 
Islamic religious figures, military heroes or carriers of Kazakh culture 
(such as folk singers, poets, or writers). This spiritual legacy has some 
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religious motifs, but it cannot be understood as purely Islamic. Islam is 
present across the shrines, prayers and sacred lineages linked to the 
Prophet or Sufi saints, but it is also associated with beliefs that refer to the 
region’s Tengrist and shamanic past, New Age trends that incorporate 
various healing practices and the supernatural as an integral element of 
the individual spiritual quest. Spiritual legacy, in the show’s philosophy, 
also includes knowledge of one’s own national past, respect for the 
pantheon of national heroes and awareness of oneself as a product of this 
past. Values that embody this Kazakhness include pride in the national 
past, generosity, sharing, responsibility and respect. In a sense, Signs: 
Legends of the Steppe offers a Kazakh version of the famous ‘Russian soul’, 
embodying the main human values, combined with a revalorization of 
so-called traditional Islam.
Television is both a window into public opinion and an incredibly powerful 
way to shape it. It operates in both directions, first by upholding political 
obligations in terms of official newspeak, forbidden and permissible topics 
and cultural values, and then by taking into account the tastes of an ever-
less captive public that is increasingly able to turn to other media, including 
online sources and foreign satellite channels. Kazakhstan is a good example 
of the challenge of the dual role of television. Although the authorities see 
it as a core means of communicating with their constituencies, the channels 
also rely on ratings and advertisements, which form the basis of their 
commercial viability. The televisual landscape in Kazakhstan is thus plural 
in the sense that it retransmits official state discourse but also offers 
entertainment, most of which is produced outside the Kazakhstani state’s 
control.
With the exception of the new cultural channel Madeniet and the 
cases discussed here, Kazakhstani television still offers few quality 
educational programmes on nationhood and has been relatively 
uninvested in such programmes. Efforts to represent the new nation 
have focused on advancing a forward-looking vision, as embodied by the 
symbolic architecture in Astana/Nur-Sultan, rather than improving 
citizens’ understanding of their controversial past. The blank pages of 
Kazakh history, which relate to Russia in general and the Soviet Union in 
particular, remain difficult to assess in an unpolarizing way. The political 
will to avoid creating cultural gaps between the Russian minority, which 
still represents a quarter of the population, and the Kazakh majority – not 
to mention between the Russian-speaking, urban Kazakh population and 
the rural, Kazakh-speaking one – plays a critical role in the absence of 
these sensitive historical moments from television.
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Even commemorations of the victims of the Soviet regime speak 
only to part of the population, explaining why Alash Orda was not 
commemorated at the founding historical moment of independent 
Kazakhstan. Having to determine the responsibility of the Soviet elites – 
whether federal ones based in Moscow or republican ones based in 
Alma-Ata – would intensify tensions and create new ideological divisions. 
Television productions have thus remained reluctant to address those 
troubled times and have long been resistant to the growing trend among 
young social activists and ethno-nationalist groups to campaign against 
the Soviet regime and the role of Russia in Kazakhstan’s history.
Still, staging the nation may take many multiple forms, including 
less official, more popular and more innovative ways of branding 
the country than the rigid state-dominated narrative. In this context, 
television is a perfectly appropriate tool, hence the emergence of patriotic 
entertainment programmes like Signs, which succeeds in blending the 
revival of interest in the Kazakh past and in knowledge of the nation’s 
vast territories with the rise in domestic tourism (especially healing 
pilgrimages), the fashionableness of the supernatural, and the celebration 
of the Kazakh ‘mentality’ and so-called traditional Islam. Signs thus 
sketches an alternative Kazakhness that is less official and more fluid, 
innovative, and in tune with global trends. This new genre of patriotic 
entertainment – already fully established in Russia – is probably destined 
to grow and mature. The authorities want to revive patriotic fervour in 
order to avoid pressure from Moscow, while the younger, increasingly 
Kazakh-speaking, post-Soviet generations display greater pride in the 
country’s past and in the celebration of a reconstructed Kazakhness.
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Language and ethnicity: the 
landscape of Kazakh nationalism
In this chapter, I set aside the state narrative on Kazakhness and focus 
instead on groups of activists in Kazakhstan that can be defined as 
nationalists or national-patriots. These activists contend that state 
policies do too little to defend the Kazakhness of the country.
During perestroika, Kazakh nationalist motifs flourished within 
intellectual circles before taking on a more political cast at the start of the 
1990s thanks to the Azat and Alash movements, though these were quickly 
liquidated by the authorities. Nationalist dissidence thus vanished from the 
political scene, though it remained visible (if discreet) in the academic 
world, especially around the promotion of Kazakh literature and the 
production of a national history alternative to the state-sponsored one.
Since the early 2010s, however, Kazakh nationalism has re-emerged 
on a different social basis, among a younger generation that interacts 
mostly on social media. So far, very few scholars have studied this 
re-emergence, with the notable exception of Diana T. Kudaibergenova 
and Serik Beisembayev.1 My own research is based on print and online 
sources in Russian as well as semi-structured interviews conducted with 
the late Aldan Aimbetov, the chief editor of Kazakhskaia pravda, in 
May 2002, March 2003, and June 2004, and with five young leading 
nationalist activists – Zhanbolat Mamay, Mukhtar Taizhan, Aidos Sarym, 
Dauren Babamurat and Valikhan Tuleshov – in June 2015 in Almaty and 
in January 2016 in Washington, DC.2
Terminological debates
In the Soviet tradition, ‘nationalism’ (natsionalizm) is defined as a negative 
feature typical of capitalist societies and/or a ‘remnant’ (perezhitki) of 
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pre-Soviet society noticeable among Soviet people that should be 
eradicated. Patriotism and internationalism, by contrast, are presented as 
the genuine way of expressing feelings of belonging to a national 
community. In the post-Soviet world, the negative load of the term 
nationalism is still very present and broadly shared by most populations, 
but multiple borrowings from Western literature and changes in mindset 
have led some in Kazakhstan to question this. Indeed, some groups now 
actively define themselves as nationalist and see this as a positive feature.
In the Kazakh language, ‘nationalism’ can be translated in two ways: 
ultzhandylyq and ultshyldyq. The first translation carries positive 
connotations, while the second is more ambiguous; it is sometimes 
negative, sometimes positive. Nationalism in the sense of ultzhandylyq 
supports emic expression, used by the subject, not perspectives applied 
by outside observers. During the perestroika years, the three main 
movements representing this nationalist trend – Alash, Azat and 
Zheltoksan – defined themselves as ‘national-democrats’ (natsional-
demokraty in Russian, ultshyl-demokratialyk in Kazakh), a positioning 
common among those who called for the Soviet regime to democratize 
and for Soviet nationalities policy to give more autonomy to national 
cultures. In the second half of the 1990s, the terminology evolved, with 
groups starting to identify themselves as ‘national-patriots’ (natsional-
patrioty in Russian, ult-patriottary in Kazakh), a term that was also, at 
that time, widespread in Russia and used to identify opponents of the 
Yeltsin regime. This term remains in use in Kazakhstan, and a whole 
group of natspat, or national-patriots, has emerged.
In today’s Kazakhstan, state organs still draw the Soviet-era 
distinction between ‘good’ patriotism and ‘bad’ nationalism. As such, 
all those who add national to their definition of patriotism position 
themselves in opposition to the state on matters of national identity. 
However, terminological debates among Kazakh nationalists are 
numerous. The majority believe that patriotism only refers to state loyalty 
while nationalism refers to the ethnic nation and should be promoted 
among ethnic Kazakhs. Some, such as Dos Koshim (see below), self-
identify as nationalists (ultshyl), not as national-patriots. According to 
him, ‘the so-called Kazakh nationalists are in fact Kazakh patriots. 
Without these “nationalists” it is possible that Kazakhstan as a state 
would not even exist’.3 As Diana T. Kudaibergenova notes, Kazakh 
national-patriots have not been able to develop a coherent theoretical and 
terminological framework for the use of ultshyldyq.4
The process of self-definition within this nationalist trend is not, as 
we have seen, specific to Kazakhstan: it relates to nationalist-themed 
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terms that are widespread all over the world. However, in Kazakhstan, 
part of the debate is specifically rooted in intra-Kazakh polemics about 
the supposed loss of Kazakh identity through Sovietization/Russification. 
The use of the adjective nagyz (‘real’ in Kazakh) to describe Kazakhs who 
have successfully preserved their identity (that is, ‘real’ Kazakhs) and the 
adjective shala to describe those who have ‘lost’ it has led to mutual 
accusations and become a way to privilege certain categories of citizens. 
The phrase Shala Kazakh, which literarily means ‘half-Kazakh’, is used to 
target Russophone and urban Kazakhs, who are considered too detached 
from their Kazakhophone and rural roots.5 This dissociation is based on 
the notion that Kazakhs have been colonized by Russians and should now 
decolonize their national conscience. This idea was indirectly formulated 
in the word mankurt, an old Turkic term updated by Chingiz Aitmatov in 
The Day Lasts More Than a Hundred Years (I dol’she veka dlitsia den’, 1980), 
who described an enslaved people deprived of their memory and, 
therefore, of their identity. The term found tremendous resonance 
in the Kazakh and Kyrgyz societies at the time of publication and has 
encapsulated criticism of the Soviet nationalities policy ever since.6
A large number of publitsitika (popular essays) have been published 
in Kazakhstan on the issue of nationalism, but these often read more like 
a nationalist manifesto or, at least, an engaged discussion on the topic 
than a scholarly analysis. An example of the former type of work is The 
Kazakh Mission, the edited volume of which was coordinated by Berik 
Abdylgaliuly, a nationalist theoretician and member of the Kazakhstan 
Institute for Strategic Studies (KISI);7 the latter category is represented by 
Kazakhstan: National Idea and Tradition8 by Kanat Nurov, president of the 
Aspandau Fund, a think tank and publishing house that has the support 
of some important political figures.9
Mapping the Kazakh national-patriotic landscape
The national-patriotic landscape in Kazakhstan is not unified politically 
or ideologically. Several generations, social networks and ideological 
orientations compete with each other. Even if any effort to create a 
typology is by definition schematizing, it is still meaningful to sketch the 
main groups. I identify four: the first historical parties of the perestroika 
years (Zheltoksan, Alash and Azat); the intellectual figures at the 
forefront of the language and culture struggle; the more politically 
oriented figures who seek to capitalize on so-called patriotic values; and 
the younger, social-media-oriented generation.
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the founding fathers
During the last years of perestroika, three Kazakh nationalist movements 
emerged, each exhibiting a different degree of radicalism.10 The first one 
chronologically, Zheltoksan (literally, December), was established in 1988 
to request the liberation of prisoners arrested after the anti-Soviet/anti-
Russian riots of December 1986.11 Led by anti-communist activist Khasen 
Kozhakhmetov and poet-activist Aron Atabek (who went on to found the 
national-patriotic society Zheruyuk in August 1989), the movement was 
officially registered in March 1990 after Moscow authorized a multi-party 
political system in the Soviet Union. Zheltoksan demanded that the 
government revisit its interpretation of the riots of December 1986, 
exhibiting special concern for Kazakhs abroad and calling for Islam to 
become a central political and ideological factor of the new Kazakh society. 
It adamantly opposed the possible privatization of the country’s land or 
natural resources. It did not call for Russians to be expelled en masse but 
urged their voluntary migration and demanded that Cossack activities be 
restricted. Later, Zheltoksan attempted to present itself as an alternative to 
President Nursultan Nazarbayev in the 1993 elections, where it was 
supported by some members of Alash and Azat.
More virulent was Alash, a political party established in April 1990. 
Taking its name from the historical Alash Orda movement of the early 
twentieth century, it hoped to play on this strong symbolic link to obtain 
recognition as the major representative of national interests. Alash’s 
followers rallied around the slogan ‘Islam, Turkism and Democracy’: 
the party wanted to create an independent Islamic state – Greater 
Turkestan – that would have included all the Turkic peoples of the CIS, as 
well as expel all Slavs from Kazakhstan.12 After the mufti of Kazakhstan, 
Ryspek Nysambayev, was attacked in December 1991 by some Alash 
members, charges were brought against the party and it was banned.13
One of Alash’s main leaders, Aron Atabek, went into exile in Moscow 
but was arrested by the Russian security services on behalf of Kazakhstan 
after publishing the newspaper Khak, which disseminated a virulently 
anti-Nazarbayev article written by the dissident Karishal Asanov.14 Atabek 
then fled to Baku, where he ardently defended the Azeri view of the 
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict for years. He became a well-known pan-
Turkist activist as part of the Turkestan Committee, which sought to rally 
opposition groups in the four Turkophone countries of Central Asia. He 
returned to Kazakhstan in 1996, publishing some poetry inspired by Abay 
and joining the self-defence militias operating in certain districts of 
Almaty. In 2009, he was convicted of hostage-taking and of killing a 
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policeman in a riot and was sentenced to 18 years in prison.15 Still 
incarcerated as of late 2020, he is considered a political prisoner by such 
organizations as Pen International.16
The most imposing political organization, however, was the Azat 
(Freedom) movement, founded in July 1990 by former foreign minister 
Mikhail Isinaliev, Dos Koshim and the late historian Sabetkazy Akatay 
(1938–2003). Very active in demanding the independence of Kazakhstan 
during perestroika, Azat was weakened after its core demands were 
met with the Soviet collapse and independence. In contrast to the other 
two parties, Azat stood firmly opposed to violent inter-ethnic relations 
and recruited members from among the Slavs and other ethnic groups as 
well as ethnic Kazakhs. Nonetheless, it called for the formation of a 
democratic Kazakhstani patriotism that would give priority to the Kazakh 
population and language.17 (Note that this Azat should not be confused 
with the opposition party of the same name created by Bolat Abilov 
in 2005.)
In 1992, segments of each of these three parties decided to 
establish a coalition with a less virulent ideology. They gathered together 
as part of the Republican Party of Kazakhstan (Respublikanskaia partiia 
Kazakhstana), led by Sabetkazy Akatay. Although the new party toned 
down its rhetoric in order to obtain registration, it refused to use the term 
‘Kazakhstani’ and endorsed the systematic usage of ‘Kazakh’ when 
speaking of the new state. On 16 May 1994, a group of 11 nationalists 
from different organizations launched a hunger strike in front of the 
parliament building in Almaty and demanded the resignation of the 
government.18 Instead, the militants were arrested and imprisoned, 
leading the various nationalist parties united under the Republican Party 
of Kazakhstan to abandon for several years their plans for large-scale 
national demonstrations. In 1999, Alash, still led by Akatay, was the only 
nationalist party to succeed in getting re-registered, this time under the 
name of the National Party of Kazakhstan – Alash (Natsional’naia partiia 
Kazakhstana – Alash). However, it proceeded to receive only 2.76 per cent 
of the vote in the legislative elections that term, lost its registration in 
2003 and disappeared from political life.19
the intellectual circles
As political expressions of Kazakh nationalism were repressed, the 
struggle moved to the cultural field. Several intellectual figures 
representing academic and artistic circles have since become the 
standard-bearers of the nationalist struggle to preserve and promote 
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Kazakh language and culture. Many of these figures come from the fields 
of history, literature and linguistics, which were already the most 
Kazakhified sectors of academic life during the Soviet era, for the obvious 
reason that mastery of the national language was necessary in order to 
access local sources. Many were moulded by the Zhas Tulpar movement, 
a Kazakh student organization that was active in promoting Kazakh 
culture in Moscow and Leningrad during the 1960s and was accused by 
the KGB of ‘bourgeois nationalism’.20
Even if some intellectuals, such as the aforementioned Sabetkazy 
Akatay, became involved in politics, most tried to remain above political 
divisions and interests. This allowed them to navigate the grey zone 
between official institutions and the opposition, forging consensus with 
the Nazarbayev regime. The face of this group was the writer and poet 
Mukhtar Shakhanov, former ambassador to Kyrgyzstan, member of 
parliament, and editor-in-chief of the cultural and literary journal Zhalyn, 
which has been published since 1969. Shakhanov also actively 
participated in ecological groups calling for protection of the Aral Sea and 
led the state commission investigating the 1986 Zheltoksan events.21
Other members of this group included the linguist and historian of 
Kazakh literature Tursynbek Kakishev (1927–2015), a professor at the 
Al-Farabi National University and one of the authors of a multi-volume 
work on the History of Kazakh Literature;22 another prominent Kazakh 
writer, Qabdesh Zhumadilov, born in Xinjiang to a Kazakh family who 
emigrated to the Soviet Union during the Sino-Soviet honeymoon of the 
1950s; Sofy Smatayev; and Mukhtar Magauin. Like Shakhanov, Akatay, 
Kakishev and Zhumadilov were known for their defence of Kazakh culture 
even in Soviet times. They competed with the Zhas Tulpar movement, 
which united mostly Russian-speaking Kazakh writers such as Olzhas 
Suleimenov, Murat Auezov and Satimzhan Sanbayev.23
Many figures of this generation fed into the Mother Tongue Society 
(Ana tili Qogami) and the Kazakh State Language movement (Memlekettik 
Til), which constituted the core of Kazakh cultural activism during the 
perestroika era. They contributed to the creation of the Qazaq Tili (Kazakh 
Language), registered as both an association and a journal in early 1990 
with the goal of ensuring the promotion of Kazakh as the state language.24 
Another important figure, the journalist Aldan Aimbetov (1931–2006), 
belonged to this generation but decided another fate for himself. 
A professor at the state medical university, he launched the journal 
Kazakhskaia pravda in 199325 and self-published it until his death. It was 
for years the only Kazakh national-patriot journal published entirely in 
Russian.26 It has since been complemented by SolDat and, more recently, 
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Tribuna (Ashyq Alan), bilingual Kazakh/Russian publications that 
likewise promote a national-patriotic agenda.27
A younger generation of nationalist activists emerged from the 
foundations and associations promoting Kazakh history and educational 
issues. The leading foundation in this category is probably the Alash Orda 
Fund, which collects works about the Alash Orda founding fathers as well 
as about Kazakh historians who worked on the topic during Soviet times.28 
One of the Fund’s main figures today, Sultan Khan Akkuly, trained at the 
Mukhtar Auezov Institute for Literature and Art and, after working for 
many years for Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, joined the Lev Gumilev 
Eurasian National University to lead a small foundation devoted to 
the study of Alash. Sultan Khan Akkuly has been visible in the media 
in recent years on the issue of identifying the skull of Kenesary Kasymov, 
the last Kazakh military leader to fight against Russia, with the hope of 
repatriating the remains to his homeland.29
the conservative patriots
A third group offers a more political reading of national-patriotism and 
tries to capitalize on its potential outreach in order to build political power. 
One organization within this group is Ult tagdyry (Fate of the Nation), 
which emerged in 2005 under the leadership of Dos Koshim, focusing 
mostly on language issues30 and inviting Russians to ‘take the opportunity’ 
to go back to Russia under Putin’s repatriation state programme, launched 
in 2006.31 Unhappy with the lack of a national holiday celebrating Kazakh 
history, Ult tagdyry also lobbied unsuccessfully to make either the 1916 
uprising or the 1986 Zheltoksan events a national holiday.32
Dos Koshim has had a long career in political activism, beginning 
during the perestroika years with the fight to recognize Kazakh as the 
republic’s official language. In the 1990s, he worked closely with the 
social-democratic party Azat, part of a network that included former 
prime minister Akezhan Kazhegueldin as well as human rights activists 
Evgeny Zhotvis and Sergey Duvanov. Loyal to his friends, Dos Koshim 
supported the rise of Zhotvis and Duvanov as political opponents to 
Nazarbayev, despite their obvious disagreements on the national identity 
issue. Dos Koshim continues to participate in the public debate about 
issues such as the Kazakh language and history, Oralmans, and the need 
for public policies to support the rural population.33
At its launch in 2005, Ult tagdyry was briefly in competition with 
another movement of the same name, which then changed its name to 
Khalyk dabyly (The Tocsin of the Nation), led by Bolatkhan Taizhan (who 
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subsequently passed away) and Sabyrzhan Makhmet.34 Another small 
political party, Ruhaniyat (Spiritual Strength), tried without success to 
register to participate in the 2011 elections on a platform of nationalism 
and environmental concerns. Its leader, Serikzhan Mambetalin, was put on 
trial in 2015 for ‘inciting inter-ethnic hate’ after publishing on his Facebook 
page excerpts from the latest book by Murat Telibekov, the leader of the 
nongovernmental organization Union of Kazakhstan’s Muslims, known for 
its provocative anti-Kazakh statements.35 Yet the rising star of this patriotic 
trend is Bekbolat Tleukhan, an MP and singer of classic Kazakh music 
known for his very nationalist agenda with reactionary values such as 
polygamy, and his promotion of rigorist Sunni Islam.
Some of these patriotic groups focus on empowering youth alongside 
promoting their conservative-values agendas. This is the case, for instance, 
with the Almaty-based Bolashaq (Future) youth movement (not to be 
confused with the state-funded fellowship programme of the same name). 
Its leader, Dauren Babamurat, has been working with rural youth and 
Oralmans since the mid-2000s, especially by bringing books to rural 
libraries and screening films in order to increase national pride.36 The 
Bolashaq movement is known for its strong opposition to Western values: 
in 2013, its members burned symbols of St. Valentine (of Valentine’s Day 
fame), seeing the saint as part of a decadent Western tradition of forcing 
young girls into early sex; they promoted instead a more national 
commemoration, namely of the legendary Kazakh couple Bayan sulu and 
Kozy Korpesh, to be celebrated on 15 April.37 Bolashaq was one of the most 
visible street movements supporting the replication of the Russian law 
against so-called homosexual propaganda in Kazakhstan, an effort that 
ultimately failed. On more than one occasion, Babamurat has violently 
expressed his hate for gay people, whom he sees as ‘degenerate’.38
Another youth movement is Alash kyzdary (or Alash arulary), 
which emerged in 2009 as the women’s counterpart of Bolashaq. It 
defends the same conservative values as Bolashaq: its young leader, 
Sandugash Dzhumagulova, fights against ‘American ideology, [which 
pushes for] girls to smoke, drink alcohol, use slang and have sex with 
almost unknown men’. 39 The group, which claims a membership of about 
1,500 activists, has organized anti-abortion campaigns and raids to 
confiscate Kazakh porn videos.
social media activists
A fourth group is comprised of younger people who use new tools such as 
social media to reach their audience. Of these, the most famous is 
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probably Zhanbolat Mamay, who began his career as a popular journalist 
for the Kazakh-language Zhas Alash newspaper and is now the editor of 
Tribuna/Ashyq Alan. He leads the Rukh pen Til (Spirit and Language) 
youth movement, a small structure devoted to promoting the Kazakh 
language that rapidly emerged, as early as 2011, as a political platform 
for this new generation of national-patriots.40
Mamay has been one of the most active critics of Kazakhstan’s 
entry into the Customs Union and then the Eurasian Economic Union. 
The feeling that the Nazarbayev era was coming to an end and that the 
Eurasian Economic Union was a strategic mistake perpetrated by an aging 
leadership gave national-patriots their largest public platform to date. 
They organized an ‘anti-Eurasian forum’ that was tacitly permitted by the 
authorities – likely to counter-balance pressures from Russia: they were 
authorized to meet publicly and garnered support from recognized 
intellectual and literary figures such as Sofy Smatayev, Temirkhan 
Medetbek, and the poet and writer Qabdesh Zhumadilov.41 The young 
national-patriots also tried to organize a referendum on the Eurasian 
Union42 and staged several digital actions – for instance, inviting people 
to wear medical masks to protest Russia’s ‘imperial virus’.43
The authorities’ attitudes toward this new generation of national-
patriots is ambiguous: they are marginalized and sometimes repressed 
but never totally silenced. In early 2012, Mamay was charged with 
inciting social discord during the Zhanaozen workers riots,44 a charge 
carrying a jail sentence of up to 12 years, but he was quickly released.45 
Mamay was back in court a few years later on trumped-up charges: in 
May 2014, as tensions around the Donbas war peaked, the Kazakhstani 
authorities arrested him and Russian white-power nationalist Alexander 
Belov-Potkin, the former leader of the powerful Movement Against Illegal 
Immigration, for inciting inter-ethnic hatred.46 Belov-Potkin allegedly 
organized a training camp for young members of the Kazakh nationalist 
group Ult-Azattygy, including Mamay. This story shares many features of 
the conspiracy theories and counter-messaging that shapes the post-
Soviet information space. The Kazakhstani authorities opened the case 
at a highly opportune moment, allowing them to kill two birds with 
one stone: they signalled to Russia that they were taking the risk of 
destabilization by Russian nationalists seriously and they neutralized the 
most visible Kazakh nationalist activists at a time of growing popular 
resentment of Kazakhstan’s entry into the Eurasian Economic Union. The 
allegation that Russian and Kazakh nationalists were working hand-in-
hand to destabilize Kazakhstan does not seem plausible, and no further 
evidence was produced in support of the accusation.
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Several other social media activists can also be mentioned here. For 
example, Mukhtar Taizhan, an economist who has been very active in 
drawing attention to the negative impact of the Customs Union with 
Russia on Kazakhstan’s economy, leads the small foundation named after 
his father, Bolatkhan Taizhan, who was a member of Zhas Tulpar during 
the Soviet era. Maksat Il’yasuly, one of the leaders of the Antigeptil group, 
which objects to Russia using the Baikonur Cosmodrome,47 became very 
visible during the spring 2016 protests against land reforms. Aidos Sarym, 
a historian and archivist by training, now coordinates the online Kazakh 
cultural project Abai.kz and heads the Altynbek Sarsenbayuly Foundation.
In the early 2000s, Sarym held a number of leading positions in the 
Ministry of Information of Kazakhstan as well as the Office of the 
President of Kazakhstan in the early 2000s. He edited National Tragedy of 
February 11, 2006 (2006), about Altynbek Sarsenbayev’s political 
assassination, and Zheltoksan (2011), a ten-volume collection of 
documents and materials about the December riots. Valikhan Tuleshov, a 
philosopher who founded and coordinates the European Club of 
Kazakhstan Public Fund, worked for several years at the Institute of World 
Economy and Politics under the Fund of the First President, and later led 
the School of State and Public Policy at Almaty Management University. 
To this list can also be added political scientist Serikzhan Mambetalin; 
social activist Rasul Zhumaly; renowned essayist Azimbay Gali; 
Makhambet Abzhan, the head of the Shanyrak public association and 
former leader of the Union of Patriotic Youth, which is close to the 
Kazakhstani Communist Party;48 and Rysbek Sansenbayuli, brother of 
the assassinated Sarsenbayev and chief editor of the popular newspaper 
Zhas Alash.49
This group does not necessarily share entirely similar worldviews, 
but they all are united by a strong anti-Russian narrative that does not rely 
only on linguistic issues or historical memories. Instead, they argue that a 
pro-Russian position favours authoritarianism in Kazakhstan and call for 
a more democratic regime. One of the main products of this new social 
media activism is the Facebook page Qazaq Orda, which has about 30,000 
followers.50 The page fights for what it calls Kazakhstan’s decolonization, 
posting anti-Russian news articles, graphs and memes. Qazaq Orda was 
particularly active during the Ukrainian crisis, republishing pro-Ukrainian 
(including pro-Bandera) flyers and memes, anti-Putin caricatures and 
jokes that analogized Putin to Hitler (‘Putler’); drawing parallels between 
the crisis and the Soviet-era Kazakh and Ukrainian genocides; and 
developing posters and memes about Kazakh history and the need to 
decolonize the country from any Russian influence.
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Shared worldviews and lines of divide
Groups that self-identify as national-patriots are heterogeneous. While 
they share a similar broad agenda of promoting the Kazakhness of 
Kazakhstan, they advance different viewpoints on several important 
questions. Consensus exists on some issues, but the lines of divide 
between them are also critical. This quote from Kazakhskaia pravda 
provides insight into the national-patriotic perceptions of present-day 
Kazakhstan:
One can say Kazakhs have almost negated themselves. What 
civilized people, having officialized its national language, speaks in 
a foreign language? What people had to leave the soil of its 
ancestors, a territory that is the ninth largest in the world, while 
having one of the lowest population density in the world? Why does 
one in every three Kazakhs today live abroad, their place is occupied 
by 129 diasporic nationalities? What native people on the authentic 
soil of its ancestors – with the exception of Native Americans – lives 
on reserves, having given its best territories to a non-native 
population? What people does not have the right to create a 
national-patriotic party or at least a movement? What else [do] 
Kazakhs have to give up, in the second decade of their independence, 
to trample their language, culture and mentality?51
The most widespread topic of discussion between national-patriot 
groups is thus the saving and promotion of the Kazakh language. This 
language-centric agenda has its roots in the Soviet period, when fighting 
for the right to speak and be taught in Kazakh constituted the cornerstone 
of nationalities policy. As Kazakhs were among the federal titular 
nationalities with the smallest share of national language fluency and 
the highest level of Russian usage, it was deemed crucial during the 
perestroika years to fight to protect the Kazakh language from near-
certain extinction.52
National-patriots are united in the belief that the Kazakh language 
should be given priority and be the only state-recognized language, 
with Russian losing its status as a ‘language of inter-ethnic communication’, 
a status that they believe protects Russian while allowing Russian-
speakers to avoid learning Kazakh.53 As proclaimed in Kazakhskaia 
pravda, ‘The language of each people, with the physical appearance of its 
representatives, is the foundation, the particularity, the shield of each 
nation. If the language were to disappear, the people would disappear as 
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well’.54 The majority of national-patriots favour the shift to Latin script, an 
old debate that regularly re-emerged on the Kazakhstani public scene 
until it was announced as an official policy for 2025 by Nazarbayev 
himself. According to national-patriots, Latin script is the symbol of 
modernity and of a pan-Turkic identity – with Kemalist Turkey as a beacon 
lighting the path – and a symbolic way to confirm the end of the Russian 
colonial era.55 Some, however, called for a shift to Arabic, as was proposed 
during perestroika, when the journal of the Young Communists, Pioner, 
launched a project to teach Arabic script.56 Today, however, this suggestion 
is considered too Islamic, if not Islamist, to enjoy broad support.
National-patriots position themselves in opposition to the state-
backed notion of a Kazakhstani nation that celebrates the country’s multi-
ethnicity. According to them, the multi-ethnic Kazakhstani nation is an 
illusion created by the Nazarbayev regime in order to avoid confronting 
Russia and Kazakhstan’s own Russian population, and because the elites 
currently in power are themselves a product of the Soviet regime and its 
ideology. According to national-patriots, the Kazakhstani nation would 
negate the right of Kazakhs to claim their own nation-state and, by 
extension, the linguistic and cultural primacy they believe they deserve. 
Many national-patriots openly refer to European nation-states as a model, 
suggesting that an authentic civic nation should emerge as an historical 
process from the merging of all ethnic or regional groups into one nation 
shaped by the language and culture of the majority. All citizens of 
Kazakhstan should, therefore, be called Kazakhs, just as all citizens of 
France are called French, whatever their original ethnicity may be. Dos 
Koshim has asked, for instance, for Kazakhstan to be renamed the ‘Kazakh 
State’ or ‘Kazakh Republic’.57
Once that declaration of intent has been made, however, many 
national-patriots disagree about what kind of relationship to build with 
the country’s Russian and Slavic minorities. Very few promote a pure 
‘Kazakhstan for Kazakhs’ that would entail expelling non-Kazakhs. The 
Kazakhskaia pravda editorial board did, however, fall into this minority 
in the early 2000s, when they asked for the expulsion of ethnic Russians 
to free up jobs and housing.58 Today, the majority of national-patriots 
claim that minorities are welcome to stay, but that they should speak 
Kazakh and share Kazakh values and traditions. All national-patriots are 
enthusiastic proponents of the repatriation of ethnic Kazakhs from 
abroad; having been protected from Russification and Sovietization, 
Oralmans are said to contribute to the re-Kazakhification of Kazakhs, 
inculcating traditions long lost by their modernized brethren in the 
homeland.59
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National-patriots also tend to share a similar reading of Kazakh 
history, especially of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. They believe 
the tsarist empire played one Kazakh juz (tribal confederation) off against 
another, whipped up fear of the Dzhungars to conquer the Kazakh 
territory, and planned the agricultural and demographic colonization of 
the steppes by Russian peasants. They see Soviet history as a direct 
continuation of Russian colonial policy, with an assumed agenda of 
demographic domination.
Their victimization narrative is built on two foundations. First is the 
memory of the political repression of Alash Orda leaders and the mass 
repressions of the 1937–8 purges.60 Small groups of activists commemo-
rate these tragic events every 31 May, the Day of Victims of Political 
Repression.61 For them, the December 1986 riots were another episode in 
the Russian/Soviet effort to repress everything Kazakh.
The second foundation is the bloody sedentarization and collect- 
ivization of the early 1930s and the subsequent famine that killed about 
one-third of Kazakhs and pushed another third into emigration.62 
Borrowing from the Ukrainian Holodomor narrative, national-patriots 
created a Kazakh term to describe the famine, Asharshylyk. They asked for 
the same status as victims of genocide and hoped for similar international 
recognition.63 The documentary film Asharshylyk by Kalila Umarov, based 
on Valerii Mikhailov’s book The Chronicle of the Great Dzhut (Khronika 
Velikogo Dzhuta), was produced in 1992 and restored in 2013.64 In 2019, 
Zhambolat Mamay released a new documentary on the famine, Zhulmat, 
viewed by half a million people on YouTube, that created vivid polemics 
within Kazakhstan and sparked some negative reactions from Russia.65
The Kazakh national-patriotic worldview is largely based on a 
shared endorsement of an alternate history and a romanticized Kazakh 
past. This alternate history finds inspiration in multiple sources, including 
the nineteenth-century Orientalist fascination with the supposed 
authenticity of the cultures of the steppes; Olzhas Suleimenov’s grand 
vision of the unity of the steppes and the critical role of the steppe world 
in founding the ancient cultures of the Mediterranean; Lev Gumilev’s 
rehabilitation of Turkic ethnic groups in the history of the Russian state;66 
and Murad Adzhi’s folk history of the 1990s around the notion that Turks 
are at the origin of all major civilizations and human inventions. This 
alternative culture is thus shaped both by the legacy of the cultural 
underground of the Soviet era and the contemporary popularity of folk 
history and conspiracy theories.
All national-patriots tend to call for a revival of the Turkic roots of 
Kazakhness, although with varying levels of pan-Turkism. For all of them, 
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the historical continuum among the peoples of the steppes is critical, even 
if they recognize the Kazakh Khanate of the fifteenth century as the birth 
of the first Kazakh state. They also cultivate romanticized notions about 
the freedom of nomadic culture and the figure of the batyr, the noble 
knight. Some give preference to an assumed pan-Turkic ideology relatively 
similar to the one in place in Turkey and in early twentieth-century Jadid 
circles, thus linking national-patriotism to Islamic belonging. Others shift 
their focus to a more Kazakh-centric pan-Turkism that is detached from 
Turkey, more secular and sometimes combined with Aryan supremacist 
motives, such as the ‘Kazakho-aryanism’ theory of Aron Atabek.67
On more contemporary issues, national-patriots present a relatively 
unified front. They consider current-day Kazakhstan to be a Russian 
colony and denounce what they see as Nazarbayev’s submission to 
the Kremlin. They ask for the closure of all Russian military bases on 
Kazakhstani territory, including the Baikonur Cosmodrome, and reacted 
violently to the rapprochement with Russia signified by the Customs 
Union and the Eurasian Economic Union.
They have also denounced Kazakhs’ cultural infeudation to Russia. 
In 2014, the Kazakh-language journal Zhuldyzdar otbarsy – Anyz Adam 
(The Celebrity Family – The Most Famous Man), known for popularizing 
world history, came under the media spotlight for publishing an issue 
devoted to Adolf Hitler and Mein Kampf.68 A Russia-based veteran group 
accused the journal of propagating inter-ethnic hate, while the chief 
editor, Zharylkap Kalybay, defended himself by saying the journal had 
merely explained who Hitler was to the wider public, without supporting 
Nazi ideology.69 The Kazakhstani justice system ordered Kalybay to pay a 
significant fine to the veterans’ group, but the scandal resonated among 
Kazakh nationalists, who tried to use the case to demonstrate the 
subordination of Kazakhstani institutions to Russian public opinion and 
its ‘obsession’ with fighting fascism.70
On Kazakhstan’s relationship with China, national-patriots have not 
forgiven Nazarbayev for abandoning some disputed border territories to 
Beijing in 1996, and they criticize China’s exploitation of Kazakhstani raw 
resources. Like many nationalist groups in the post-Soviet space, Kazakh 
national-patriots share strong environmental concerns – a legacy of the 
Soviet ecological movement of the 1960s – and this provides another 
impetus for their denunciation of China’s poor environmental standards 
and workers’ rights. They also warn that Kazakhstan might become a 
Chinese agricultural colony and were vocal participants in the 2009 
protests against the proposed transfer of over one million hectares of 
arable land to Chinese farmers. These protests forced the government to 
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retract its plans and to recognize the illegality of transferring land to 
foreign nationals.71 In spring 2016, the protests against land reform and 
the ability of foreigners to rent lands for up to 25 years again raised the 
public profile of national-patriots, especially in some provincial cities.
But beyond this façade of consensus, national-patriots are divided 
on many other important questions. Some, such as Murat Taizhan, Aidos 
Sarym and Valikhan Tuleshov, call for classic liberal values and a European 
model of development (though they do not stand for a pro-US foreign 
policy and many of them are proponents of a kind of pan-Turkic identity).72 
Others are much more critical of both the West’s foreign policy – 
denouncing, for example, US firms operating in the Caspian Sea that help 
consolidate the Nazarbayev regime without enriching the country – and 
values. Indeed, many who call for conservative values in Kazakhstan are 
careful to differentiate the liberal West from the conservative West. They 
support the rise of far-right parties in Europe, the shared agenda of strong 
nation-state sovereignty, the rejection of any supranational construction 
and the promotion of so-called traditional family values. To a lesser 
extent, national-patriots are also divided on whether they see Russia or 
China as Kazakhstan’s main enemy, a decision that depends on whether 
they look toward recent history and a medium-term future (in which case 
Russia is the problematic neighbour) or to ancient history and the long-
term future (in which case emphasis is put on China).
Another dividing question among national-patriots in Kazakhstan 
relates to their conceptions of national identity. Atabek is the only figure 
to insist openly on the notion of national socialism: ‘National-Socialism is 
not [the] fascism of Mussolini or Hitler!’ he writes. ‘National-Socialism is 
a political and economic term which scientifically underpins the state 
construction, with the interest of the Nation and of Social Justice at its 
core’.73 His radical worldview remains in the minority, even if many 
national-patriots believe in some kind of genetic or biological definition 
of the nation. For instance, Dos Koshim has stated that ‘Turkic unity, it 
seems to me, is in the blood’. 74 Similarly, some believe that Kazakh society 
should value juz (clan) lines as a constitutive element of the national 
identity. Others, however, see this as a ‘backward’ element cultivated by 
Russians and Soviets that should be rejected in order to become a unified, 
modern nation-state.
However, national-patriots’ main disagreement relates to religion. 
Here, at least three schools can be identified: those who promote liberal 
values and a secular nationalism, those who call for the rehabilitation of 
Tengrism and those who link Kazakh national identity to Islam. The third 
trend appears to be the rising one. In the early 1990s, the group Alash 
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called for a theocratic regime; since then, however, it has rapidly shifted 
toward a more secular narrative.75 One of its past leaders, Aron Atabek, 
has since became a fervent proponent of Tengrism. He considers Islam to 
be a universalistic religion that negates the specific national features of 
each country and denounces Wahhabism as a new internationalism. 
Atabek’s views also contain an underlying subtext of conspiracy regarding 
the links between Islam and ‘Masonic’ culture, an indirect way to consider 
both Arabs and Jews as Semites.76 However, a growing trend among 
national-patriots is to link national identity and Islam, as Bekbolat 
Tleukhan does in calling for Kazakhs to adhere to strict Hanafi traditions.77
Potential for social mobilization
What will happen if this national-patriotism is fully mobilized? What 
audience supports it, and what topics may crystallize public opinion in 
favour of national-patriots? On the other side, where do they lack 
credibility?
The first priority for national-patriots is to secure their political 
legitimacy in the face of a regime that has successfully captured the 
narrative of the nation. The ethnic and linguistic Kazakhization of 
the state administration has been underway since the mid-1990s, and the 
regime has, at least thus far, been a source of upward social mobility for 
a large proportion of urban Kazakh youth.78 National-patriots may claim 
that the Nazarbayev regime is a-national or anti-national (dominated by 
ethnic minority oligarchs, selling its resources to foreign firms and so on) 
but this discourse is too radical to gain broad public support. National-
patriots must, therefore, recognize the success of the regime in 
nationalizing Kazakhstan and work in its shadow.
Many natspat acknowledge that they are both repressed and used 
by the regime against Moscow as involuntary puppets of the president’s 
administration, AkOrda, though this does not undermine their ability 
to continue to act autonomously as well. One good example of this 
paradoxical status is Askar Nursha, a young scholar who was dismissed 
from the Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies under the President 
after expressing concerns about the benefits of the Eurasian Economic 
Union but who quickly found a new niche at the no-less-official Institute 
for World Economy and Politics under the Fund of the First President.79
National-patriots themselves disagree on the extent to which their 
movements are political. Some see the cause as an intellectual trend that 
will progressively become mainstream with the rise of a post-Nazarbayev 
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generation, while others would like to be politically engaged already and 
denounce the repression visited on them by the current authorities. Any 
attempt to organize national-patriotism as a political force has thus far 
failed. Any claim, for instance, that ethnic Kazakh oligarchs should be 
preferred over non-Kazakh ones (such as Alexander Mashkevich and 
Vladimir Kim), a claim that was quietly made by businessmen Nurzhan 
Subkhanberdin and Mukhtar Ablyazov at the peak of their influence, has 
been considered a direct attack on Nazarbayev’s legitimacy.80 Aidos 
Sarym summarizes this dual strategy:
First possibility: the political landscape will soon be nationalized 
and all parties will then speak in the state language and define 
their ideology based on Kazakh culture, traditions and historical 
background. In that case the creation of a Kazakh political party is 
not necessary. Why create a Kazakh party if all other parties are 
Kazakh in spirit and essence? Second possibility: the political 
system will not modernize and will stay the same. In that case, for 
sure, the question of creating such a party will emerge. But in that 
case the debate should be about creating not a party that will 
advance some questions and topics, but a party that will ask for 
structural change in the whole political landscape of Kazakhstan.81
This quote aptly captures the internal contradiction of nationalism as 
political activism: once the goal of nationalizing the society and the state 
is obtained, the existence of a political party calling for nationalism no 
longer makes sense. Although Kazakhs now represent more than 60 per 
cent of the population, national-patriots continue to see them as a cultural 
minority in their own state.
A second issue for the movement to mobilize its potential is that 
national-patriots have not been able to bridge the gap between rural and 
urban populations, a schism that remains the main social and cultural 
divide in the country. National-patriotic literature reproduces the classic 
topics of the romanticized national awakening of the nineteenth century 
in Europe and Russia. It mourns the lost authenticity of Kazakh culture, 
exalts the Kazakh aul (village), tries to recreate genuine national values 
from scratch and complains about the degenerated and Russified ‘asphalt 
Kazakhs’. But while natspats dream of reaching a rural audience, they 
themselves tend to be educated urbanites shaped in the late Soviet and 
early post-Soviet mould whose lives are largely disconnected from the 
countryside. Moreover, in order to mobilize rural youth, the issue of Islam 
and its place in national identity would have to be addressed openly.
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Moreover, national-patriotism is still very much centred on the 
language issue. But once the Kazakh language is rescued from disappear-
ance, which it arguably has been at this point, its symbolic defence will 
not be enough to support a political project per se. This is the conclusion 
of the WikiBilim group, a group of young activists that seeks to develop 
online educational content in the Kazakh language for Wikipedia in order 
to show the potential of an audience that not only consumes Kazakh-
language content but is also capable of producing it.82
On the opposite side from these weaknesses, national-patriotism 
can rely on several strengths. First, Kazakhstan is demographically 
‘Kazakhifiying’ rapidly, a trend projected to accelerate in the next two 
decades. The demographic gap between Kazakhs and non-Kazakhs is 
widening fast. In 2013, the natural growth rate of the Kazakh population 
was 2.3 per cent (though still lower than the 2.6 per cent growth in the 
Uzbek minority), while that of Russians and Ukrainians was negative 
at –0.51 and –1.96 per cent, respectively.83 These demographic trends 
also impact the average age of each group. In 2013, the average age of 
Kazakhs was 28.9, compared with 38.5 for Russians, 43 for Ukrainians 
and 26 for the Uzbek minority.84 This age gap of about a decade between 
ethnic groups means than the aging of Russian and Slavic minorities will 
accelerate, as the majority of them are already past reproductive age. In 
20 to 30 years, the number of Russians will decline abruptly because of 
natural factors; the northern regions will be largely populated by 
pensioners. This already unbalanced equation tilts further in favour of 
Kazakhs with the repatriation of more than one million Oralmans.
New generations, especially among middle-class and provincial 
notables, will probably be the ones bearing the flag of Kazakh nationalism, 
becoming a more significant niche for politicians to capture with 
more nationalist policy decisions. Already today, some elites do not hide 
their support for a more pro-Kazakh policy in terms of language, culture 
and memory, among them Imangali Tasmagambetov, former mayor of 
Almaty, Astana, and then defence minister; Marat Tazhin, former foreign 
affairs minister, secretary of the National Security Committee, secretary 
of Kazakhstan’s Security Council, and then ambassador to Russia; 
Akhmetzhan Yessimov, former mayor of Almaty; Mukhtar Kul 
Mukhammed, former minister of culture; and Berik Abdylgaliuly, who 
worked as akim (governor) and deputy akim in Kostanay and Karaganda. 
To this list could potentially be added, even if their stances on national-
patriotism are less straightforward, Oraz Zhandosov, former deputy 
prime minister, former minister of finance and economy and the director 
of the Rakurs Center for Economic Analysis; and Bulat Utemuratov, said 
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to be the richest man in Kazakhstan, who occupies several positions 
in the presidential administration and served as the president’s special 
advisor on several issues. Moreover, a younger generation is already 
involved in the presidential party Nur-Otan and the current administration, 
pushing for a more assertive policy in terms of national identity (see 
Chapter 10).
The natspat movement is thus becoming increasingly visible. In 
2009–10, it was mostly intellectual figures, led by Mukhtar Shakhanov, 
who protested against the Doctrine of National Unity and its mention of 
a Kazakhstani nation. In 2011, 138 public figures addressed an open 
letter to President Nazarbayev, the prime minister and the heads of the 
two chambers of parliament asking them to strip the Russian language of 
the special status granted to it by the constitution.85 Since then, the topic 
of Kazakhstan’s relationship with Russia has become the main channel for 
natspats to reach a broader public. This outreach began with public 
protests outside Russia’s embassy and consulates in Astana, Almaty and 
Uralsk demanding the suspension of Russian rocket launches from 
Baikonur after a proton rocket crashed in Kzyl-Orda province in 2013. 
That same year, some 500 people gathered in Almaty to protest against 
the decision to join the Eurasian Economic Union and to ask for a 
referendum on the matter.
One of the probable but yet-to-be-explored strengths of national-
patriotism in Kazakhstan is its likely ability to capture the current wave of 
conservative values that is apparent all over the post-Soviet space as well 
as in Europe. Sociological surveys conducted by the Almaty-based 
Strategy Centre for Social and Political Research revealed that only 18 per 
cent of respondents consider Western countries to be a good model for 
development (European countries received 13 per cent and the United 
States 5 per cent). Russia collected 22 per cent of said preferences, 
probably mostly among Russians and Russia-oriented Kazakhstani 
populations, while the notion that Kazakhstan should build its own path 
was selected by 43 per cent of respondents.86 Another survey, conducted 
in 2014, shows that only 17 per cent of respondents believe that Western 
values are becoming more and more prevalent in Kazakhstan society, 
while 69 per cent feel that the culture of Kazakhstan should stay 
distinctive and resist outside influences and intrusions. One-third suggest 
that future cultural developments should be based on Kazakh national 
customs, values and traditions.87 The current cultural zeitgeist in 
Kazakhstan therefore appears favourable to stronger nationalist claims.
When Nazarbayev stepped down from the presidency in March 
2019, natspats hoped to conquer a reactivated public space. With the help 
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of some patrons inside the system, a group led by Amirzhan Kosanov 
launched Jana Qazaqstan (New Kazakhstan), a new movement with a 
nationalist agenda. Key figures in the movement include Nazira Darimbet, 
Aidos Sarym and Rasul Zhumaly. Kosanov has a long history of political 
opposition, having worked with former prime minister  Akezhan 
Kazhegeldin and then for the more nationalist Azat party. On 9 June 
2019, during the presidential elections set up to elect Nazarbayev’s 
successor, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, Kosanov secured the highest vote 
share of any opposition candidate in the history of independent 
Kazakhstan: 16 per cent. However, he undermined his legitimacy by 
recognizing Tokayev’s victory without even trying to leverage the votes he 
had won to secure a voice in the new government.
This disappointing post-electoral performance confirmed that the 
nationalist movement does not yet constitute a genuine opposition but 
remains more of a lobby within the current political system. Indeed, such 
a reality is hardly unique to Kazakhstan; in neighbouring Russia, 
nationalists have likewise experienced a ‘managed’ relationship with the 
authorities that sometimes allows them to be vocally critical but more 
often leaves them as part of the rank-and-file supporting the government. 
Jana Qazaqstan’s announcement that they might transform the movement 
into an official political party would likewise follow the pattern established 
in Russia by the likes of Dmitri Rogozin’s Rodina party.
Jana Qazaqstan’s posture thus highlights the limits of the national-
patriotic opposition: beyond defending ethnic Kazakhs’ rights, its ability 
to advance a credible political agenda seems quite modest so far. The 
movement’s political programme limits itself to principled statements 
about democracy, ethnocentric Turkic solidarity, leaving the Eurasian 
Economic Union, and criticizing Russia and China, but remaining vague 
on concrete economic and political reforms (except regarding private 
land ownership) and sound foreign policy measures. Moreover, while 
nationalist sentiments are on the rise among youth, the very limited social 
media presence of Jana Qazaqstan has called into question its ability to 
develop broader strategies for securing support among urban youth and 
to reach out to the rural population by other means.
The landscape of Kazakh nationalism or national-patriotism remains only 
loosely structured. Compared to the structures that exist in Russia, 
Ukraine or the Baltic states, it seems to still be in its infancy. But when 
viewed in the context of neighbouring Central Asian states, this national-
patriotic trend has become an active part of society in a relatively similar 
manner as it has in Kyrgyzstan, although with a critical difference: 
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Kazakhstan has been able to avoid mass inter-ethnic riots (skirmishes 
between ethnic groups do happen regularly but on a very localized basis, 
mostly in rural areas between Kazakhs and Uzbeks, Dungans, Uyghurs, 
Chechens or Turks), while Kyrgyzstan’s political life has been shaped to a 
not insignificant degree by the tensions between the Kyrgyz majority and 
the Uzbek minority.
Kazakh national-patriots occupy small niches: they dominate some 
cultural institutions, often state-sponsored but with limited outreach, and 
now use social media to spread their message and overcome their lack of 
political organization. Many groups recognize that before even trying a 
Gramscian strategy of penetrating the state and energizing the official 
political and intellectual life, national-patriots should focus on cultural 
enlightenment (prosveshchenie) in order to raise awareness among the 
population about what they consider to be critical issues for the future of 
the nation.
Kazakh national-patriots also display classic identity anxieties and 
post-colonial narratives. They feel alienated in their own country and 
have difficulties moulding an autonomous space for self-expression. They 
find themselves either co-opted by the authorities (if they agree to 
rally behind official institutions that promote Kazakh language and 
culture) or marginalized and sometimes penalized by a heavily developed 
bureaucracy. But their main difficulty has been more structural: given 
the success of the Nazarbayev regime in capturing the national identity 
narrative, the national-patriots have little room to attract an audience. To 
enjoy the new space opened by Nazarbayev’s departure from the 
presidency, natspats will have to demonstrate that they have a structured 
political project to offer: fighting for the symbols of the nation does not 
say anything about the nature of the regime they would promote 
(democratic, hybrid, authoritarian), nor about its values and ideological 
orientations (pro-Western or not, with Islam as one of its main values or 
not), nor about the economic policies it would implement to keep citizens’ 
standards of living on their upward trajectory.
National-patriots will also have to prove that a cosmopolitan 
nationalist elite can legitimately represents a rural Kazakh society that is 
mostly interested in upward social mobility and economic prospects. 
Valuing the aul as the place of authenticity of Kazakh values does not 
illuminate any clear economic development strategy. Integrating the 
Oralmans has shown obvious limits and anti-Oralman xenophobia has 
developed among ethnic Kazakhs themselves. To the despair of national-
patriots, many ordinary Kazakhs find it easier to coexist with Russians 
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than with Oralmans: Soviet and post-Soviet shared values remain a more 
efficient ‘glue’ for building a civic identity than a reconstructed and 
artificial pan-Kazakh identity. Feelings of belonging are much more 
embedded in ‘banal nationalism’ than in the existence of a theoretical 
nation. To be successful, therefore, national-patriots will have to come to 
terms with the Russian and Soviet past of the Kazakh nation and integrate 
it in a more positive way into their ideological construct.
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Generational changes:  
the Nazarbayev Generation
In March 2019, Nursultan Nazarbayev stepped down from the presidency, 
a post that he had held since Kazakhstan’s independence. This was not 
intended to be a departure from politics altogether: indeed, Nazarbayev 
had planned to remain in power through tailor-made institutions. Yet 
this strategy has not been playing out quite as intended. Although 
Nazarbayev’s official successor, then-speaker of the upper house of 
parliament Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, was indeed elected and received 
71 per cent of the vote, there were serious protests criticizing the 
handpicking of a successor and the non-transparency of the vote. The first 
protests began just after Tokayev proposed renaming Astana Nur-Sultan 
in honour of the president. Shocked by the lack of public consultation on 
a gesture that so clearly smacked of a cult of personality, protesters took 
to the streets under the slogan ‘Nur-Sultan is not my city’. In the weeks 
that followed, protest sentiment grew steadily, with several thousand 
protesters turning out in both Almaty and Nur-Sultan, chanting slogans 
such as ‘Old man out’ (shal ket). The authorities decided to react with 
repression: several prosecutions and arrests of leaders took place, a clear 
sign that the change in president was in no way a change in regime, a 
transition toward democracy, or any kind of liberalizing perestroika.
Even if the protests have seen a large number of retired people, 
especially mothers, taking advantage of the current unstable context to 
express resentment, most of the protesters have been young people. 
These young people were all born under Nazarbayev’s reign – those aged 
under 29 comprise 9 million people, or 51 per cent of the population of 
Kazakhstan – and hence represent what can be called the Nazarbayev 
Generation. They have no direct memory of the Soviet regime, only family 
recollections, though many of them do recall their parents’ struggles in 
the difficult first decade of the country’s independence. Since the early 
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2000s, they have lived in a world of political stability and relative material 
affluence, developing a strong consumerist culture. Even with growing 
government restrictions on media, religion and formal public expression, 
they have been raised in a comparatively free country. Who are they? 
What do they think and wish for? What are their social and cultural 
practices and behaviours? How do they see the world and Kazakhstan’s 
place therein?
Sociological research on Kazakhstani society
Research on Kazakhstan to date has focused primarily on state 
construction, elite-level discourses, foreign policy, security issues and 
economic strategies. Studies of social and societal transformations, 
meanwhile, have remained peripheral. For a long time, there was no 
tradition of sociological surveys in the country – except those com- 
missioned by state institutions, which are classified, often of mediocre 
quality and deploy doubtful methodologies – and few cultural 
anthropologists looking at the micro-level. However, things have changed 
in the past decade: we now have a whole generation of scholars, both 
Kazakhstani and foreign, who have been collecting sociological data and 
conducting interviews to gather local voices, offering both quantitative 
and qualitative insights into the evolutions of Kazakhstani society.
Youth – the most rapidly changing and receptive segment of 
Kazakhstani society – has been one of the main objects of this new wave 
of research that is transforming our knowledge of the country and helping 
us move beyond the usual clichés about ‘Nazarbayev-stan’. It is not that 
the natural change of generations was heretofore ignored by scholars and 
the policy community; the expectation of a presidential transition has 
always been accompanied by discourses about the long-awaited arrival in 
power of new generations. But the view of these generations was 
oversimplified, focusing on their political and geopolitical orientations 
almost to the exclusion of their social and cultural practices. A black-and-
white narrative cast the Bolashak generation – those trained abroad 
under the Kazakhstani state programme, who supposedly represented 
the liberal, Western-oriented youth of their day – in stark contrast 
with the desperate provincial youth, who were seen as being motivated 
by jihadism and as going to volunteer in the Syrian war theatre.
We now have at our disposal several categories of surveys. Among 
the biggest data sets comparing several tens of countries, Kazakhstan was 
surveyed by Asia Barometer in 2005,1 World Values Survey in 2011,2 
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Life in Transition in 2006 and 2010,3 the Pew Research Center in 2012 
and 20134 and Gallup every year since 2006.5 Several UN institutions 
have included Kazakhstan in their surveys, among them the United 
Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), the International Organization for 
Migration (IOM) and the International Labour Organization (ILO). Some 
foreign organizations have likewise conducted public opinion polls in 
Kazakhstan, such as the International Republican Institute between 2008 
and 20116 and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung on youth in four Central Asian 
countries in 2015.7 At the regional level, several institutions have also 
carried out surveys, often but not always focusing on questions relating 
to regional integration. Examples include Central Asia Barometer,8 
Eurasian Integration Monitor9 and the Eurasian Development Bank.10 In 
2015, the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) and Gallup published 
a series of surveys, conducted across the whole post-Soviet region, 
looking at Russian media influence.11 In 2007 and 2012, Barbara and 
Azamat Junisbai conducted, with the Kazakhstan-based BRIF Research 
Group, two large surveys of between 2,000 and 3,000 interviewees, 
funded by the National Council for Eurasian and East European Research 
(NCEEER) and the National Science Foundation (NSF), comparing 
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.
To these should be added a long list of smaller nationwide surveys 
conducted by teams of local and/or foreign researchers. The government-
funded research centre Molodezh’ (meaning ‘Youth’) publishes a national 
report every year.12 In 2010, Kazakhstan’s Department for Youth Policy 
and the Centre for Analysis and Prognosis conducted a survey designed 
to gauge patriotism among young people. Data was collected in all 
fourteen oblasts, as well as the two cities of Almaty and Astana.13 In 2017, 
the Institute of World Economy and Politics (IWEP) conducted a survey 
offering rare insight into Kazakhstani citizens’ perceptions of the media.14 
The ‘Strategiya’ Center for Social and Political Research has implemented 
several surveys and polls commissioned by different institutions on topics 
ranging from youth to the media market.15
At a more individual level, Ro’i and Wainer conducted 700 
interviews on religious identity in 2006;16 Al-Farabi Kazakh National 
University surveyed young people on the ‘Formation of Civic and Patriotic 
Education among Youth in Kazakhstan’;17 and the private Narxoz 
University, which teaches primarily economics to a student body of 
roughly 8,000 millennials and post-millennials, surveyed 1,500 school- 
children (from ninth to eleventh grade) from Atyrau, Pavlodar, Shymkent, 
Kyzylorda and Semey in 2017.18 Nazgul Mingisheva conducted a survey 
with 94 students at Karaganda State Medical University in 2015–17, and 
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Galym Zhussipbek and Zhanar Nagayeva distributed questionnaires to 
students of the private Suleyman Demirel atindagi Universitet in Almaty 
and the state medical university in Semey, as well as to working youth in 
Almaty and Atyrau.19
Needless to say, surveys geared toward generalizability may 
overlook context-specific understandings and local interpretations of 
terminology. Yet when taken together and complemented by cultural 
anthropological studies based on qualitative interviews, they shed light 
on the new directions taken by this Nazarbayev Generation.
Value-realm of a conformist generation
Based on this new wealth of data, what can we say about the Nazarbayev 
Generation? First, that ‘generation’ should probably be plural: there are 
in fact already two generations, Generation Y (born in the late 1980s and 
90s, and also known as millennials) and Generation Z (those born in the 
2000s). In many ways, Kazakhstani members of generations Y and Z are 
not so different from youth elsewhere in the world; they are in fact far 
more similar to each other than were their counterparts in previous 
generations. They are, for instance, all ‘digital natives’, living in a visual 
culture where one often communicates with images rather than with 
text;20 they are obsessed with immediacy and community feedback; and 
they do not like planning for the future.21 They are environmentally 
aware, think globally, favour blending cultures, embrace DIY (do-it-
yourself) and are politically indifferent but believe in co-creative 
mechanisms.
The Nazarbayev Generation is quite conformist in its life goals: it 
believes in family values, marriage, having children, healthy living and 
material comfort. Young Kazakhstanis are not, on the whole, attracted to 
a quest for knowledge and see higher education only as a tool for getting 
a good job; they trust that having the right social connections will help 
them build their lives and careers.22 They are far from a revolutionary 
generation: they do not challenge their parents’ values and ways of life, 
trust family more than any other institution and, overwhelmingly (more 
than 90 per cent) view their relationships with their parents positively.23
They still differ from older cohorts in some respects: they are more 
individualistic and believe in their uniqueness; they are better disposed 
toward elements of a market economy, such as a private sector, 
entrepreneurship and a banking system; they display greater respect for 
individual success; and they are less troubled by social inequality and, 
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therefore, less supportive of the state addressing this inequality.24 In 
essence, they are the children of the economic liberalism that has shaped 
independent Kazakhstan. Consequently, the feeling of being affected by 
a class divide is mentioned by only one-third of young ethnic Kazakhs – 
with the Atyrau region showing the highest levels. Social inequality 
appears to be a very serious concern for some ethnic minorities, such as 
Ukrainians and Chechens, but not for Russians.25
Kazakhstani youths’ support for economic liberalism does not 
translate into them being specifically favourable toward a democratic 
regime or liberal values. The 2011 World Values Survey found that all 
generations broadly supported the vague principles of a ‘democratic 
system’ (while also desiring a ‘strong leader’), but that 18- to 29-year-olds 
were, if anything, somewhat less supportive (84 per cent compared to 
90 per cent among those over 50, for example).26 Similarly, research 
conducted by Barbara Junisbai, Azamat Junisbai and Christopher Whitsel 
demonstrates that 18- to 29-year-old Kazakhstanis are significantly less 
likely to express support for democracy than previous generations – or 
even their generational counterparts in Kyrgyzstan. Less than a quarter of 
them believe that ‘citizens should be more active in questioning the 
actions of leaders’, compared to 87 per cent of the population as a whole.27 
While two-thirds of youths declare that they are occasionally interested 
in politics, less than 10 per cent of them discuss politics with family and 
friends or participate in any form of civic activism.28 As Junisbai, Junisbai 
and Whitsel conclude, ‘In Kazakhstan, young people appear to be 
socialized in accordance with both aspects of the political context under 
consideration …: presidential authoritarianism, which in Kazakhstan 
has a distinctly paternalistic flavor, and patronage politics’.29 The 
2015 Friedrich Ebert Stiftung survey confirms how low altruism and 
participation in citizens’ initiatives fall on youths’ lists of priorities. They 
are quite happy with society as it is, considering women, ethnic minorities 
and the religious to have sufficient rights.30
Just as they are not actively pro-democracy, Kazakh youths are not 
especially attracted to so-called Western values. A survey conducted in 
2015 by Friedrich Ebert Stiftung found that 47 per cent of youth identified 
Russia as the country to which Kazakhstan should look for its 
development, while only 19 per cent felt that Europe should be the 
foremost model, 10 per cent China and 8 per cent the US.31 However, 
there are several definitions of liberal values. A more refined perception 
of these values helps dissociate the rejection of liberalism in the sense of 
neoliberalism and identity politics – laissez-faire capitalism and the 
promotion of individual sexual and ethnic differences – from the backing 
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of a more traditional liberalism – a responsible social democracy that 
provides good public services and protects basic individual rights.32
Changing benchmarks in national identity and language
In terms of national identity, Kazakhstan’s youth population displays 
a complex combination of civic and ethnic identities. This reflects 
Kazakhstan’s ambivalent conception of nationhood as a whole, which is 
torn between the promotion of an inclusive Kazakhstani identity focused 
on prosperity and a Kazakh-centric identity that celebrates Kazakhstan 
as the homeland of ethnic Kazakhs. Raised with this ambivalence, 
Kazakhstani youth echo its main features: ethnic identity continues to be 
most authoritative, but references to Kazakhstani identity are also on the 
rise. Even if youth do not spontaneously identify as Kazakhstani, they 
show strong patriotism, believing in the country, seeing their future in it, 
and supporting an inclusive definition of the nation based on territorial 
identity.33 However, this Kazakhstani identity does not take the form of 
the kind of Kazakh-Russian/Slavic compromise expressed by the 
Eurasianist state identity. The non-ethnic identity that emerges is a result 
of globalization and cosmopolitanism more than any specific position in 
Kazakhstani nationhood vis-à-vis Russia. The symbolic identity battle is 
thus waged between a closed, isolationist Kazakh identity and an open, 
globalized Kazakh identity, with the median Russian/Slavic/Eurasian 
level now only one of many elements of the latter.
This identity shift is supported by profound demographic evolutions. 
Among youth, ethnic Kazakhs’ dominance is now secured: in 2013, ethnic 
Kazakhs represented 66 per cent of the 25- to 29-year-old cohort and 
71–3 per cent of every younger age group.34 The demographic rebalancing 
in favour of Kazakhs has also been reinforced by the government’s 
repatriation policy. While it is difficult to collect detailed demographic 
data on Oralmans, it seems that more than half of them are of working age 
and 40 per cent are children,35 meaning that Oralman youth represent at 
least half a million people, further tipping Kazakhstan’s younger cohorts 
in the direction of Kazakh ethnicity.
The dominance of ethnic Kazakhs among younger age cohorts does 
not automatically translate into a decrease in knowledge of Russian, 
however. On the contrary, this knowledge has been growing over the 
years. At the last Soviet census of 1989, 64 per cent of Kazakhstan’s ethnic 
Kazakhs reported having Russian as their first or second language, while 
by 1999, this number had risen to 75 per cent.36 The level of Russian 
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fluency had risen even further by 2009, when 79 per cent reported the 
ability to write fluently in Russian, 84 per cent the ability to read Russian 
fluently, and 92 per cent the ability to understand spoken Russian.37 
Kazakhstan’s next census, to be conducted in late 2020, will provide an 
indication of whether this trend is continuing or reversing.
But if the Russian language is enduring or maybe even becoming 
more widespread in Kazakhstan, it is not at the expense of the Kazakh 
language. On the contrary, it currently appears that both Kazakh and 
Russian are strengthening (or, at the very least, maintaining) their 
positions, meaning that the government’s ambition of making virtually its 
entire population fluent in both languages is not unrealistic.38 The share 
of Kazakhstanis who fluently write, read and understand Kazakh rises 
sharply with the younger generations. In 2009, among those under the 
age of 29, at least 80 per cent indicated that they understood some 
Kazakh, meaning that Kazakh is gradually gaining legitimacy as a national 
language the knowledge of which is unavoidable even for non-Kazakhs. 
Indeed, 55 per cent of young ethnic Russians agreed that every citizen of 
Kazakhstan should know the Kazakh language.39
The authorities hoped to spread the Kazakh language far more 
rapidly than turned out to be possible and passed laws upon laws trying to 
make it an influential language in the public space. Where voluntarist 
policy failed, demography succeeded: members of new generations 
arriving at school and university now more often speak Kazakh than 
Russian. Language use in schools is thus progressively shifting. As seen in 
Figure 10.1, 55 per cent of Kazakhstani students were studying in Kazakh 
and 41 per cent in Russian in 2003.40 15 years later, between 2017 and 
2018, 66 per cent were studying in Kazakh and just 31 per cent in Russian. 
This 10 per cent decrease in Russian-language education reflects ongoing 
demographic change: by 2013, 73 per cent of schoolchildren were Kazakh, 
while only 16 per cent were Russian. Yet as Figure 10.1 shows, the number 
of pupils studying in Russian has been gradually increasing again since 
2015 – which, given that the number of ethnic Russians continues to 
decline, means that ethnic Kazakhs and some minorities continue to choose 
a Russian-language education over a Kazakh-language one.
The broad rebalancing of the language of education in favour of 
Kazakh supports the policy of boosting Kazakh at the official level and in 
the media and cultural realm. This is complemented by Kazakhstan’s 
trilingual policy, which advocates English as the third language of 
education. Mentioned by Nursultan Nazarbayev in his address to the nation 
in 2007 and then codified in several official documents,41 this trilingual 





































































































































as in the Nazarbayev Intellectual Schools, with the (failed) hope of reaching 
40 per cent of schools by 2020.42 Not only was this roadmap obviously 
unrealistic in terms of time, but the push for trilingualism also dramatically 
weakens an already low-quality education. However, it does demonstrate 
how the Kazakhstani regime aims to artificially reduce the role of the 
Russian language by replacing it with English.
Norms and behaviours: a polarized generation
More than previous age cohorts, the Nazarbayev Generation is polarized 
in many of its norms, behaviours and values. This polarization is especially 
pronounced on issues related to so-called national traditions, especially 
those related to gender, which has become one of the fastest-evolving 
realms of identity worldwide. The relationship between genders is a 
central question for many youth, not only because they are at an age when 
gender identity takes a more ‘definitive’ form – in sexual orientation, 
marriage strategies and professional opportunities for women – but also 
because of the need to navigate contradictory cultural pressures. On the 
one hand, Kazakhstan has been re-traditionalizing gender roles: young 
people are expected to fulfil the roles conventionally associated with their 
genders and engage in the ‘proper’ behaviour for their cultural and social 
group.43 On the other hand, youth have become accustomed to cultural 
products from abroad in which traditional gender identities are often 
challenged or transgressed.44
Additionally, the value codes espoused by youths depend on 
whether they are urban or rural, whether or not they are accustomed to 
travelling abroad and being in contact with foreigners, and the regional 
contexts from which they come. Indeed, regional differences are strong 
in today’s Kazakhstan, with the western and southern regions remaining 
more traditional. Youth in Shymkent, for instance, are more conservative 
when it comes to issues associated with ethnicity – they position 
themselves less in favour of inter-ethnic marriages and of friendships with 
those from different ethnic groups, and prefer to associate with ethnic 
Kazakhs or Uzbeks over Russians – while youth in Astana and Almaty 
appear more cosmopolitan and more open to Russianness.45 However, 
their everyday interactions with ethnic Russians or Slavs in the urban 
environment also make young Kazakh urbanites more likely to insist on 
their ethnic identity than their rural counterparts.46
Moral conservatism dominates Kazakhstani society. Homosexuality 
is understood as a deviance and is disapproved of by 60 per cent of ethnic 
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Kazakhs (45 per cent of ethnic Russians), with one-third neutral and only 
3.4 per cent approving.47 Two-thirds of youths oppose abortion and think 
it should be illegal or authorized only for medical reasons.48 Preference is 
given to a traditional vision of family; women’s chastity is valued even if 
pre-marital sex is globally accepted. Many young ethnic Kazakhs would 
like three to five children, but without any preference for boys over girls.49 
About 20 per cent of ethnic Kazakhs (less among ethnic Russians) favour 
polygamy. One-third of youth neither condemn nor accept bride 
kidnapping, often excusing it as a ‘traditional’ norm. Young people are 
quite equally divided between those who consider men and women to 
have equal social roles and those who see the man as the breadwinner 
and head of the family. Globally, ethnic Kazakhs are more conservative 
than ethnic Russians, as are rural dwellers over urbanites. Yet some 
segments of youth do criticize their traditional patriarchal society, 
including their parents’ promotion of authoritarian behaviours at home, 
and challenge conservative norms by listening to music such as Q-pop 
band Ninety-One and hip-hop artist Scriptonite.
Religion is not directly associated with the re-traditionalization of 
gender norms, even if the two are often considered to be connected for 
those who link gender identity to Islamic values. On that matter, too, the 
Nazarbayev Generation is more polarized than their elders, with some 
groups advancing clear secular values and others promoting a more 
religious sensibility. A sizable majority of young people (80 per cent) 
consider themselves religious, would like to see religion play a bigger role 
in the country, and would welcome more religious education, but do not 
actively take part in any religious practices.50 Among youths, one also 
notes the rise of practices such as not drinking alcohol, fasting during the 
month of Ramadan and performing zakat (giving alms to the poor and 
needy), but religious duties such as daily prayer are performed only by a 
tiny minority (about 6 per cent).51
Religious identity is growing faster than religious practice: halal 
food and Islamic fashion have become ‘trendy’ in some circles.52 These 
new urban codes are particularly widespread among the middle classes 
involved in the private sector, for whom a bourgeois Islam goes hand-in-
hand with advancing Islamic business ethics and copycatting patterns 
inspired by globalized Emirati-style entrepreneurs.53 Social tensions 
within Muslim communities and in their interactions with secular 
segments of society are dominated by debates about female dress code, 
since the topic embodies issues of purity, morality, self-respect and the 
call for more control over a rapidly evolving society. References to Shari’a 
as religious orthodoxy, largely absent from Central Asian traditions, have 
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emerged: the share of Kazakhstani people who felt that it would be ‘very 
important’ for good government to adopt laws in line with Shari’a more 
than doubled between 2007 (5.45 per cent) and 2012 (13.04 per cent),54 
independent of age cohort.
Another factor accentuating this polarization has been the 
socioeconomic opportunities (or lack thereof) offered to young people. 
Officially, more than 96 per cent of working-age youth do work, but 
of these, 16 per cent are self-employed, making them vulnerable in terms 
of job stability.55 Moreover, about one-third of young Kazakhstanis of 
working age worked informally in 2017, without the protection of a 
labour contract, with lower wages and often in poor working conditions. 
Meanwhile, about 350,000 Kazakhstani youth have been found to be 
neither employed nor enrolled in any educational institution and are thus 
classified as NEET (not in employment, education, or training). This 
number has been growing since 2012, especially in the southern and 
western regions, indicating that many young people face the challenge of 
a skills mismatch: they lack the competencies that would make them 
attractive to employers.56 Globally, the rural/urban gap is even more 
pronounced for the Nazarbayev Generation than for older generations: 
rural exodus and migration to cities constitutes one of the main social 
transformations since the country’s independence, yet 43 per cent of 
youth still live in rural regions with noticeably less socioeconomic 
opportunities.
Some regions of Kazakhstan now constitute poverty pockets, in 
which prospects for youth are minimal. Petty crime thus presents itself as 
a path out of poverty for many youths (especially males) in search of a 
social role. As studied by Serik Beysembayev, cultural codes of masculinity 
and group solidarity among criminal networks and Islamic militant 
groups are quite similar, creating some capillarity between the two 
worlds.57 Research done by Noah Tucker and his team on Rudnik, 
Satpayev and Kengir, near Zhezkazgan, for instance, has shown how 
deteriorated local conditions have been a push factor for jihadist 
radicalization.58
On the other side of the spectrum, among the upper and middle 
classes, many young people have had a chance to study abroad. In 2018, 
almost 90,000 Kazakhstan students studied abroad, mostly in Russia 
(69,000), followed by Kyrgyzstan (almost 5,000), and then Turkey, the 
US, the UK and the Czech Republic, at between 1,500 and 1,900 apiece.59 
While in the minority, 13,000 were able to get Bolashak state scholarships 
for this study abroad, and these young people now constitute the country’s 
rising elite in state administration and big public and private firms.60 
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Wherever young people study abroad, a stay away from home often leads 
to a change in the components of their self-identification, obscuring some 
while reinforcing others. The repertoires of normalcy, in terms of both 
values and social practices related to gender issues, body language 
and family and community ties, may undergo important shifts. This 
negotiation is sometimes successful, leading to individual empowerment, 
but may fail if people believe cultural borrowings will be rejected by their 
native environment.61
Youth cultural ecosystems
Kazakhstani youth live in a highly connected world dominated by second-
generation social media such as Instagram, Telegram and WhatsApp.62 
Internet penetration has been growing rapidly: as of 2018, 80 per cent of 
the Kazakhstani population had access to the internet, and the country 
leads Central Asia for the number of mobile internet users (more than 
6 million active users via notebooks and smartphones) and for access to 3G 
and 4G.63 Of the approximately 125,000 Facebook users in Kazakhstan in 
2016, 45 per cent were aged 26 to 34 and 20 per cent were aged 18 to 24.64
YouTube plays a key role in shaping youth culture. In Kazakhstan, 
the most popular channel is the private music channel Gakku, which has 
1.4 million subscribers and 892 million views, followed by Seventh 
Channel, known for its Kazakh-speaking sitcoms, and Yuframe, which 
presents small video sketches, social videos and pranks, watched 
141 million times with over 635,000 subscribers.65 But Kazakhstani youth 
are also globalized through cultural consumption: US and European 
channels, movies and bands dominate, but Turkish, South Korean and 
Indian productions have been growing in popularity in recent years, 
especially among female viewers.66 Russian culture remains important, 
but it is no more than one of a plurality of both foreign and domestic 
products being consumed.
For the Nazarbayev Generation, finding the right balance between 
cultural authenticity and globalization is a central question. Indeed, 
Kazakhstani youth find themselves quite divided on critical components 
of identity. The norms of Kazakhness are still in the process of being 
defined and several contradictory trends create points of contention. We 
can observe this in the growing labelling of those who remain too close to 
Soviet/Russian references as sovki and the even more pronounced 
divisions between supposed nagyz and shala (see Chapter 9). 
Complementing this binary vision, young people have also developed 
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an interest in genealogical identifications as a way to discuss cultural 
differences within the Kazakh nation. References to the juz have always 
been present in everyday discourse and social interactions in Kazakhstan, 
but youth are now divided on the issue: half of them think that juz 
connections matter, while the other half do not.67 Youth interest has been 
shifting, in fact, toward sub-ethnic clan identities (Naiman, Kipchak, 
Zhetyru and so on), cultivated by growing folk literature and social media 
debates.
Youth cultural ecosystems are quite vibrant in Kazakhstan. A small 
but active segment of young people is devoted to creating a modern Kazakh 
culture that would be detached from Soviet legacies and Russian cultural 
influences, in tune with global trends, and connected to and inspired by 
Asia – be that South Korea, Japan, Singapore or Malaysia. Music often acts 
as the main vector for these new voices.68 Even Almaty’s small hipster 
community is delving into creating new original meanings for a globalized 
Kazakhness,69 and musical production excels at combining different cultural 
influences to produce a ‘fusion-type of lyrics and rhythms.’70 A whole range 
of artists are now using art, and especially street and performing arts, to 
create a new public space for the discussion of topics usually considered too 
sensitive, from historical memory and identity to gender and corruption.71 
While social activism and volunteering remain valued only by a small 
minority of young people, changes are on the way. Young people do not 
report interest in institutionalized politics, but may work horizontally with 
their peers: some young activists use social media to express political 
dissidence, criticize the everyday corruption of politicians and bureaucrats, 
promote urban activism and charitable activity, organize awareness 
campaigns about women’s rights or environmental issues and so on.72
In this youth ecosystem, nationalism occupies a larger space than it 
does for older generations. Symptomatically, part of the Nazarbayev 
Generation can also be described as the ‘Q-generation’, where Q stands 
for Qazaqstan, the Latinization of Kazakhstan. Through this highly 
symbolic change of letters, the Q-generation is making a strong statement 
in support of Kazakhstan moving away from Russia, turning toward Asia, 
and embracing its allegedly unique features.
The Nazarbayev Generation, or the end of  
‘post-Sovietism’
The Nazarbayev Generation displays genuine cultural pluralism. The 
question is, how can this translate into pluralism at the political and 
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institutional level? The Kazakhstani state administration is quite young 
on average, with more than 22,000 civil servants under the age of 30 in 
2014, but these young workers populate the administrative side of 
administration, not the decision-making level.73
That being said, the long-awaited rejuvenation of elite circles seems 
to have begun in the past few years. Several new, more youthful figures 
have taken up ministerial and mayoral posts:74 in 2019 Bauyrzhan Baibek 
(b. 1974) became mayor of Almaty, the first Bolashak to reach such a high 
level; Baglan Mailybayev (b. 1975) spent six years (2011–17) as vice-
president of the presidential administration; Maulen Ashimbayev 
(b. 1971), trained at Tufts University’s Fletcher School, was first deputy 
of the presidential party Nur Otan in 2018–19; and former mayor of 
Astana Aset Issekeshev (b. 1971), then head of the presidential 
administration.
The state-controlled media sector has been reinvigorated by the 
arrival of a team of young, nationalist-minded figures, such as Erlan Karin 
(b. 1976), who have dynamized media production, especially in Kazakh, 
and have reached out to the younger generation. Minister of Information 
and Communication Dauren Abayev (b. 1979) has become one of the 
government figures most active on social media. A rapper, ZAQ, even won 
a seat in Zhas Otan, the youth wing of Nur Otan. To complement that 
trend, former Press Secretary of Nur Otan Aleksandr Aksyutits has been 
appointed head of a new social media holding, Salem Social Media, 
indicating a recognition on the part of the state that it needs to learn to 
communicate with youth.
During the spring 2019 protests, a new generation of activists 
emerged, structured under the slogan ‘Oyan, Qazaqstan’ (Wake Up, 
Kazakhstan), a direct reference to Alash Orda and to one of its main poets 
and activists, Mirjaqip Dulatuli (1885–1935). Since then, Oyan, 
Qazaqstan has become a better-organized movement that has taken the 
lead on protests by myriad smaller, decentralized groups. Oyan, 
Qazaqstan checks all the boxes that would make it a classic example of 
urban liberalism among the middle and upper classes. It is most prevalent 
in the two capitals, Almaty and Astana/Nur-Sultan, with less represent- 
ation in provincial cities and probably no footholds at all in rural 
Kazakhstan. It brings together several leading figures, each of whom act 
in their own way, through social media, flashmobs, street art and so on. It 
relies heavily on social media: rooted in an Instagram campaign, it has 
originated several popular hashtags, including #QazaqKoktemi (Kazakh 
spring) and #MenOyandim (‘I woke up’), as well as the famous rallying 
cry ‘You cannot run from the truth’, displayed on the sidelines of a 
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marathon in Almaty just after Nazarbayev’s resignation. Among the 
movement’s main figures are pro-democracy activist Dimash Alzhanov, 
the artist Saule Suleimenova and her daughter Suinbike Suleimenova, 
the pop producer Anuar Nurpeisov, and Beybarys Tolymbekov, who 
originated the ‘You cannot run from the truth’ slogan.
Around these leaders are a few hundred young activists involved in 
a vibrant hipster culture that has thus far mobilized mainly around issues 
of urban management – from waste and traffic jams to new buildings and 
heritage preservation – and environmental protection. Since the 
beginning of the protests, urban and environmental issues have been 
supplemented by more political slogans around the notion of fair 
elections, the right to free speech and demonstration, respect for the 
Constitution, stopping illegal arrests and so on. As Kassymkhan Kapparov, 
an economist and member of the movement, explained during an 
interview, Oyan ‘has a focus on promoting universal democratic values 
and human rights. There is no political agenda other than changes to the 
current political system that would allow the exercise of such rights’.75
Contrary to the national-patriotic side of the spectrum, this trend is 
more liberal and cosmopolitan, seeking to articulate Kazakhness with 
globalization and ready to take from the West without ‘becoming’ the West. 
Even if it does focus on issues related to democratization and human rights, 
it would be premature or excessive to label Oyan, Qazaqstan a pro-Western 
movement, as it is mostly centred on domestic issues with no foreign policy 
strategy. But its political agenda is more or less clear: a parliamentary 
democracy, reform of the judicial system, the election of local akims to 
develop local governance, and the de-monopolization of the economy. 
Some of the Oyan, Qazaqstan leaders, such as Dimash Alzhanov, were 
trained in Europe and may thus be able to connect with the famous 
Bolashak generation. The values and worldviews of this generation remain 
to be studied in depth, but one might suspect that they will come up with 
an original combination of national and globalized features and leave their 
mark on the country in the years to come.
The spring 2019 protests have thus crystallized into two main 
trends: Jana Qazaqstan and Oyan, Qazaqstan. On one side, the national-
patriots have been trying – and thus far failing – to become agenda-setters 
inside the system; on the other, the more cosmopolitan and liberal groups 
active in the streets and on social media have been trying to influence the 
system from the outside. The groups thus show two possible directions for 
post-Nazarbayevian Kazakhstan and challenge the current political 
setup, which does not allow for widespread public participation in 
decision-making. Both push for a more nationalist, Kazakh-centric 
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agenda, although one is more isolationist and backward-looking and the 
other more cosmopolitan, globalized and forward-looking; one is focused 
on cultural rights and the other on more universal political rights.
Over the course of Nazarbayev’s three-decade reign, Kazakhstan has 
evolved from a post-Soviet republic facing the dilemma of a late and 
sudden independence to a nation with a new paradigm wherein the 
legacy of the Soviet Union has gradually receded and made room for new 
realities. First, Kazakhstan has succeeded in its Kazakhization; it is now 
the country of Kazakhs, in which ethnic minorities represent a declining 
part of the population. The old divide between the Russified urban world 
and the Kazakh-speaking rural world has been transformed. Rural 
dwellers have been moving to cities and confronting old urbanites with 
different cultural habits, and cities are progressively becoming a Kazakh-
dominated realm, both ethnically and linguistically. The issue of the 
‘Russianness’ of Kazakhstan’s northern regions is likewise gradually 
losing its political acuity, being replaced by points of contention within 
the Kazakh nation itself.
At stake for the Nazarbayev Generation will be not so much the 
defining of Kazakhness in opposition to the Soviet legacy, Russia, and 
Russian minorities, but the many internal nodes of tension inside 
Kazakhness. Many questions will have to be addressed by the younger 
generations: What will be the role of Oralmans as a ‘yardstick’ of a less 
Sovietized/Russified/cosmopolitan Kazakhness? How can a balance be 
found between western and southern Kazakhstan, on the one hand, and 
the rest of the country, on the other, given what seems to be a growing gap 
in values and rising economic disparities? What kind of legitimacy will 
Islam have in the public space? Will the mores and values of the country be 
based on ‘reinvented traditions’ and the search for cultural authenticity 
(especially in gender relations) or on more cosmopolitan worldviews and 
behaviours? Should Kazakhstan project itself as leading the Central Asian 
region or move toward the lonelier trajectory of Kazakh Eli, looking to 
Mongolia, South Korea or Singapore as its model? What political regime 
and political culture will this Nazarbayev Generation promote – a patronal 
regime with an improved, more efficient, technocratic culture or a more 
genuine plurality and institutional consolidation?
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Conclusion: The missing pieces of 
Central Asia’s nationhood puzzle
Post-colonialism and the issue of agency and victimhood
The main stumbling block of history-writing in independent Central Asia 
concerns the interpretation of Soviet rule as a form of colonialism. To 
date, although Central Asian official historiographies have engaged in 
surface criticism of the way in which the Soviets wrote national history, 
they have not undertaken any real revisionism: the methodological revolt 
of the former colony against the colonizer has not happened, and national 
historiographies remain deeply anchored within Russian and Soviet 
Orientalizing narratives.
The major moment of history to which Central Asian nation-builders 
could potentially refer as a historical alternative to the Soviet experience 
is the few decades stretching from the end of the nineteenth century to 
the 1930s. During that period, Central Asian national elites advanced 
well-articulated narratives about what they wanted for their nation and 
even proposed political projects that could serve as an alternative to 
incorporation into the Russian Empire/the Soviet Union, such as a union 
of Turkic nations. These initiatives, like the modernizing Alash movement 
among the Kazakhs and similar groups among the Uzbeks, Kyrgyz and 
Turkmens – as well as conservative efforts that had more religious-
oriented agendas – were necessarily branded as enemies of Soviet power 
by Soviet historiography.
Paradoxically, however, these movements were not easily rehabilit- 
ated after independence. During perestroika and the early 1990s, 
references to them helped nationalist groups rally support for their efforts 
to denounce local Soviet elites.1 Yet the majority of these nationalist 
circles expressed pan-Turkic (and sometimes pro-Turkey) solidarity and 
occasionally Islamic sensibilities that could not be accommodated by the 
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young Central Asian states, all of which insisted on their national 
sovereignty, uniqueness and secularism. Such nationalist dissidence was 
therefore quickly shut down by the ruling regimes – not because of its 
critical stance vis-à-vis Russia, but because it accused the local authorities 
of representing continuity with Soviet domination and its bureaucratic 
structures.2 But these dissident strands themselves failed to transform 
into genuine democratic movements, instead contributing to the 
rigidification of the identity markers on which post-communist elites built 
their legitimacy.3
Because of their political origins, then, the Central Asian regimes 
have largely disempowered their own historiographical efforts. For 
years, they have missed out on the opportunity to rehabilitate possible 
alternative histories, instead continuing to claim that the Soviet 
experience brought them an independence that they would not otherwise 
have secured. While this discursive line is entirely accepted in Kyrgyzstan 
and Tajikistan, where the Soviet regime is thanked for paving the way to 
independence, it is more controversial in the other three republics. The 
Turkmen, Uzbek and Kazakh regimes denounce Soviet colonialism, yet 
without openly promoting the few historical alternatives that existed – 
and without recognizing their own status as direct heirs of a Soviet regime 
they criticize for its colonialism.4
In recent years, however, the situation has been evolving, with the 
slow but progressive reintegration of some of the representatives of 
historic elites into the nation’s pantheon. The first move was made in 
Uzbekistan, where national communist figures were gradually 
rehabilitated by official historiography – although ‘cleansed’ of their pan-
Turkic and Islamist narratives.5 In Kazakhstan, too, we can observe the 
hesitant reintroduction of figures associated with Alash into the state-
validated pantheon through diverse commemoration performances, 
statuary and documentary films screened on national channels. The 
scholarly community, however, is still lacking a comprehensive study of 
the role of these national elites in developing alternatives to the Soviet 
project and on how their memory was transmitted during Soviet times 
before being instrumentalized to decolonize the national narratives.
The rehabilitation that these early twentieth-century national elites 
are enjoying today is indeed rooted in a broader phenomenon: the 
reformulation of local narratives of the Soviet experience through the 
prism of post-colonialism studies.6 Whereas 30 years ago it was difficult 
for Central Asian elites to accept any comparison with the ‘developing 
world’, younger generations are more inclined to see their experiences 
reflected in other post-colonial situations – such as India’s relationship 
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with the United Kingdom or those of some West African countries with 
France – and to accept comparison to the ‘Global South’ without feeling 
humiliated. A new generation of local experts has been socialized in 
international organizations working on development aid or financial 
assistance, thereby discovering that Asian and African countries have far 
more advanced debates on these questions. The ability to integrate 
Central Asia into the wider discussion on post-colonial conditions and to 
engage in systemic comparative case studies may help encourage a 
discussion rooted less in emotional reactions and more in social science.7
Inside, but also outside the classroom:  
what reception for national biographies?
Whatever the content of contemporary history textbooks and their 
possible move toward a more post-colonial approach, we are still missing 
some key elements necessary to understand their full influence. For 
instance, we know a lot about the underlying logic of textbook production, 
but less about textbooks’ reception by teachers and pupils. How are the 
texts taught? How much room for manoeuvre do teachers have in 
discussing the materials presented in textbooks? What really goes on 
inside the classroom? As each country has introduced one form or another 
of unified testing at the end of school/before entering university, teachers 
must follow a quite detailed calendar of how many hours must be devoted 
to each epoch and must train pupils to answer questions in a standardized 
way. Nevertheless, there is still some space for interpretation. Damira 
Umetbayeva’s study of history teachers in Kyrgyzstan shows, for example, 
that many educators, especially those from the older generation of Soviet-
educated personnel, try to transmit a more positive vision of the Soviet 
Union than is presented in today’s textbooks.8
Not only do we lack data on the impact of history textbooks on 
Central Asian pupils, but we also know very little about the relationship 
between textbooks and other narrations of the nation with which citizens 
come face-to-face in their daily lives. Textbooks are not the only state-
sponsored media: museums, statuary and toponymy are also deployed to 
display authorities’ vision of the past. Each capital city has been enriched 
by at least one new history museum (either an entirely new construction 
or the transformation of a Soviet predecessor) exhibiting the new 
narrative. Local museums in provincial cities have followed the same 
trend of ‘updating’ their discursive line. Museums often display a slightly 
different narrative than the one presented in textbooks: written texts are 
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more conservative and slower to evolve, while museology has greater 
opportunities to reshape itself. Perhaps, too, the room for innovation 
accorded by bureaucratic structures to museums is broader than that 
permitted to textbooks: traditionally, the censorship of texts has been 
more comprehensive than the censorship of visuals or artefacts, the 
interpretation of which is more malleable.
Urban landscapes have likewise been reshuffled, with massive 
changes to street and city names as well as the erection of statues aimed 
at erasing the Soviet past and promoting the new national pantheon. 
There are a few studies on these transformations, but they remain 
fragmented – focusing mostly on the changes of the 1990s or on a given 
city, especially Astana/Nur-Sultan9 – and we still lack a comprehensive 
understanding of the non-written toolkit for developing the national 
biography. More importantly, we know very little about who the different 
agents behind these transformations are. Even in authoritarian countries, 
the authorities are not monolithic: they are comprised of several layers of 
powers, vested interest groups and patrons who may have their own 
preferences regarding history-writing. Decision-making processes 
surrounding the installation and removal of statues, for instance, are 
surprisingly diverse, with numerous competing actors and bureaucratic 
logics.10
Investigating this local level would make it possible to take into 
consideration the diversity of urban contexts. In Kazakhstan, for instance, 
under pressure from activists trying to preserve the memory of local 
figures repressed during Soviet times, municipalities may choose to 
invest in new statuary or commemorative plaques. A whole memory 
industry – with sculptors, artists and construction firms that specialize in 
memorial complexes – has developed. We have learned about the public 
reception of these new urban objects thanks to research inspired by Pierre 
Nora’s notion of lieux de mémoire (sites of memory),11 ethnography of the 
state,12 and political geography works devoted to the subjective 
construction of space (including several studies on Akmola/Astana/
Nur-Sultan).13
What seems to emerge from the different sets of data is a more 
positive vision of Russia and the Soviet past than history textbooks and 
official state historiography would lead one to expect. We have less 
detailed research on Soviet nostalgia in Central Asia than in Russia, but a 
body of corroborating evidence makes it possible to capture broad trends. 
Timur Dadabaev’s research on memory of the Soviet Union in Central 
Asia, based on a series of unique interviews, highlights a nostalgia that 
textbooks usually ignore.14 While sociological data remain sparse and 
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insufficiently fine-grained, we can still elucidate that Russia enjoys a 
relatively positive image. For instance, the annual Gallup World Polls 
from 2006 to 2018, which surveyed four Central Asian countries – 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan – found that Russia 
had the highest approval rate of any country, with 80 per cent of Central 
Asians, on average, expressing approval of the Russian government, an 
approval rate far higher than that accorded to any other external actor.15
A series of 10 focus groups conducted in 2019 in Kazakhstan by the 
Strategiya Centre for Sociological and Political Analysis16 also confirm the 
persistence of Soviet-era narratives about history. For instance, when 
asked about the process by which the Kazakh Steppe joined the Russian 
Empire in the nineteenth century, the vast majority of participants 
reproduced the standard Soviet narrative of Kazakh hordes who were 
attacked by Dzhungars and therefore needed the protection of Russia, 
even if a plurality also held that the Russian tsars were engaged in a 
more cynical strategy of conquering the steppes. Yet all agreed that 
colonization had had complex results: the loss of national language, 
religion and independence, but also better access to education and 
technical knowledge.
When asked about the Soviet era, the majority of participants 
likewise reproduced the narrative that all Soviet nations were brothers 
and sisters under Russia’s leadership, with only a few denouncing the 
destruction of the Kazakh nation, collectivization, the exploitation of 
natural resources, nuclear tests in Semipalatinsk and so on. Asked about 
the Soviet Union in general, participants gave predominantly positive 
responses: the Soviet Union offered order, discipline, ideology, humanity, 
spirituality, free education and medicine, high-quality products and so 
on. However, nostalgia does not mean wishing for going back in time: 
when asked if they would like to return to that state of affairs, almost all 
participants were explicitly against the idea and expressed satisfaction 
with Kazakhstan being an independent nation.
A more refined sociology of Central Asian sociocultural con- 
stituencies would probably capture some of the missing nuances and 
allow us to differentiate between the attitudes of different social groups. 
For instance, the fact that the teaching profession does not attract many 
young people (who see teaching as a last resort for those without any 
other job opportunities) and remains dominated by an older generation 
trained in the Soviet period probably causes teachers to be more ‘pro-
Soviet’ than other sociocultural groups. Artemy Kalinovsky’s research on 
massive developmental projects in Tajikistan similarly depicted a universe 
of engineers and technical professions who remain deeply committed to 
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the Soviet modernizing project.17 The largely Sovietized/Russified urban 
educated elites also tend to display a decisively positive vision of the 
Soviet decades, as they perceive the new, more ethnicized and nationalist 
environment to be inhospitable to them.18 Perceptions of the past appear 
closely linked to one’s personal situation and a nostalgic vision of a time 
when one’s own profession or social identity was more highly valued.
Non-state-produced tools of narrating the nation
State-sponsored products related to the national biography must compete 
with non-state tools that belong more to the memory field than to the 
domain of history/historiography. Indeed, there are many forms of ‘public 
history’, defined here as any communication about the past crafted 
outside the traditional circles of academia and political elites – that is, 
with little or no input from professional historians. These imaginational 
registers may be just as powerful as history textbooks, if not more so, but 
they have remained largely overlooked in academic research.
Memory studies in Central Asia remain a largely underexplored 
field for research. We know that family memory remains the most efficient 
tool for transmitting the past – what parents and grandparents say at 
home may have a greater impact than what is taught at school because it 
is emotionally contextualized.19 For instance, research conducted in 
Russia on family memories of Stalinist violence has confirmed that people 
who belong to families that were repressed during the Soviet era exhibit 
a more critical stance toward current politics and are more concerned 
about issues related to the politics of history than individuals who do 
not.20 Both having a relative who was arrested unjustly and then executed, 
sent to a camp, or disappeared in the 1930s and having had discussions 
about the Stalinist repressions at home are strongly and consistently 
correlated with greater desire for historical knowledge, less cynicism 
about the knowability of history, and opposition to prioritizing national 
pride over historical objectivity.21 As yet, there are no such studies of 
family memory in Central Asia, even at the elite level.
Interpretation of the past is also an intrinsic part of the imaginary 
world of art and fiction. How can we, for example, measure the role that 
Soviet-era films, regularly shown on Central Asian channels, play in 
shaping a vision of the past that may contradict what is written in the new 
textbooks? What about the impact of historical movies and series 
produced since independence, which are more fictional and romanticized 
than the official line taken by textbooks? Even less is known about the 
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impact of video-game culture on younger generations’ vision of the past. 
Research conducted in Europe and the United States has demonstrated 
the impact of personal identification with fictional characters in 
historically documented or more controversial settings.22 The ‘dryness’ of 
history textbooks, which are dominated by boring texts heavy on dates 
and names, may mean that they are not an efficient tool for moulding new 
generations, who have grown up in a world of visuality, interactivity and 
immediate impressions.
Finally, while non-state actors cannot impact official history 
textbooks, they can invest in the field of public history. ‘Popular history’ 
or ‘folk history’ has been growing in Central Asia ever since the collapse 
of the Soviet Union, particularly in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, where the 
media market has historically been freer and where publications from 
Russia are distributed widely. Nationalist-oriented folk history has been 
quite successful in spreading an epic vision of the past not fully in line 
with more sober history textbooks. While it is difficult to gauge the impact 
of folk history, as we lack data on its circulation, anecdotal evidence 
confirms that it is widespread among the urban educated middle classes 
and student communities.
In Kazakhstan, for instance, the trilogy Kochevniki (Nomads) by the 
poet Ilias Esenberlin (1915–83) has shaped how generations of Kazakhs 
picture the nomadic Kazakh world of the fifteenth through nineteenth 
centuries. The same can be said of Zhestokii vek (Cruel Century) by the 
Buryat writer Isai Kalashnikov (1931–80), which describes Genghis 
Khan’s rule and whose publication in 1979 struck a chord with the Turkic-
speaking Soviet world. Lev Gumilev and Murad Adzhi also participated in 
this rehabilitation of Steppic history. In the 2000s, there emerged another 
form of folk history, related to traditional genealogical and clanic 
identities. This popular history, as well as popular philology, should not 
be dismissed as an object of study, as it allows individuals to construct a 
vision of Central Asia’s agency in a way accessible to all.23
This popular public history gained new allies with the emergence of 
a more vocal national opposition that seeks to promote alternative 
biographies of the nation. As mentioned, alternative historical 
interpretations had existed in competition with those of the state during 
perestroika and the early years of independence, but they were rapidly 
marginalized and repressed, with the result that they did not reach a 
wider audience. Almost three decades later, the situation has evolved 
dramatically. While Central Asian governments remain strong proponents 
of bilateralism, it is now in good taste to express at least symbolic support 
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for regional cooperation, especially since the onset of the 2016 Uzbek 
political thaw. Secularism remains the official discursive line, but reality 
has become much more complex: with the rise of Islamic identity and 
piety among Central Asians,24 especially among the younger generations, 
the regimes realize that they must acknowledge cultural evolutions and 
embrace them rather than confront them.
A new generation of public intellectuals has also emerged. The use 
of social media allows them to reach a broader audience than the narrow 
literary circles of the perestroika years. They frequently defend ethno-
nationalist views that have a strong Turkic component, celebrating the 
greatness of Turkic civilization and the unique role of their own nation 
within it. But they do not profess pan-Turkism in the sense of calling for 
political unity among the Turkic peoples, and they are even less interested 
in espousing Erdoğan’s Turkey as a model for emulation. Unlike their 
predecessors of the early post-independence years, these public 
intellectuals have been able to find a middle ground in their relations with 
the authorities. They position themselves as a kind of ‘constructive 
opposition’, just as Russian nationalists orient themselves toward the 
Putin regime: depending on the situation, they may either support the 
regime as the protector of the nation or else criticize it. In the latter case, 
they may face administrative difficulties or even arrest, but even when 
they come into conflict with the regime, these nationalist intellectuals 
usually receive gentler treatment by the authorities than do pro-Western 
human rights defenders. They all benefit from the presence of patrons 
inside the system who share their nationalist vision, while their middle-
of-the-road position allows them to continue to exist even in a relatively 
restrictive political environment.
One example of the difficulty of reconciling official historiography 
with nationalist alternatives was the 2016 centenary of the 1916 Steppe 
Revolt. The celebration mobilized nationalist groups and all those who 
wanted to have an open and frank discussion about the uprising. The 
Kazakh and Kyrgyz authorities struggled to decide whether to meet these 
demands in order to satisfy this segment of their constituencies – as well 
as, in the case of Kazakhstan, to demonstrate autonomy from Moscow – or 
to repress them as a threat to relations with Russia.
The new generation of nationalist public intellectuals have also 
succeeded in blending old-fashioned perestroika-era claims about the 
destruction of the national languages and the supposed genocidal policies 
of the Soviet regime with more modern debates about globalization as a 
threat to sovereignty and the hidden hands manipulating world affairs – a 
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narrative usually underpinned by anti-Semitism and claims that the 
‘national gene pool’ is being destroyed by Western pro-LGBT+ policies. 
These narratives thus target not only Russia, as the former imperial 
centre, but also – and sometimes even to a greater degree – China and the 
West, whose presence in the region is seen as a new form of imperialism. 
These narratives are perfectly adapted to the ‘confrontainment’ social 
media environment in which the average citizen consumes news and 
accesses broader debates: they focus on conflict rather than compromise; 
they rely on emotions, polarization and stereotyping for storytelling; and 
they deploy negative content, incivility, conspiratorial explanations and 
character attacks. These intellectuals leave a powerful mark on public 
perceptions of the national biography that partly contradicts the official 
discursive line.
Last but not least, one of the key drivers of official nationhood in 
Central Asia has been the marginalization, if not sometimes the 
silencing, of Islam. Like nation, religion is not a given but a construct, 
one that articulates itself along with other aspects of life. It can take on 
multiple forms and identities, from being a purely transcendental faith 
in God to being an ideological ferment for political action, including 
diverse cultural, community and history-based phenomena that help 
people to situate themselves in the world. Understood both as 
universalist religion and as national tradition, Islam can both compete 
with and reinforce nationhood, projecting different Selves and 
Others. The interaction between religion and the nation can therefore 
go from symbiosis (the nation is defined by its majority religion and 
religion can be only a national tradition), through mutual indifference 
(secularism as state ideology and Islam as apolitical religion), to open 
or hidden conflict (Islam as a threat to the nation, or political Islam as 
alternative to the current logic of nationhood and as expressing a 
preference for a globalized Ummah). In Central Asia’s nationhood, 
Islam has historically been the main ignored identity marker, but that 
situation is currently in flux. The need to fully reintegrate Islam into 
efforts to craft nationhood will become increasingly apparent in the 
coming years and decades.
All these elements lead to Central Asian societies becoming 
increasingly plural and their citizens having increasingly heterogeneous 
perceptions of what should constitute the national biography. Whereas 
they were previously state-centric, hegemonic and consensual, Central 
Asian nationhoods are now gradually coming to be shaped by plurality 
and heterogeneity in terms of ideological content, actors, and forms of 
co-creation.
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